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AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

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AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

BY

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"SOCIOLOGY AND MODERN SOCIAL PROBLEMS," ETC.

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PREFACE

THE psychological study of the social life will probably continue to be known as "social psychology," though the author would prefer to call it "psycho-sociology," or "psychological sociology." Although only half of the total field of theoretical sociology, it is, from the standpoint of practice, by far the most important half, since the solution of all social problems must start with the control of the psychic elements involved. Accordingly, it has seemed to the author that a simple statement of the bearings of modern psychological theories upon the problems of social organization and evolution may be useful as a basis for the construction of general sociological theories, and as an introduction to sociology and the social sciences in general.

A word may be advisable as to the relation of this text to the author's "Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects." In general, it is a simplification and systematization of the theories presented in the latter work, but statements have been brought down to date, a new phrasing has been adopted and new points of view have been developed. The general point of view of this text, however, remains the same as that of the former work; namely, that the explanation of social phenomena is to be sought in the underlying traits and dispositions of the individual, in the influences of the environment which act upon his plastic nature, and in the resultant aims and standards which he develops.

Especial attention has been paid to recent methods developed in psychology and sociology. As regards "objectivism," while the author holds to the objective method in the

broad sense of the term and believes that objective terms should always be preferred to subjective terms in social description, when it is possible to employ the former without ambiguity or loss of clearness, yet he also holds that a radical objectivism in the social sciences is, from the nature of the phenomena with which they deal, impossible for several reasons:[1]

(1) Society is itself essentially an intersubjective relation. In other words, there is no society between two individuals, in the ordinary sense of the term, unless there is a relationship between their minds. A sociology written in purely physical or objective terms would no longer be a sociology in the full sense; for the social life is essentially psychic, and sociology essentially a psychological science.

(2) In the explanation of human society a purely objective sociology is especially bound to be deficient because civilized man lives in an *ideational* rather than in a *perceptual* world. The socio-psychic process which we call human culture, or "the social mind," and which has been in process of gradual formation for thousands of years, has become so important in the social life of civilized man that an attempt to interpret that life in terms of a sheer objectivism would be sheer nonsense.

(3) A purely objective statement of social processes would in practice lead to a denial of the importance, in the social life, of centrally initiated psycho-neural processes in the individual. The existence of such centrally initiated processes seems beyond question in psychology. To describe them in purely physical or physiological terms would be of no advantage to the social sciences, since the names for their psychic correlates are much better known and understood. In practice, objectivism in the social sciences would

[1] The author has treated this matter more at length in an article in the *American Journal of Sociology* for November, 1916.

mean simply some form of physical environment determinism.

(4) A practical objection to a statement of social processes in purely physical terms would be that such a statement, even if theoretically possible, would smack of academic pedantry. It seems to the author highly desirable that the social sciences should avoid, so far as possible, the development of an over-specialized scientific terminology, and should express themselves whenever possible, if sufficient accuracy can be attained, in ordinary language.

(5) However, the author has endeavored, so far as possible, to use such objective terms as activity, habit, adaptation, stimulus, response, and the like, whenever they were adequate for his purposes, reserving subjective terms, such as feeling, intelligence, valuation and the like, only for those central processes whose statement in objective terms, even if possible, would gain nothing for clearness. He believes that this is the true scientific procedure. For this reason, he has also often used such terms as "group," and "group life" where "society" and "social life" might seem ambiguous, and he has attempted as objective a definition as possible of the term "social." In general, he has tried faithfully to follow the best psychological and sociological usage in such matters.

To make his point of view in social psychology still clearer, the author will quote at length the words of an eminent psychologist. Professor Hugo Münsterberg, in speaking of the social psychologist and his problems in a recent work, made the following statement:[1]

"His interests naturally refer to two aspects. He asks how the real social groups become organized, and, secondly, how these organizations work. His problems are the structure and the development of society. But we must not for-

[1] "Psychology, General and Applied," pp. 265–269.

get that the social functions which we studied are not the only activities which enter into the functioning of the social group. The individual differences of men, their mutual approach, their submission and self-assertion secure the organization and through it the working of society, but they are certainly not the only events which are involved in the life of the social group. The individual does not cease to stand in the midst of nature when he enters the social group. His personal life with all its reactions toward the non-social world is necessarily included in the group as a whole. The development of the human aggregate in its complex form includes, therefore, the individual processes as much as the strictly social processes.

"But we must consider one more factor of utmost importance. It may be brought to sharpest relief, if we *compare the social mind with the individual mind.* Such a comparison is not meant as a metaphor. It is a true, far-reaching analogy, an account of really corresponding processes, and a careful tracing of the similarities can help us to understand the one through the other. In our individual consciousness the elements were the sensations and their combination was effected in the mind by association, their superordination and subordination by reënforcement and inhibition. In the social mind the elements are the individuals; their combination is secured by their approach and intercourse, their superordination and subordination by submission and self-assertion. The unity of personality in the individual mind finds its analogy on the social side in the unity of the social group, ultimately of human civilization as a whole.

"Moreover, we have on both sides *an analogous physiological basis* for the mental process. Each mental element in the individual is based on the action of a brain cell, and these brain cells are connected with one another by cellipetal and cellifugal fibers. In a corresponding way the element

of the social group, the personality, has as its physiological basis the whole individual brain, and these brains are connected with one another through the centripetal and centrifugal parts of the bodies. Each neuron of the central nervous system has its receiving nerve fibers by which it is stimulated from other cells, and its transmitting fibers by which it sends its messages to other cells, but no two cells are grown together. They are only in such neighborhood that the excitation of one can stir up and communicate excitation to the next. The analogy is evident; two individuals are never grown together. There is a "synapsis" between any two brain neurons, and the same "synapsis" between any two social neurons. But in all communication and intercourse the individual transmits by his motor apparatus, his muscles, and the next receives by his sensory apparatus, his sense organs.

"So far the analogy is simple. But the social psychologist who carried the comparison no further would leave out two elements of the individual process which we recognized as fundamentally important for the understanding of the psycho-physical mechanism. Only if we trace the counterparts of those two factors can we arrive at a true, psychological understanding of organization and development in the social group. We recognized firstly that the interplay of the elements in the individual mind can never be understood as long as only the direct connections between the psycho-physical processes are considered. All the life experiences of the individual are preserved in dispositions of brain cells which are acting without conscious accompaniment. They shape our decisions, they represent our knowledge, they make our lips speak before we have the words in consciousness. In short, all the actions of our mind consist not only of the mutual influence of the mental elements, but still more of the coöperation of those brain cells through which the million-fold psycho-physical short

cuts are established and which outside of consciousness perform the services of mental connections. They remember for us; they think for us; they will for us.

"We have a perfect analogy to this situation in the objective elements of mental communication between individuals. A letter, a newspaper, a book, exists outside of the individuals themselves, and yet it intermediates between two or between millions of persons in the social group, just as a not conscious cell process intermediates between two neurons. The book remembers for the social group, and the experiences of the group, objectively recorded in it, shape the social action and the social thought. The letter can connect any distinct social neurons; the paper may distribute the excitement from one point of the social group to millions of others. Every objectified expression becomes a social short cut. As any psycho-physical explanation of the individual mental life must give attention to those unconscious brain processes, the explanation of the social mind necessarily involves the objectified records of experience and suggestions which intermediate between individuals. They are an organic part of the psycho-physical mechanism of the social group.

"Yet the second factor is no less important. The individual's mind cannot be understood as long as only the interconnection of the brain cells is considered, even if the not conscious cell activities are added. We have put the chief emphasis on the further fact that the psycho-physical brain function is always the starting point for external action. Those millions of brain cells are coöperating in producing muscle contractions and gland activities and blood-vessel changes; and they themselves are again influenced by these external results. The brain cells cause the contraction of the muscles in the arms or fingers, and these contracted muscles awake new sensations in the brain cells.

The interplay of the mental states demands this constant reference to the products outside of the brain.

"We have the analogous process in the productions of the social group. They evidently take the form of the *social institutions*. The millions of individuals coöperate in producing the institutional civilization; the administrative and the legal institutions, the educational and the religious institutions, the economic and the technical institutions, result from the action of the social neurons. But every change produced in these institutions has its influence on the social group itself. It is a constant interchange between the organized group of individuals and their institutional products. If we were to carry the action theory to its social consequence, we should say, moreover, that not only does the resulting institution become the source of influences on mankind, but that the production itself changes the producers, just as the motor impulse in the individual shades the sensory process from which it starts. The subconscious brain processes, and the peripheral bodily processes outside of the brain, are the two great classes of activities which are essential for the explanation of the individual mind. In exact correspondence the functions of the intermediating records and the functions of the institutional products are the two great realities outside of the individuals, without which the social mind cannot be explained. The mere associationism must be overcome in social psychology, just as much as in individual psychology."

I have cited this passage at length, because it so nearly states my own viewpoint in approaching the problems of the social life, and also because I hope that its citation may help to prevent misunderstandings of the position of the text at certain points.

It will be noted that an earnest endeavor has been made, in this text, not to take sides on metaphysical doctrines.

The author is convinced that scientific social theory should be so formulated that it will fit in with any reasonable metaphysics whatsoever. As long as metaphysical presuppositions continue to influence our statements of social facts and tendencies in sociology and social psychology, so long will radical disagreements continue to manifest themselves among sociologists and social psychologists.

While the discussions of the text are mainly theoretical, with a minimum of illustration, yet an abundance of references to concrete material for the use of the student will be found in the footnotes, with suggestions for collateral readings. At the end of each chapter also will be found a list of references, the first named of which is especially commended for reference in connection with the chapter. Chapters I-III are intended to be introductory; Chapters IV-VIII contain the central theories of the book; while Chapters IX-XIV develop certain principles and points of view not adequately developed in the central portion of the text.

The author wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness not only to all his colleagues in sociology and social psychology in general, but especially to Dr. W. H. Pyle, Assistant Professor of Educational Psychology in the University of Missouri; to Dr. L. L. Bernard, Assistant Professor of Sociology in the University of Missouri; to Dr. W. I. Thomas and to Dr. R. E. Park, Professors of Sociology in the University of Chicago; all of whom have read portions of the manuscript and made valuable suggestions. I have also to thank Professor Bernard and Mr. C. C. Taylor, of the Department of Sociology of the University of Missouri, for assistance in the reading of the proof.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD.

University of Missouri,
December, 1916.

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AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

CHAPTER I

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, ITS RELATIONS AND METHODS

THE NATURE OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES. All science is an effort to understand the mechanism, or technique, of concrete processes. Its problem is to show how forces make the world of experience what it is from moment to moment. But in its endeavor to explain things science takes the common sense point of view. It does not question the reality of the phenomena or processes which it studies. Its endeavor is simply to account for phenomena by observing all the conditions which seem to be in any way connected with their appearance. Any phenomenon is explained scientifically when all of the conditions essential to its appearance are fully described.

Now, it has been supposed by some that science is limited to the description or explanation of the phenomena of physical nature; and it even has been often denied that the so-called mental and social sciences are true sciences at all. But, if the method of science is what we have just stated it to be, it is evident that there is no essential difference in method between the so-called natural sciences and the social sciences. The effort of the social sciences is also to understand the mechanism, or technique, of the processes of social life. Their endeavor is also to explain phenomena by describing fully all the conditions essential to their appearance. Like the natural sciences they have to adhere to the common

sense point of view. They cannot question the reality of either physical or mental processes, or of mental interactions between individuals, because that would be to take a critical attitude toward the phenomena which they study and to question the reality of their subject matter.

Social Psychology and Sociology. Starting, then, with the common sense view of the world, both sociology and social psychology seek to show how certain conditions or forces make our social life what it is from moment to moment. Both aim to make human society and its changes intelligible. How, then, do they differ from each other? Is there a place for both? And what are their relations?

Sociology, as its name implies, is a theory of the social life, not simply of one of its phases, but of the social life as a whole. We may define it, for our purposes, as *the science which deals with the origin, development, structure and function of the reciprocal relations of individuals.*[1] In other words, it deals with the whole evolution and organization of our social life, endeavoring to get a theory of its conditions and changes as a whole. Human institutions, human achievement and civilization are not to be understood, sociology insists, by being studied as things apart, but only as products of social evolution. Industry, government, religion and morality, in order to be understood scientifically, must, therefore, be related to the general theory of social evolution and organization. Just as the theory of organic evolution is the necessary foundation for any right development of the biological sciences, so the theory of social evolution, the sociologist holds, is the necessary foundation for the proper development of the social sciences. Like the theory of organic evolution, the theory of social evolution is an indispensable instrument for the advancement of

[1] For a discussion of the various definitions of sociology, see the author's "Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects," D. Appleton & Company, 1912, pp. 1–8.

science. The sociologist, then, with the problem of the mechanism of social evolution as his chief concern, occupies the central point in the field of social sciences.[1]

But what is social evolution? Undoubtedly, the phrase, as ordinarily used, usually means the evolution of civilization or "culture," the development of the arts and institutions of civilized human life. But the sociologist finds that social evolution began long prior to human civilization; that it is something much larger than mere cultural evolution. The animals below man, for example, can scarcely be said to have civilization, or to have passed through even the rudimentary stages of cultural evolution; but many of them have a relatively highly developed social life, complex forms of association and of group organization. The simpler and more rudimentary forms of human social life are clearly in evidence among them. Indeed, when we take such primary forms of association as those between parents and children, or between the sexes, we see that their beginnings were coeval with the origin of the higher types of animal life. Social evolution is thus seen to be more nearly synonymous with the evolution of groups of living organisms than with the evolution of human culture, even though this latter phase of social evolution may be the part which is most interesting to us. Speaking purely objectively, social evolution may be characterized, then, as an evolution of coadaptive activities between relatively independent individuals.

Now, what has psychology to do with all of this and with sociology? Is not sociology rather more closely dependent upon biology? The answer is that, so far as we can discover, there is no complex evolution of group life until mind appears. There are, to be sure, groups or colonies of

[1] For collateral reading on the relation of sociology to the other social sciences, see the author's "Sociology and Modern Social Problems," Chap. I; or "Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects," pp. 29–55.

plants and of other low organisms to which we have no right to attribute any degree of mental life throughout the organic world; but the degree of organization to which these attain is usually of the simplest sort, being based upon close physiological or ecological interdependence. As soon as mentality appears, however, interdependence of another sort is possible, and another sort of group or collective life appears, which adds to mere physiological interdependence psychic interstimulation and response.

Now, as we shall see, it is this latter form of group life, characterized by some degree of mental interaction, which is worthy of the name of social life. Mental evolution must accordingly be regarded as antecedent in some degree to social evolution. Psychology as the study of the mental life becomes, therefore, the indispensable scientific basis for the study of the social life. Much of the explanation which sociology gives of the mechanism of social processes must be, accordingly, in terms of mental interstimulation and response and of the genesis of mental processes. This part of sociology is essentially psychological and may well be termed social psychology, or, perhaps, more accurately psychological sociology. It is this interpretation of our social life in terms of mental interaction which will concern us in this book.

Social psychology is, however, we must note, often used in a much broader sense as a study of all of the reciprocal relations exercised by the group and the individual upon one another. In this sense social psychology would include the study of both the social aspects of individual consciousness and the mental aspects of association. It is the latter, however, with which we shall chiefly concern ourselves. We mean by social psychology, then, for the purpose of this book, the psychology of associational processes, or, a psychology of the social life. The study of the social aspects of individual consciousness we shall consider a part of in-

dividual psychology, while the study of the mental aspects of association, of the functioning of mental processes in social life, we shall endeavor to show is the most fruitful and at present the most practically important part of sociology. Let us now note why sociology must depend upon psychology for its principles in attempting to explain the origin, development, structure and function of the forms of the social life.[1]

The Social Life Essentially Psychical. That the social life is essentially psychical admits of no doubt, even upon the most searching investigation. We cannot think of society in any intelligible sense in which we use the term without reference to consciousness. Moreover, when we study all of the elements which go to make up the social life we find them to be either conscious processes or closely associated with conscious processes. Any situation in the social life of humanity, for example, will be found upon analysis to consist of conscious activities, mental attitudes, ideas, feelings, beliefs, interests, desires, values and the like. Customs, usages, traditions, social standards, civilization itself, all alike resolve themselves into elements which are essentially psychical. We cannot, indeed, think of human institutions and of human history as existing apart from consciousness. This does not mean, however, that society is purely a psychic fact. It is only saying that, even from the standpoint of natural science, however primordial physical and biological elements may be in social life, they are not that which constitutes it. It is the psychic element which is the constituent principle of social life.[2] Otherwise, the cells of our body would form a society.[3] Mere physiological interdependence is then not sufficient to consti-

[1] *Cf.* "Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects," pp. 58–63.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 11–14.

[3] That some sociologists have regarded multicellular organisms as "societies" surely does not make them such. Such a view, aside from its scientific difficulties, does not accord with any of the established uses of the word in ordinary speech.

tute society; but society is that form of collective life which is carried on by means of mental interaction.

From Comte down, most sociologists have recognized that *it is the psychic element which constitutes the social.* A few, however, have endeavored to make physiological interdependence between individuals the constitutive principle of society. They have landed in such absurdities as making a biological organism a form of society, or even a host and its parasites! A few other sociologists have attempted to make some specialized form of the psychic the constitutive principle of society, such as suggestion, imitation, sympathy and the like. These sociologists would generally limit society to humanity. While their position may seem more tenable than that of those who would make some physical or biological principle the basis of their sociology, yet they are in equally great difficulties when they attempt to make such a principle as imitation, for example, interpret the whole of the social life. We cannot say, therefore, that the criterion of the social is "contract" or "imitation" any more than we can say that it is physiological or economic interdependence. Rather, we must conclude that the main line of development of sociological thought has, on the whole, been right, and that the criterion of the social is *interdependence in function on the mental side.* It is intermental life in a group of individuals which makes possible social life. While there is no excuse for the one-sided conclusion that intermental life is the whole of social life, yet, on the other hand, we must recognize that the former is the essential and constitutive principle of the latter.

It is mental interaction, or the functional interdependence of individuals on the psychic side, then, which constitutes society. Whether we define society, in a concrete sense, as a national group, a cultural group, or any social group of animals or men, it is the mental element in the life of the group which makes it a society. But this mental ele-

ment is functional to the collective life. It is an instrument by which the collective life is carried on. It is not society itself, for that is the collective life of the group which is carried on by means of this mental element. If a formal definition of society is desired, perhaps as good a working definition as we can get is to say that, in the concrete sense, *a society is any group of individuals who carry on a common life by means of mental interaction.*[1] If there are temporary or partial associations which we call societies, but which this conception does not seem to fit, they are, nevertheless, always found within the larger, more permanent groups, and their inclusion or exclusion from a formal definition of society is of no scientific importance. It is important, however, that our definition should be broad enough to include both animal and human groups; for in searching for the beginnings of social evolution we shall have to turn to animal life.

If we turn again to social evolution, we remember that at its least definition it is an evolution of coadaptive activities in a group of relatively independent individuals. However, we do not ordinarily speak of such evolution as social when it is unaccompanied by any manifestations of consciousness, as in groups of interdependent vegetable organisms; but only when we conceive of the activities as mediated and controlled by conscious processes in some form. It is, in particular, some degree of reciprocal consciousness of one another on the part of the individuals of the group which we demand for the establishment of social relations. Now, how far down such consciousness goes in the scale of animal life it is impossible to say with exactness. But the most

[1] In accordance with this definition the word "social" should mean *of, or pertaining to, a group of individuals who carry on a common life by means of mental interaction.* It is consequently inclusive of all phases of group life. This is the recognized scientific meaning of the word, and there seems to be little reason for coining a new technical word, such as "societal."

ordinary observation establishes the fact that many of the instincts of the higher animals develop socially — that is, they are stimulated only by some sort of consciousness of the presence of other individuals of the same species.[1] Such consciousness is required especially for the development of the typically human instincts, while the *acquired* uniformities in all human groups, upon which the structure of civilization is built, are notoriously brought about by such psychic processes as suggestion, imitation and sympathy. Approaching social life thus from the standpoint of evolution we discover again that it is essentially psychic in its methods; and that a psychological explanation, therefore, is necessary to understand its processes. If a purely objective sociology, that is, a sociology wholly in terms of physiological interstimulation and response, were possible, it would be meaningless to us. A scientific description of social life, and particularly of human social life, must be in terms of conscious processes if it is to be intelligible to us. The psychological part of sociology, that is, social psychology, it is evident, therefore, is its most important and fruitful part; while psychology itself is the chief antecedent science from which sociology must obtain its principles of interpretation. This latter statement, however, must not be understood to mean that it is not equally legitimate in certain parts of sociology to make use of the principles of other antecedent sciences, especially of biology, in scientific interpretation.

The Problems of Social Psychology. It is evident that the sociologist studies primarily the associational processes which lie back of the forms of the social life. The social psychologist, in the sense in which we shall use the term, consequently, will study the psychic factors, that is, the states of consciousness and the neural processes which

[1] *Cf.* McDougall: "Introduction to Social Psychology," pp. 93, 94.

accompany those states,[1] which enter into or affect associational processes. More briefly, the social psychologist studies the psychical interactions of individuals.[2] These may range from the simplest forms of interstimulation and response to such definitely developed forms as communication, suggestion, imitation, sympathy and reflective coöperation or conflict. Not until the social psychologist studies these forms of mental interaction, however, with reference to their bearing upon the objective forms of the social life can he be said to reach the truly sociological plane; for the aim of the sociologist is always to reach a theory of the objective social life. To this extent the social psychologist may fall short of being a true sociologist, although if he carries his generalizations far enough he necessarily becomes one. In any case, the unit of investigation, then, in both sociology and social psychology, so far as the latter concerns itself with the social life, is always some phase of the associational process, the social psychologist studying this process on its psychic side.

The sociologist and the social psychologist, then, study the more general and fundamental social phenomena. The economist, the political scientist and the student of other

[1] The student of social life has no need to take sides in the quarrel between "psycho-physical parallelists" and "interactionists." This question is a metaphysical one, and should not be allowed to obtrude itself in science. Besides, according to the hypothesis of psycho-physical parallelism each conscious state and its corresponding neural process are exact correlates. It makes no practical difference, therefore, whether one term or another is used to describe the whole process. *In this book,* accordingly, *when subjective terms like "mind," "feelings," "ideas," "beliefs," "values," psychical processes, etc., are used, it must be understood that the correlated neural processes are included in those terms,* unless we expressly state otherwise.

[2] This must not be taken to mean that the social psychologist studies only the *temporary* relations between the individuals of a group, as has been recently suggested, and not the permanent relations. Note carefully the argument of the next few pages.

social sciences, on the other hand, study the relatively more specialized social phenomena, and often what may be called social products, rather than social processes. However, this distinction between the subject matter of sociology and of the special social sciences must not be taken as absolute; for the real distinction between sciences, let us not forget, is always a distinction in problems. The problems of sociology and social psychology on the one hand, and of the special social sciences on the other, we shall see, are entirely distinct. Let us see what the problems of sociology are.

The time honored division in the problems of sociology is the distinction into *static* and *dynamic* problems. The static problems, from the point of view of psychology, reduce themselves to problems of the types of interaction, and so of organization, found among the individuals of a given group under given circumstances. They are problems of a hypothetically stationary society; that is, one in which the types of interaction, and so the forms of social life, do not change. The dynamic problems, on the other hand, are those of changes in the types of interaction between individuals, and so in the types of social organization and activity. They cover the whole field of social evolution, from the genesis of the simplest forms of association to the latest changes in human social life. The problem of social evolution, indeed, is the central and most important problem of pure sociology. Just as in biology the central problem is organic evolution, so in sociology the great aim of research is to construct a tenable theory of social evolution. By this must be understood a scientific theory of social change and development of all sorts — from those of the family life to the rise and decline of civilizations; for we shall discover the same forces at work in the minute as in the great social movements.

The problems of sociology may thus be classed conveniently as problems of social organization and functioning on

the one hand, and of social origin and development on the other. An equally convenient classification, and perhaps somewhat clearer, would be to say that the four fundamental problems of sociology are those, (1) of social unity or solidarity; (2) of social continuity; (3) of gradual social development or normal social change; and (4) of abrupt or abnormal social change.

This is the classification which we shall adopt as most convenient for our purposes in this book. The problems of social unity and solidarity and of social continuity are evidently problems of social organization and functioning; while the problems of gradual social development, or of normal social change, and of abrupt or extraordinary social change, are problems of social evolution. Thus the two classifications are readily reconciled.

Now the problems of social psychology, so far as it aims at a theory of social life, are in no wise distinct from the problems of sociology. Social psychology will simply study the place of psychic factors in these problems. Thus it will study, for example, the rôle of instinct and acquired habit, of emotion and the desire for pleasure, of love and hatred, of feeling and intelligence in the social life. But if its analyses are considered carefully they will be seen to have to do with the larger theoretical problems of social organization and evolution, or with the practical problems of social order and progress. Instinct and habit in their workings in the social life, for example, will be studied for their bearing upon the origin and organization of groups or forms of association. Feeling and intellect may, on the other hand, be studied in order to see their bearing upon social unity, or upon gradual or abrupt social changes. In all of this, of course, the social psychologist may disclaim that it is his intention to present any complete theory of social life; but he must recognize that, so far as his work has value, it contributes to that end. If, indeed, his work be systematic

and on the highest scientific level it must aim to present the psychological part of such a theory,[1] taking for granted the contribution which the nonpsychological sciences will make to completed sociological theory.

The Methods of Social Psychology. The chief and most fruitful method in modern sociology has been to take truths discovered in other sciences and carry them over and apply them to the explanation of social life. There is no reason, indeed, why this should not be done, even though the method may have manifest limitations; for there is no reason why the student of society should have to work out for himself, independently, truths which have already been discovered by investigators in other realms. For whatever may be thought of the doctrine of the unity of nature, it is evident that "the social" is no distinct realm in itself, but is evidently a certain combination of biological and psychological factors. Every social situation is made up of, and may be analyzed into, geographical, biological and psychological elements. Ascertained truths in biology and psychology may be used directly, therefore, to explain certain social phenomena. From this it follows that the chief method of social psychology, or psychological sociology, must be to take ascertained laws and principles of the mental life and apply them to the explanation of phases of the social life in which these laws and principles are manifestly at work. Deduction from ascertained laws and principles of antecedent sciences must then be the prime method of social psychology.

However, a safe scientific procedure in the study of society, under present conditions, is not so simple as the above

[1] For further discussion of the relations of social psychology and sociology, see the works and articles referred to in the author's "Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects," pp. 61–63; the *Psychological Bulletin* for December 15, 1916; and the list of references at the end of this chapter.

paragraph would seem to imply. Psychology, as the whole scientific world knows, is very far from a settled condition; and this is also true in a less degree of biology. Where, then, are the ascertained laws and principles of antecedent sciences, one may ask, from which one is to make his deductions, or, which one is to apply in the explanation of social phenomena? Moreover, the phenomena of human society, at least, are so complex that it is unreasonable to suppose that the *modus operandi* of its forces could be discovered in psychological and biological laboratories, even if the exact nature of the forces at work in human society were known. Deductions from seemingly established truths of antecedent sciences must, therefore, be supplemented in the social sciences by the use of many other scientific methods. Most important among these, perhaps, is the statistical method. The psychologists and biologists, indeed, are already beginning to perceive that this is a most valuable method to supplement laboratory experiments. Human nature is still so little understood that its workings in social relationships perhaps can be more easily seen from the observation of social life and from social statistics than from direct experiments in the laboratory.

If, for example, we wish to understand the trend of human nature in domestic or industrial life, we should scarcely get any light on the subject from psychological research, as it has been usually conducted. Observation of the daily life around us, the study of human history, and of statistics of present social conditions would, however, show us, with a fair degree of clearness, what to expect of human nature in given industrial or domestic relations. Such methods of study, then, reveal great trends of human nature which laboratory methods would never suffice to discover. Now, statistics is nothing more than an attempt to make accurate social observations and measurements through the use of trained observers and the tabulation, enumeration and com-

parison of the facts which they observe. It is evidently the one method open to us of measuring social facts upon a wide scale, or mass movements. It is greatly to be regretted, therefore, that as yet we possess statistics of only very small sections of our social life. The whole statistical method, indeed, has still to be enormously developed and improved before it is susceptible of application to the general problems in the field of the social sciences. While we may pin our faith to future developments in statistical methods, it must be confessed that, as yet, but little use has been made of it in dealing with the problems of social psychology.

We shall get more help from the historical and comparative methods. The study of human history enables us to compare social processes and development at different points of time. It enables us to see clearly the entrance of new factors into the social life and their modifying effect upon the older factors. We shall be able to perceive through history, therefore, quite clearly the working of certain psychic factors, such as acquired habits, ideas, inventions and social standards. Recorded human history, after it has been made relatively accurate by subjection to thorough scientific criticism, must be regarded, then, as one of the greatest aids to the social psychologist.

Of scarcely less importance than historical records, in the strict sense, is the mass of anthropological and ethnographical material which has been accumulated within the last century by the observation of savage, barbarous and semi-civilized peoples. This mass of data enables us to compare not only the customs, usages and institutions of various peoples in different stages of social evolution, but also to compare the reactions of human nature to various conditions in different periods of cultural development. We thus may obtain much light not only upon social origins, but also upon the whole process of social development.

There are, of course, great dangers in the use of this method when it is applied to the interpretation of the social life of existing civilized peoples; but there can be no question as to its value when used with reasonable precautions by one who understands thoroughly the principles of individual psychology.

Finally, we should not overlook the fact that the observation and study of existing social life, especially of the smaller human groups which involve face-to-face association, by a trained, scientific observer, furnish a wealth of facts, which, in a certain sense, are of greater scientific value than any which history or anthropology can offer.[1] When there goes along with this observation of the facts of our everyday social life what we may call "sympathetic introspection" of the minds of individuals making up different groups and classes, we get a very valuable insight into the processes of social life; for we then study them from the inside, as it were. Of course, the method of sympathetic introspection is open to many possibilities of error, for it is largely deductive, and the deductions may be made from a wrong psychology. Thus "psychological fallacies" may be introduced into our reasoning. However, we *are* conscious of the states of consciousness of our associates with more or less accuracy; and this fact alone is sufficient to justify our claim for the value of sympathetic introspection as a method of social psychology. When coupled with observation of ourselves and our associates it enables us to

[1] "The Social Survey," as a method of studying existing social life by a proper combination of all inductive methods, may be fairly said to promise to become in the near future the all important method of the social sciences. See Aronovici: "The Social Survey"; also the bibliography on the social survey, published by the Sage Foundation. For collateral reading on scientific methods of social study the student could scarcely do better than to read Professor Chamberlain's article on "The Method of the Multiple Working Hypothesis" in the *Journal of Geology* for November, 1897, and apply the same to the study of human society.

study more or less immediately the working of many psychic elements, such as, interest, desire, emotion, belief and the like. After deduction from ascertained laws and principles of psychology, sympathetic introspection is probably our chief instrument at the present time for the psychological analysis of existing social life.

The psychological analysis of contemporary society through the deductive application of the laws and principles of individual psychology on the one hand, and the use of observation (coupled with sympathetic introspection), of history, and of anthropological data on the other hand, must constitute the preliminary methods of social psychology. But after analysis should come synthesis. Without synthesis the only result of the use of all of these methods would be fragmentary views of the social life, which could hardly be called a theory of society. The results of deduction from the principles of antecedent sciences and of the inductive study of the social life through the use of history, anthropology, statistics and observation must, of course, be put together by means of a constructive synthesis before our psychological theory of society is complete.

We cannot leave the subject of scientific method without registering a protest against the conception of scientific method which some modern thinkers hold. We refer to the assumption that scientific method consists wholly in tracing the sequences of mechanical causation, thus excluding the psychic entirely from the realm of science. If this assumption is warranted, then, of course, any explanation of our social life in terms of conscious processes is unscientific.[1] But science, *as science,* we need only remark, accepts no universal principle of explanation. If it did so before the validity of such a principle of explanation was demonstrated for all realms of phenomena, it would transform

[1] See note on page 9; also a discussion by the writer in *Science* of March 14, 1913, p. 412.

itself at once into metaphysics. The method of science is not to build itself upon some universal assumption; rather its method, as we have already said, is that of common sense, to accept one principle of explanation as far as it will work, and in another realm to make use of another principle, if that will work there. Now in the physical sciences the mechanistic principle of explanation seems to have demonstrated its sufficiency; but the case is very different in the mental and social sciences. Whether one believes philosophically in the universal validity of the mechanistic principle of explanation for all concrete processes, one must admit as a scientist that this validity has not yet been demonstrated for psychic and social processes. In other words, while as scientific students of society we can have no objection to carrying the mechanistic explanation of things as far as it has been demonstrated to go, yet, if we keep the scientific attitude in mind, we are not warranted in extending its use beyond those limits. The economist, for example, would not be justified, at the present time, in trying to construe the phenomena of price and markets in terms of mechanical causation. Moreover, if he did so, such an explanation by itself would be meaningless; for we cannot understand such a thing as value apart from consciousness. In the social sciences, then, explanation in terms of conscious processes must continue, so far as we can see, for an indefinite time to be the main method of those sciences. This is, of course, equivalent to saying that the social sciences must develop through psychology, rather than through the physical sciences.[1]

Another conception of scientific method in the social sci-

[1] For the further discussion of "objectivism" in the social science, see the Preface of this book, and also the author's article "Objectivism in Sociology," in the *American Journal of Sociology*, for November, 1916. Compare, also, the statements made by Professor Judd in his article on "Evolution and Consciousness" in the *Psychological Review* for March, 1910, xvii, pp. 77–97.

ences which would exclude the use of psychology in them is the so-called "objective" method. This method claims that in the social sciences the scientific procedure must be merely the investigation of the coexistences, sequences and interrelations of social facts, without any attempt at psychological explanation and with as little use of psychological assumptions as possible.[1] One variant form of this method is known as "mass interpretation," a social group being considered, as regards its activities and movements, practically as a simple mass without reference to the biological or psychological make-up of the individuals involved. As regards this phase of objective method it must be said that it lends itself altogether too easily to the development and support of social theories not in accord with the results of the scientific study of the individual. It is a method which, in the past, has introduced altogether too many fallacies in sociology for it to be tolerated as the scientific method in that field.

As regards the view that the method in the social sciences should be the analysis of the objective coexistences, sequences and interrelations of social facts without any reference to psychological laws and principles, it must be said that this method would never suffice to make anything more of the social sciences than mere descriptive sciences. For example, if we trace the sequence of cultural stages in the history of a people, how shall we understand such a sequence if we neglect habit, suggestion, imitation and invention on the one hand, and the reactions of human nature to the physical and economic environment on the other? Again, if we find two cultures blending through mutual borrowing, how shall we understand the process unless we

[1] This is the view of Dr. Rivers of Cambridge University, England. See his "Kinship and Social Organization"; also his article on "Survival in Sociology" in the *Sociological Review,* vi, pp. 293–305; also *ibid,* ix, pp. 7-13.

understand the workings of imitation, sympathy and antipathy in the mass of the individuals concerned? It is evident that the very coexistences and sequences which the objective school of sociologists propose to study without reference to psychological laws are themselves psychological facts. This is true not only of economic values, social standards, tradition and religions, but equally so of customs, institutions, law and government. In civilized human society the mass of social phenomena can only be understood as essentially psychological phenomena. There seems to be but little use even of delaying attempts at psychological explanation of the great mass of social facts, simply because psychology is unsettled on the one hand, and the inventory of social coexistences and sequences is incomplete on the other. Rather psychology and sociology must develop together, for the social life cannot be understood apart from mental life.

Social Psychology and Other Sciences. The distinction between sciences, as we have already said, is the distinction between problems. There is nothing in the social life of man which cannot be explained by the principles of the sciences antecedent to sociology. Nevertheless, these antecedent sciences do not explain the social life of man, for the simple reason that that is not their problem. The different sciences represent so many divisions of labor among the workers in the scientific field. The distinction between sociological sciences and psychological sciences, as we have seen, is difficult to define, when once we recognize the validity of the psychological method in the social sciences, unless we frankly recognize that the distinction is one of problems. As has often been said, psychology studies the individual, while sociology studies the group. But we have found that we cannot understand the individual apart from his group, nor the group apart from the nature of the individuals who compose it. This does, how-

ever, give us a point of view which enables us to see at once that the social sciences are interested primarily in the problems of a collective life, and not primarily in understanding the nature of the individual. Sociology, therefore, turns to biology and psychology, the great sciences of individual nature and development, for its principles of understanding the behavior, interactions and organization of individuals in groups; and social psychology does the same. We have, indeed, already seen how the social psychologist must get his knowledge of instinct, habit, feeling and intellect from the individual psychologist, and how his work consists largely in the tracing of the workings of these various psychic elements in the social life. The social psychologist remains a psychologist even if he is at the same time a sociologist.

For this very reason he must, of course, be alive to all that modern biology can teach him. The behavior of the individual, even if modified and controlled by consciousness, is, nevertheless, rooted in the biological conditions of life. There is, perhaps, no biological fact of importance, at least so far as man is concerned, which has not its correlate in mental life. Instinct, for example, is the psychological correlate of hereditary structure; individuality and originality are correlates of the biological fact of variation; while mental and social selection seem to be more or less correlated with natural selection. These are only a few examples of the bearing of biological facts and laws upon mental and social life. To make the psychology of the individual the immediate basis of social psychology is, of course, not to exclude in any way the fullest recognition of the working of biological factors in the social life; for modern psychology bases itself upon modern biology.

The connections between social psychology and the theoretical portions of the special social sciences are manifestly very close. This the history of these sciences clearly shows.

Throughout their development they have had to make or borrow a psychology for their purposes. The central problems in most of these sciences are, indeed, psychological problems in the broad sense of the term. Thus the central problem of economics is usually considered to be the origin and nature of economic value. That economic value cannot be understood apart from psychology on the one hand, and from social life on the other, the recent literature of economics clearly demonstrates. In other words, economics depends for the solution of the problem of economic value as well as for many of its other problems upon social psychology.[1] The same is true of political science. In that subject the problem of sovereignty, of the origin and nature of governmental authority, is manifestly a phase of the general problem of social control, which, as we shall see, is one of the central problems of sociology. In ethics the origin and nature of moral value and of moral obligation is a central problem. As in economics, recent literature clearly attests that this central problem of ethics can only be solved through the understanding of the psychology of the individual on the one hand, and of the social life on the other. Moral value, like economic value, is a socio-psychological phenomenon. Illustrations might be multiplied of the dependence of the special sciences upon the development of the psychological phases of sociology for their own development. It is not too much to say, indeed, that the special sciences will have to be largely rewritten as social phychology develops; and this process is, indeed, already in evidence.

On the other hand, social psychology can only develop into a comprehensive psychological theory of society by making free use of the data and present results of the special social sciences, not less than of psychology and biology

[1] Compare the argument in Anderson: "Social Value," Chaps. VIII–XIV.

themselves. While these sciences deal with relatively specialized phases or sides of the social life, yet the phenomena of which they treat are, so far as civilization is concerned, all important; and, indeed, in some cases are practically coeval with the existence of human social life. Thus economic facts have been found to play a very important part in human society from the very beginning. The whole series of economic processes must be understood, therefore, by the social psychologist, and this is practically equivalent to saying that he must learn all the results of scientific investigation into those processes which the modern science of economics can offer him. While social psychology is fundamental for the special social sciences, it is evident that the results of those sciences can be of great assistance to the social psychologist.

The relations between history and social psychology deserve a word. We have already seen that the scientific use of recorded human history must be one of the chief methods of social psychology, especially of that portion of history which records the conscious state and the social mental phenomena accompanying, antecedent to, or consequent upon, social conditions and changes. The social psychologist can thus get probably a clearer and truer view of the part which mental processes play in human life than he can get from the observation of the individual in the laboratory, especially if the history of which he makes use is brought down to the present. Now the emphasis upon the importance of the historical method in the social sciences means, of course, the importance of scientific history for social psychology. On the other hand, there can be no doubt that social psychology is equally important for scientific history, at least if the latter is to attempt any explanation or interpretation of the connections between the facts or events which it describes. The modern school of historians, in general, indeed, have come fully to recognize that history, so far as it is inter-

pretative, is a socio-psychological science; and this sufficiently recognizes its dependence upon social psychology.

Social Psychology and Social Practice. The bearing of social psychology upon the practical social sciences and arts, upon social policy, in general, is equally close. As one studies the social policies of the past critically, one is almost always struck by the fact that they show inadequate knowledge of human nature on the one hand, and of social life on the other. Since the time of Hobbes, at least, social policies have become closely linked with social theories; and social theory, for the most part, has been woefully one-sided and unscientific. Now the defects in practically the whole body of social theory in the English speaking world for the past three centuries have been, in the main, psychological defects. We now know that the theories of Hobbes, Rousseau, and Bentham were based upon radically wrong ideas of human nature; and perhaps we shall soon discover that the same thing must be said of many of the social theories of the later nineteenth century.

The present age, at any rate, is characterized by an all but universal disagreement regarding social policies and by a multitude of one-sided attempts at social reform. These one-sided social movements obstruct social progress, or at least make it very slow. Moreover, men have become divided as to whether progress is to be sought through the gradual modification of existing institutions and social organizations, or through some sudden revolutionary social change. They are also divided as to whether the means of progress is through changing the opinions, ideas and values of individuals, or merely through changes in the external environment. Now, social psychology, if it can show the way in which we may expect the individual to function in given social situations on the one hand, and the psychic mechanism of normal social changes on the other, should be of great assistance in formulating rational and pro-

gressive social policies. We hope to show that social psychology can be of the greatest assistance in every form of social work, from that of the welfare worker in a small group up to that of the statesman who guides the destiny of a nation or a civilization.

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For current scientific articles along the line of social psychology the student should consult such periodicals as the *American Journal of Sociology,* the *Sociological Review,* the *Psychological Bulletin,* and the *Psychological Review.* The last named publishes each year the *Psychological Index,* which contains a bibliography of the books and articles in social psychology which have appeared during the current year. Consult also the bibliographies usually published with each issue of the *American Journal of Sociology.*

CHAPTER II

ORGANIC EVOLUTION AND SOCIAL EVOLUTION

The social life of man is a part of the world of life in general, and even in its psychological interpretation we must have, for a background, the laws and principles of organic evolution. As we have already said, the factors and forces of organic evolution are also at work in social evolution. Let us see just what the relations are between these two phases of evolution.

Organic Evolution and Social Evolution. In a large sense organic evolution includes social evolution. But in a narrower sense social evolution must be regarded as a distinct phase of universal evolution, having its own peculiar factors or forces, going on within the larger process of organic evolution, just as the latter may be regarded as a relatively differentiated, specialized process going on within cosmic evolution. Organic evolution affects all phases of social evolution,[1] but the relations of the lower phases of social evolution to organic development are much closer than the relations of its higher phases. These higher phases, having to do especially with the development of civilization in human society, may be called cultural evolution, and upon them organic evolution has only an indirect bearing. This is because organic evolution has to do mainly with the physical and congenital traits of man, while cultural evolution relates rather to his mental and acquired

[1] For collateral reading on this point and illustrations, see the author's "Sociology and Modern Social Problems," Chap. II. Other references will be found at the end of this chapter.

traits. The biologist pays but little attention to acquired traits, but in sociology these become altogether the most significant things; hence biological laws and facts form only a basis for the work of the sociologist. Nevertheless, it is important, even in social psychology, that these biological forces which lie back of our social life be kept in a proper perspective; for they affect both the individuals who compose social groups and the organization of the groups themselves. Let us note first of all the relation of these forces to the individual.

Organic Evolution and the Individual. Every inborn trait of the individual is a product of organic variation; most such traits are transmitted by heredity; and, finally, the more important have been tested by selection. The individual as he is born into society is thus a product of organic evolution. He may be greatly modified by the particular environment in which he lives, and so far as his behavior as a member of the group is concerned, this may be, perhaps, indefinitely modified; but it nevertheless remains true that the individual as he comes into society by the gate of birth is a product of organic evolution. Variation, heredity and selection have given him distinct individual and racial traits which will affect his reactions to his group and the reactions of his group to him throughout his life. This is easy enough to see as regards his gross bodily traits, especially those connected with the great biological facts of race and sex. But if modern biology is worth anything, it must be equally true regarding those mental and moral traits of the individual which are bound up with the congenital structure of his nervous system. The connections between the different elements of the nervous system must be equally subject to the forces of organic evolution, with the other bodily traits of the individual. It is no longer questioned, by either biologists or psychologists, that there is an hereditary structure of the nervous system which

is the result of the organic evolution of the individual; or that such hereditary structure expresses itself in the behavior of the individual in certain characteristic reactions. These are known to psychologists as native impulses or tendencies, instincts, appetites and emotions. It would seem that there can no longer be reasonable question as to the existence of a human nature, then, which is distinct from the mental and moral character which the individual ultimately acquires through his life in society. The only questions that may reasonably be raised are those which concern the number, nature and variety of these original tendencies in man, which were placed in him by organic evolution, and those which have to do with the modifiability of these tendencies in society. These questions we shall discuss later.

The original intellectual capacity of man also requires notice as a product of organic evolution. Anthropology teaches us that the distinctive physical difference between man and other animals is the much greater size of the human brain. Now this greater size of the human brain is almost wholly due to the enormous increase of the "associational areas" in man, that is, the areas concerned with intellectual processes. Hence man's inborn capacity for learning and thinking is very much greater than that of any other animal. We must regard this larger brain and greater intellectual capacity of man, from the point of view of organic evolution, as a mutation which was found to be of the greatest significance in man's struggle with the rest of the animal world and hence was perpetuated by heredity and selection. The specific discussion of the significance of this variation in the direction of higher intellectual capacity we shall reserve until we discuss the relation of organic to mental evolution.

Finally, let us note that organic evolution has created original differences between individuals, and that these are very significant for the social life. Man is the most varia-

ble of all animal species, and human individuality and personality owe not a little of their distinctness to this fact. If it is true of the animal species below man that no two individuals are born exactly alike, it is even more true of man. There is organic variation in all directions. Some individuals undoubtedly are born with favorable variations, others with unfavorable. Some are born strong and some weak. In part, the original strength or weakness, physical or mental, of the individual is a matter of his heredity, of the stock from which he sprang. But it is also a matter of individual variation. Owing to variation and heredity, therefore, there is no such thing as biological equality among individuals. Some men are born superior, others inferior. From a biological point of view there is no truth in the old belief that all men are born equal. It is only from a moral and social point of view that they may be deemed equals.

The original differences between individuals express themselves most strikingly, in human society, in the facts of sex and race. There can be no doubt that the original differences between the human sexes in inborn disposition are considerable,[1] and that these differences are very important in the social life. Connected with the primary and sec-

[1] See the discussion of "Individual Differences" in Münsterberg: "Psychology, General and Applied," Chap. XVI. In speaking of races, Münsterberg says (p. 233): "Those mental functions which can most easily be submitted to experimental investigation, the elementary functions of perception, attention, memory, and feeling show rather insignificant differences." The same is true of the sexes. It must be emphasized, then, that the differences between the sexes and between races are in native reactions, in *innate dispositions*, and not, so far as we know, in their intellectual capacities See also Thorndike: "Educational Psychology," Vol. iii, Chaps. IX, X. A good summary of the already extensive literature on innate sex and race differences is to be found in Jastrow: "Character and Temperament," Chap. VII.

For collateral reading on racial differences, the beginning student could not do better than to read Boas: "The Mind of Primitive Man," Chaps. I, IV.

ondary physical differences between the sexes are, undoubtedly, certain differences in their native reactions. All experiments made upon the original tendencies of man indicate that this is the case. These differences, we may also note, are found between the sexes practically throughout the organic world. The general conclusion of psychologists is that such sex-differences are not qualitative but are quantitative, and hence are what we may call complementary differences. The original differences between the sexes, in other words, are such as to favor their harmonious adaptation to each other in the social life. This is not always true of the differences which have been produced artificially by civilization. The present tendency, therefore, to ignore or minimize the natural differences between the sexes can hardly be considered other than a grave scientific and social error.

The original differences between the various human races are equally significant with those of sex for the social life of man. There can be no question but that the different races have been specialized in their history physically to different geographic environments. Whether these differences, thus produced, have also affected their nervous systems, and so their hereditary reactions to stimuli, may still perhaps be regarded as an unsettled question. The bulk of scientific opinion holds to the view, however, that such differences in native reactions do exist among the different human races; and such experimental evidence as we have seems to confirm this view. It is also very generally held that the differences between races, like the differences between the sexes, are not qualitative, but quantitative; that is, they consist in the greater strength of certain natural tendencies, or impulses, in one race than in another. It may be suggested that, if this view is found to be true, social experience will yet show that the differences between races are also in the nature of complementary differences; in other

words, that they are not such as to prevent the harmonious adjustment of different racial elements in a common social life. In any case, it must be remembered that physical anthropology has shown that the physical differences between races, which often seem so large to us, are, when carefully studied, found to be very slight. The same conclusion would seem to hold for their mental differences. Therefore, in any event, careful training to establish the right acquired habits, in the individual, might easily overcome any disadvantage which might be inherent in original differences, since these latter are probably not profound.

Organic Evolution and Mental Evolution. Mentality may, from a strictly biological point of view, be regarded as a variation in the life process. It is a variation which natural selection has favored from the beginning in the animal world. Among animals, those that would stand the best chance of survival would not be those that developed the greatest physical strength, but rather those that developed the keenest intelligence; that by means of it could adapt themselves quickly to their environment; that could sense approaching danger and escape it. Intelligence, it is evident, has had a survival value from the start far in excess of almost any other organic trait.

Now, as all organisms do not show signs of mental life, we must seek to locate mind, if possible, in the scheme of organic development. The lowest organisms do not possess nervous systems; hence in the case of these it would seem idle to raise the question whether they have neural processes which are accompanied by consciousness. In such forms of life, which include the lower animal types and the whole vegetable world, adaptation to environment is probably secured by purely physical or mechanical means. But, as we ascend in the animal scale, the catabolic nature of the organism — that is, the tendency to expend energy rather than to store up energy — becomes more and more pronounced.

Hence, bodily movements become more varied and more complex. Now consciousness, intelligence, seems to have been developed as a control over the complex and varied movements of the higher forms of animals. Even in the highest animals, however, there are many bodily activities which are not accompanied by consciousness. The need of control by consciousness apparently exists only at those points where changes, new adjustments, in relatively complex activities occur. We may conclude, therefore, that consciousness is associated with that process in living creatures which we know as adaptation, especially when the process of adaptation is rapid and complex. The function of the mind in the life process seems, therefore, to be: to furnish a superior method of control over complex adaptative processes. Intelligence and the neural processes immediately involved in consciousness constitute the master device produced by organic evolution to perfect the control of the organism over its environment.[1]

According to this view of mind, it is not something apart from the life process. It is subject, therefore, to organic evolution, like all other elements in life. The things that stimulate it, and its methods of response, may be as much affected by natural selection as any other of the inherent elements of our organic make-up. Our capacities for sensations, our eyes and ears, and all the mechanism of perception, our natural disposition, our emotions, our intellect and even our reason have been produced by organic evolution and fixed in us by selection. All these things have relevancy to the life process. They must be understood as functioning within that process. This does not mean, of course, that they may not function at times in very imper-

[1] Compare Angell: "Psychology," p. 7; also Chap. III. If collateral reading is desired on the function of mind in organic evolution, read Judd's article on "Evolution and Consciousness" in the *Psychological Review*, Vol. xvii, pp. 77–97.

fect and even disadvantageous ways. But it does mean that the whole mechanism of the mind must be regarded as an instrument, however imperfect it may be, of adaptation, an instrument for doing things which are important for life.

If the function of the mind is to bring about rapid, short cut adaptations of the organism to its environment, then manifestly it must select, among the countless stimuli which surround an organism, those which need attention for the maintenance and development of the organism's activities. Hence intelligence is *selective* even in its earliest beginnings. From the first, therefore, mental activity is more or less purposeful or teleological activity. Purposeful activity[1] must be regarded, therefore, like mind itself, as a variation which has been found useful to living creatures and hence perpetuated and developed by natural selection. It is not so important, from a strictly scientific point of view, to decide the old metaphysical debate as to whether purposeful activity is a form of mechanical reaction or not, as it is to see that such activities are peculiar to living creatures and have been developed because of their survival value.

We cannot deny the existence, perpetuation and development of purposeful activity in the animal world; nor can we deny the corresponding fact that the mind (or, we may say, the nervous system), selects the stimulus to which it responds. Moreover, in the higher creatures the stimuli to which responses are to be made are actively sought, as we shall see later. The mental, the purposeful, the teleological becomes increasingly important as we ascend in the scale of life. These are facts which some sociologists apparently wish to overlook, but they are of the utmost significance for

[1] "Active adaptation" is probably the better scientific term. Adaptation of this sort is, of course, the direct outcome of those organic changes which developed intelligence. They are not separate processes, but simply objective and subjective names of the same process.

the social life of man. Human society is no theater of the play of blind, mechanical forces. Society, as we have seen, has been constituted by mind. It is, from the start, a more or less purposeful activity. It becomes increasingly so, until, when we reach the level of the present most highly civilized human society, we may properly say that it is dominantly so. And, indeed, the purpose of the social sciences is nothing less than to replace the action of blind, mechanical force in human social life by the action of intelligent purposes.

The Origin of Animal Association. Social evolution undoubtedly sprang from the necessities of the life process. The processes of both nutrition and reproduction in all higher forms of life involve a necessary interdependence among organisms of the same species. Almost from the very beginning of life, the association of the sexes has been necessary for reproduction and for the care and rearing of offspring. In the higher forms, too, some degree of association has always been necessary for the procuring of an adequate food supply and for protection against enemies. Now this necessary interdependence of living forms in the food and reproductive processes has been the basis of social evolution. Life has never developed in an isolated way. From the very start there has been unity, group life, among organisms of the same species. While this interdependence was at first purely physical, there can be no doubt that the same interdependence of life processes is what has given rise, in its higher stages, to that psychical interaction which we call association or society. Society, in the sense of a group of organisms carrying on a common life by means of mental interaction, is, then, an expression of the original and continuing unity of the life process of the associating organisms. The functional interdependence on the psychic side must be regarded as the result, on the one hand, of the breaking up of the life process into several relatively inde-

pendent centers, and, on the other hand, of its original and continuing unity. Social life must be regarded as a higher, more complex unity of a psychic character developed out of a primitive biological unity.

Now this conclusion is very important for sociological theory, because many of the most serious errors in social theories, in the past, have come through the assumption of the existence of individuals who were developed in isolation or separateness. Then, in order to obtain society, the theorist had to bring together these individuals developed in isolation. The result was that the unity of the social life seemed a mystery which could only be explained through either some intellectualistic or mechanical theory. As soon as we see, however, that the social life springs spontaneously from the necessities of the life process, that it has grown out of both of the fundamental phases of that process, namely the food process and the reproductive process, then there is no mystery regarding its unity. It is clear, for example, that as long as food remained abundant animals of the same species would tend to remain together and that from their proximity alone functional relations in nutritive and reproductive processes would tend to become established among them. In the higher forms of life when food supplies became scarce control over food would very often necessitate association, because a food supply can be more easily secured by a group of coöperating individuals than by isolated individuals. Natural selection would therefore operate in favor of those groups which associated in order to control food supply. It would especially favor groups which developed means of psychic interstimulation and response between individuals to further coöperation, and those groups in which the interstimulation and response was quick and sure — that is, those in which definite and well organized relations in coöperation were established. From this point of view we may say again that living together in

groups, and the development of psychic forms of interstimulation and response in the animal world, is a variation or mutation in the life process which has been established by natural selection. Animal association, then, like everything else established by natural selection, is an instrument of control over life processes. It may especially be regarded as a control over the food process, since food is the prerequisite for any sort of survival, and even for reproduction. This does not mean, however, that association has been developed, even in the animal world below man, chiefly to control food, or that the food process has exclusively determined animal association. On the contrary, other factors also enter in.

Among the things in the environment to which organisms have always to adjust themselves, besides food, are animate enemies, either of the same species or of others. Now defense against enemies can be much better undertaken by groups of individuals than by isolated individuals. Conflict in the animal world has therefore tended, in the main, in the direction of a gregarious life. Many writers have been inclined to make the necessities of defense indeed among certain types of animals entirely sufficient to account for their group life. This may be so in the case of some species, for it is certain that there are no dangers which animals have to fear so much as other animals; and therefore, that there is no force working for group cohesion stronger than the necessities of defense against other animals, either of the same or of related species. In many cases at least, the most cohesive groups among the higher animals are those which function obviously largely for defense. In the struggle of group with group, the chances are that the better organized group will survive. Here again we find that natural selection has placed a premium upon group life. Ultimately, of course, the outcome of intergroup struggle must be to favor those groups that can develop the best

leadership, the greatest sense of group solidarity, and the most intelligent coöperative activities in facing a common foe. Animal association must, therefore, be regarded also as an instrument developed by evolution for defense against enemies. It is easy to exaggerate the importance of the rôle of conflict in the animal world in the origin of social life; but it must be conceded to be one of the most important factors, though it is related functionally, of course, to the food process which we have just discussed, and to the reproductive process which we will now consider.

In spite of the importance of the two phases of life which we have just mentioned, it seems probable that the chief rôle in the genesis of animal association has been played by the reproductive process. The birth and care of offspring among all the higher animals have been from almost the earliest stages of organic evolution very important phases of the life process. Indeed, from the standpoint of a series of generations, or of the continuity of life, that is, from the standpoint of the species, the reproductive process is of equal importance with the food process. Now, sexual reproduction has always necessitated the interaction of two individuals; but the association which it gives rise to in the earlier stages of evolution is indefinite, and often momentary. It is not until we find the production of "child" forms which need prolonged and tender care on the part of one or both parents, that the reproductive process gives rise to definite, intimate and prolonged association.[1] The association between the child form and the mother form, moreover, is so intimate that the more intimate and sympathetic forms of association may be derived in large measure from it. Thus we know that from this relationship sprang the family, in the full sense of the term, an indefinite association of par-

[1] For illustrations of the influence of sex and parental care in human social origins, read Chapter V of the author's "Sociology and Modern Social Problems," Revised Edition.

ents and offspring. Out of the family has certainly grown the consanguineous group; and out of the kindred group have grown many of the most important things in human society.

The enormous consequences of the reproductive process for social life have been due to the fact that the relationship of the child form to the parent form becomes more intimate and prolonged as organic evolution advances. In those species where the dependence of the child form upon the parent form is very slight the social results of the reproductive process are comparatively unimportant; but with the prolongation of the period of immaturity of the child and of the period of dependence upon the parent form, with the consequent increasing necessity for a coöperation of both parents in the care of offspring, the reproductive process brings about increasingly important social results. It makes possible the type of animal which can live largely by what he learns from his social environment. It also develops, if it does not originate, a whole series of instinctive reactions of a sympathetic or altruistic character. The higher forms of association among animals must be regarded, therefore, as built up by the reproductive process, that is, by the necessities connected with the birth and rearing of offspring needing prolonged and tender care.

Indeed, when we examine carefully the whole series of animal associations, from the ants and bees to man, we find them to be quite as obviously devised to guard the birth and rearing of each new generation as to assure an adequate food supply. Many of the most peculiar arrangements in animal society, as well as in the social life of man, seem designed to safeguard the reproductive process. The control over the reproductive process is, then, one of the functions of association, and there can scarcely be any doubt that most of the higher phases of association have originated to form such a control. There is much truth

in the contention of those writers who have claimed that social life has developed about the child; for in the succession of generations it is the child form that really stands for the continuity of social life.

Thus the great forces of organic evolution — nutrition, reproduction and the struggle of species with species, group with group — have produced social evolution. We cannot make social evolution a product of any one of these factors alone. It has functioned with reference to all of these phases of life and no single one has determined it. From the standpoint of organic evolution, then, there is no mystery about the origin of animal association.

The Origin of Human Society. From the scientific standpoint it is impossible to regard human society as anything else than a development of animal association, just as it is impossible to regard man as anything else than a highly developed animal. While human society has such distinct and peculiar traits that many writers, as we have seen, would limit the conception of society entirely to it, yet undoubtedly these traits must be considered as much higher developments of the same fundamental forces which are at work in animal association. In other words, human society cannot be regarded strictly as having had an independent origin, but must be considered scientifically as a developed form of animal association. Now the peculiar trait of human society which marks it off roughly from animal association is what we call "culture," that is, civilization in the very broadest sense of that term. Social evolution in the human species, in other words, has reached a stage of development in which a new and seemingly independent phase is developed which we have called cultural evolution.

Is cultural evolution due to the working of an absolutely new factor or factors which we do not find in the animal world below man? No scientific sociologist would

say so. On the contrary, he would affirm that man's culture is simply due to his greater intellectual capacity, on the one hand, and his greater capacity to form acquired habits, on the other hand. We have not, however, dispensed with any of the factors which entered into animal association or added any distinctly new ones. The type of association has changed, but not the fundamental nature of the association. Social life has indeed risen to a new level; but the fundamental factors, nutrition, reproduction, struggle for existence, variation, heredity, instinct, habit and intelligent adaptation, all remain with us, though in varying proportions.

There can be scarcely any doubt that the distinctive features of man's social life are due to that fundamental mutation which we have already spoken of as distinguishing man especially from the other animals, namely, the development of a large brain with highly developed "associational" or intellectual areas. Man's higher intellectual development, in other words, is responsible in the main for his peculiar social life. This is not to deny that man, as an animal, may have certain peculiar instincts, or original tendencies, which characterize him as a species distinct from other species; or that these original tendencies of his nature may not account for some of the peculiarities of his social life. It is only to assert that the distinctive features of man's social life may be, in the main, traced to his higher intellectual development and to the correlative fact of his greater ability to form habits, that is, to modify his original tendencies through his intelligence.

Thus one distinctive feature of human groups, which in many ways has been the most significant of all facts for the development of human social life, the possession of articulate language, is obviously due to man's higher intellectual development. Articulate speech implies the power to form abstract ideas, though it, of course, reacts

to develop such ideas. The whole process of intercommunication by definitely formed sounds, used as symbols, implies a development of the ideational centers of the brain such as no animal possesses. If the human brain were not capable of forming free ideas, unattached to specific reactions and situations, the abstract symbols of language would have been impossible. But from the moment that they became possible a new type of social life was also possible, a type in which the interactions between individuals became far more definite and, at the same time, far more complex. It became possible to communicate from individual to individual definite ideas and images which would aid in the mutual adaptation of the whole group. It became possible, also, to make many new and complex adaptations which could not have been made without such an instrument as organized language. It became less necessary to make use of, or rely upon, in the common life, the original inherited tendencies of the individual. Finally, articulate speech reacted to develop, through learning, the rationality and self-consciousness of each individual member of a group.

But we must not forget, of course, that in all ages the fundamental adaptations between individuals in human groups have rested upon instincts established by natural selection, just as in animal groups. These instincts have always been the basis of the simpler forms of association among men, and have existed, as we have seen, long before the human stage was reached. The developed intellect of man has simply enabled him to modify these original reactions and to build upon them many habits. Man has not dispensed, therefore, with heredity and instinct as a basis for his social life. He has simply reared an enormous superstructure upon these through a new and superior instrument of adaptation, the intellect. Even cultural evolution, therefore, rests upon organic evolution.

On the other hand, we must not forget that it is probable, yes, certain, that man's higher intellectual development has been brought about largely through his social life. We do not refer to the things which the individual learns in his lifetime, but rather to innate intellectual capacity. It seems certain that the greater brain of man has been an advantage in his srtuggle for existence chiefly because he lived a social life. The conclusions of anthropology are, in the main, that it was the social life of man's prehuman ancestors which fostered and made possible selections in the direction of a larger brain; that is, in the direction of superior intellectual capacity. Prehistoric archeology seems also to establish that the brain was perfected in paleolithic times, through the struggle of group with group and of race with race. The present intellectual capacity of man, in other words, emerged as a result of intergroup struggle, and not through the struggle of man with his nonhuman environment. The differences between animal and human society have been due, then, to the natural social evolution of the human species, and not to any mysterious leaps.

Human civilization, according to this theory, is not the result simply of man's instincts plus an indefinite capacity of man to form habits of any sort. It is the result, rather, of his higher intellectual evolution, necessitated, first, through his struggle with the animal world and his geographic environment, and secondly, through an increasingly complex group life. In other words, it is due to a series of mutations which have endowed man with a superior neural and mental mechanism for the rationalization of experiences, and so for the production of ideas and of inventions. This superior mental mechanism enabled man to control his habits and make advantageous adjustments when any new situation confronted him. It also enabled him, through the use of concepts and articulate speech, to hand from one individual to another, and from one genera-

tion to another, any knowledge which might be useful to his group. Thus was built up a fund of tradition, the gradual modification and increase of which constitutes the development of human civilization.

Must, then, the higher intellectual evolution of man be a primary datum for social science, or may social science, for the sake of so-called "objectivity," ignore man's superior brain and keep its interpretation in terms of the activities connected with food, reproduction and defense? The materialistic theories of human society have generally proceeded upon the assumption that this may safely be done. Therefore, they have ignored, in large measure, the importance of social psychology. Interpretation for these thinkers in terms of habit and environment, has seemed sufficient; but it may be safely said that while this procedure may work very well for animal groups it is not adequate in the social life of man. It is not adequate for the simple reason that the higher, intellectual centers of the brain have become the chief organ of adaptation in man. Social psychology has an importance for the understanding of human social life, therefore, which it does not possess for the understanding of the group life of the animals below man. The origin and development of human culture or civilization, the rise in human society of special institutions of social control, such as government, morality, religion and education, all human social progress, in a word, can only be understood through the understanding of that collective mental life which human groups have developed on the basis of man's higher mental, and especially intellectual, evolution.

It must not be forgotten, however, that environmental factors have always stood back of all this higher intellectual development of man and his cultural evolution. Not only did environmental forces select and fix the higher intellectual traits inherent in man, but constant emergencies or

" crises " in individual and social life, arising from environmental factors, have stimulated the activity of his intellect, developing habits of attention and of thinking which have led to his inventions and his many higher adjustments.[1] The most important of the " crises " which have stimulated man's thinking have probably been those connected with food or the necessities of defense. Recurrent crises seem to have been especially important in developing primitive man's mental and social life, such as the alternation of the seasons and, later, of peace and war. The former, probably, had much to do with the origin and development of primitive agriculture and of primitive architecture, for the emergencies of winter months had to be met. The latter had much to do with the development of the habits connected with government, and of social order generally. All this is, however, what we should expect as soon as we understand that the human intellect, from a psychological point of view, is merely a superior adaptive organ to secure habits to meet the environmental situation. Even this distinct, peculiar element in man's social life, functions, therefore, with reference to habit and environment.

Now if our theory is true, all, or nearly all, of the distinctive traits of human social life should owe their distinctiveness to the intellectual element in them. Is this what we find? If we take the family group, as a form of association which is common to both the higher animals and man, we find certain features of the family life of human beings which are distinctive and peculiar. Some of these, such as the lack of a pairing season in the human species,

[1] Compare Thomas: " Source Book for Social Origins," pp. 13–22. For collateral reading on the influence of the environment, see almost any of the papers in Part I of the above book, especially those by Mason, McGee, and Roth. An exceedingly good discussion of the influence of environment, from the biological standpoint, will be found in Conklin: " Heredity and Environment in the Development of Men," Chap. IV.

may be due largely to difference of instinct between man and the animal. On the other hand, such striking differences as the facts that the endorsement of society is almost invariably sought among human beings before the establishment of a new family group; that there exists a feeling of modesty regarding matters of sex; and that a specific virtue, chastity, has been developed to safeguard human family life, are certainly due to man's higher intellectual development.[1] Again, man's technological inventions, by which he has been able to attain to such mastery over physical nature and to transform his material environment, are manifestly a direct outcome of his superior intellectual capacity. Anthropologists generally hold that the earliest tools of man were made in as essentially a rationalistic manner as the latest inventions of modern times. Again, the conscious social morality of man is certainly to be correlated with his power to form ideals by abstract thinking and to communicate ideas by means of speech. Finally, the distinctive forms of social organization among men, as for example, the State, all show a very large rational and deliberative element.

The whole biological constitution of man, as created by organic evolution, coöperated, of course, with man's intellect to make human culture and the peculiar traits of human society. Thus man's prolonged immaturity has been a biological trait of scarcely less significance than the human intellect itself, for the understanding of human social life. We have already noted how the prolongation of the period of immaturity of offspring affects social evolution in general, cementing the union between parents and giving opportunity for the development of the more intimate and sympathetic forms of association. There can be scarcely any doubt that the prolonged period of immaturity in man has had

[1] See "Sociology and Modern Social Problems," Chap. V.

much to do not only with the origin and permanence of the family and the kindred group, but also with the high development of sympathetic feeling and altruism in human society generally. However, the prolongation of the period of immaturity in man is chiefly significant as the great underlying biological fact which has created plasticity in the individual and in society. A prolonged period of immaturity means a possibility of great control over the habits of the individual. It means, in brief, the possibility of education. It gives opportunity, therefore, for custom and tradition to mold each individual in conformity with the habits of his social group. It is indeed through prolonged immaturity that the intellectual elements of human society — ideas, ideals and social values — get their opportunity to do their work. The spiritual possessions of humanity, such as language, religion, government and moral ideas, could scarcely be transmitted from one generation to another without prolonged immaturity. Ultimately, then, the capacity of human society to progress rests upon this biological circumstance, scarcely less than upon man's superior intellectual power. The two, indeed, as we have just said, are correlatives. Man's brain is an instrument of such possibilities as it has only because it is itself a slowly developing organ, only partially completed at birth, and destined to get its full development through reaction with its environment. This gives plasticity to the human individual, a plasticity which is, as we have just said, the very basis of progress, because it is the basis for the effective functioning of the intellectual element.

We must conclude, then, that it is the modification, direction and control by the intellect of instinctive and habitual activities which has produced the distinctive traits of human social life. This, however, is by no means to propose an intellectualistic theory of human society. On the contrary, the social development which we find in humanity is, in

principle, the same as the social development which we find in animals below man; that is, this social development in essentials rests upon and has arisen out of the great forces which have made organic evolution. Heredity, variation, struggle and selection have laid the foundations for social development in the human as well as in the animal world; but in the human world man's higher intellectual evolution has modified the working of all of these factors and made possible an independent evolution of its own within the frame work established by organic evolution; namely, cultural evolution. But cultural evolution, as the human phase of social evolution, is not free to take any development which man's fancy may dictate. A culture, or a civilization, which is not adjusted to the requirements of man's increasingly complex existence is just as bound to be eliminated sooner or later by the forces of organic evolution as is a species of plant or animal which is unadapted to its environment. Human society is modifiable by the human intellect, but it is the business of social science to find out in what ways and in what directions it can be advantageously modified.

Was Man Primitively a Social Animal? A further question remains as to the social character of primitive man. We have assumed that primitive man and his precursor lived in groups, as this is in accord with the best biological knowledge which we at present possess. Anthropology, however, seems to show that the groups of primitive man and his precursor were relatively small, that is, they were family groups, or small hordes made up of a few related families. Man's primitive sociality was narrow, therefore; and this has had some most unfavorable effects upon the later developments of his social life. Human instincts, in general, show that while man is by nature adapted to small groups he is not well adapted to large groups. Indeed the evidence of psychology seems to

indicate that man's natural sociability is confined to the family and the kindred group. The adjustment of the human individual to larger groups is, therefore, entirely dependent upon acquired habit and education. Inasmuch as the control of habit through education is still so faultily performed, it should not be surprising that we must say that man, in general, in civilized society presents the appearance of being only partially socialized. This should be the less surprising, since world civilization and world wide human relationship are but developments of yesterday. With reference to the complex social life of the present man's incomplete socialization, then, seems most pronounced. On account of this fact, many social thinkers have doubted man's natural inherent sociability and have regarded his social life as built up entirely by the intellect or acquired habit, pointing to the so-called antisocial traits of man as primitive.[1] This theory is manifestly in accord with an egoistic theory of human nature which we shall consider in the next chapter, but a few remarks here will be appropriate.

There is no evidence, anthropological or otherwise, which warrants us in believing that the most opprobrious of the so-called antisocial traits of man were primitive. The lowest peoples in point of culture, even at the present time, we find to be essentially peaceful. Prehistoric archaeology shows no clear evidence even of warlike implements or weapons until we come to the middle of paleolithic times. Anthropological researches have also established the fact that war with its attendant ferocities and cruelties is more characteristic of that stage of human culture which is called "barbarism" than of the lower stage which we call "savagery." We know, definitely, that cannibalism and slavery both were developed only in the stage of barbarism. The

[1] See Ward: "Pure Sociology," p. 556; also Dealey: "Sociology," Chap. II.

predatory and antisocial traits of man must, therefore, be interpreted as developments due to the transition from a social life of small relatively isolated groups, whose struggle was chiefly with physical nature, to a social life of groups in close contact and in competition with each other for the means of existence. These predatory traits have been developed, in other words, through the filling up of the world with human beings and through the development of an intense struggle for existence between human groups. There is no reason for thinking them primitive, in the sense that man was originally a fierce solitary creature who lived by preying upon his kind, as we have just implied. The predatory features of human society were probably less characteristic of primitive social life than they have been of barbarism and of civilization. It is even perhaps psychologically right to infer, as McDougall and others have done, that warlike and predatory tendencies have been inbred to a higher degree in modern man than they were in his primitive ancestors. The civilized nations of the earth are descended largely from the fighting and victorious tribes of barbarism. Hence the selective process which their ancestors passed through from the higher stages of savagery to the present day, it may be well argued, has tended to inbreed in them warlike and predatory traits. More probably, however, it is the survival among us of the traditions of barbarism which accounts for the predatory and warlike character of modern civilization.

There is, at any rate, nothing, so far as we can see, in man's inherent nature which will necessarily prevent his harmonious adjustment in a world wide society of humanity. While man's native impulses adjust him only to a relatively narrow group, his intelligently formed habits can adjust him to wider and wider groups. History shows that there has been an expanding social consciousness. Accompanying this expanding social consciousness there have been wider

and wider adjustments made by individuals, until, at the present time, the conscious endeavor of the most highly developed individuals in our civilization is to adjust themselves to humanity collectively. This adjustment, however, could never be brought about by the forces of organic evolution working by themselves. It is only possible through high education of the individual and conscious moral ideas; it is through such conscious efforts of education and through the deliberate adoption of humanitarian social standards that we must expect the new and fully socialized individual to arise, rather than through any processes of organic selection, either natural or artificial. Organic evolution, after all, only furnishes the basis of social evolution. It fails, and must necessarily fail, to produce a type of individual adapted to the needs of present social life. Even though we were all born with the highest qualities of body and mind which selection could produce, we should still all be born savages with only the potentialities and capacities for high civilization. This is exactly what organic evolution has done for the race, it has produced a type endowed with the potentiality and capacity for the highest social and cultural development.

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CHAPTER III

HUMAN NATURE AND HUMAN SOCIETY

We cannot understand human society unless we understand human nature. By human nature we mean the nature with which the individual is endowed by birth, and not that which he acquires through the influence of his environment after birth.[1] It is, in brief, the original nature of man. This is the nature, in other words, which organic evolution has given man, while his acquired characteristics are the gift largely of civilization or his social environment. Some social thinkers have argued that the original nature of man has nothing to do with his present social life, but this is as great a mistake as those have made who have confounded social evolution with organic evolution. The original nature of man is not like a piece of blank paper, on which any character may be impressed. It must be neither neglected by the social psychologist nor over-emphasized. He must, if possible, get a just view of its relation to existing social facts.

Wrong Views of Human Nature. Social thinkers have, in general, tended to have either too pessimistic or

[1] Professor Cooley, in his writings, uses the term "human nature" to mean "the nature which is developed and expressed in those simple, face-to-face groups that are somewhat alike in all societies, the family, the playground and the neighborhood" ("Social Organization," p. 30). It is the nature *acquired* in the simple, universal forms of human association, according to Cooley. This is not in accordance with the best psychological usage, but to avoid ambiguity we shall employ, whenever possible, such expressions as, "the original nature of man," "the original tendencies of human nature," and the like.

too optimistic a view of human nature. Very few of them have struck the just balance between the extremes. The lack of a scientific psychology of the individual, of course, accounts for the numerous one-sided views of human nature which have afflicted the social thinking of the past. Let us note a few of these wrong views.

The first one which we shall mention is the passive view of human nature, namely: that the individual is by nature inert and does not act until some external cause or stimulus compels him to act. According to this view, sense impressions received from the external world are what cause the individual to act. Complex behavior on the part of the individual is to be understood through what is known as "the law of association," of sensations and ideas. The nervous system, under this psychology, is regarded merely as a system of conductors. Action must, accordingly, be explained always through external stimuli, or the way that these stimuli happen to associate with other stimuli already received by the nervous system. The individual under such conditions, it is evident, must be a victim of his environment.

Now, this view of human nature has, in the main, been given up by the leading psychologists of today. This is owing partly to advances in physics, chemistry and biology, and partly to the results of laboratory experiment. Physics has definitely established the kinetic theory of matter, or rather of the universe, according to which every particle of matter in the universe is in spontaneous motion owing to its own internal nature, without having to be affected by external forces. Biology has also definitely shown that a characteristic of living bodies is their spontaneity, that is, their self-activity.[1] Finally, biological and psychological

[1] Compare the statement of Jennings ("Behavior of the Lower Organisms," p. 284): "The organism is activity"; also of Thomson ("Heredity," p. 172): "The organism is an active, self-assertive, self-adaptive living creature — to some extent master of its fate."

experiments have shown that living organisms remain active in media from which all changes have been excluded.[1] The conclusion has been reached, therefore, that the organism is by nature self-active, and that it does not require stimulation from its environment in order to act. Action really springs from within. The external stimulus is not that which compels action but that which gives opportunity for action and conditions it.[2] The organism, under all normal conditions, is constantly discharging energy and must select the stimuli, in general, upon which it reacts, if life is to be sustained.

The higher animal organisms, in particular, are very catabolic in their nature, that is, they are constantly discharging energy. Their nervous systems, so far from being mere systems of conductors of the impressions made by external stimuli, seem to be rather *organizing* systems, into which are gathered and adjusted, so to speak, all of the external stimuli which can be of any use to the organism. The "law of association" has thus been superseded, in modern psychology, by the "law of organization." The psycho-physical organism must be regarded as self-active, taking up from the environment whatever it needs in order to aid it in adapting itself to its surroundings. The subjection of the organism to the environment is, therefore, only indirect, through habit and natural selection, and not direct, as the passive psychology supposed.

It is not true, then, that the organism reacts to all the stimuli in its environment, or that its behavior may be re-

[1] Jennings: "Behavior of the Lower Organisms," pp. 191, 283–286.

[2] Says Hobhouse ("Mind in Evolution," Revised Edition): "The revolution in biological theory will be found, as time goes on, to have invested the constitution of the living organism, as against the environing conditions, with a new importance; and in this constitution the fundamental fact everywhere is that the living being is not passive, but active, not mechanical in its reaction to things, but assertive, plastic, and, in a measure proportioned to its development, self-determining."

garded simply as a resultant of the pressure upon it of the total external conditions. Rather the organism selects from among the countless stimuli which surround it only a certain few upon which to react. These few stimuli which are selected for attention are those which have to do with the needs of the organism in carrying on its life activity. The self-active individual thus becomes increasingly master of his environment with the development of his power of intelligent selection through the evolution of mind. Our view of the original nature of the individual, therefore, precludes the conclusion of that easy-going philosophy which regards him as the victim of the circumstances of his environment. On the other hand, it remains equally certain that the environment continually reacts upon and modifies the individual during his life time. For while the beginning of activity lies in the nature of the organism, yet the stimulus maintains, develops and conditions the activity. Thus the activity of the organism becomes modified through reaction with the environment. The total behavior of the organism can, of course, only be understood through understanding its inner constitution, on the one hand, and the stimuli in the environment to which it may react upon the other. Our purpose at present, however, is not to explain this total behavior, but rather to point out that the view of the organism as passive, or, as we have called it, "the passive view of human nature," is without any scientific foundation; and that we must regard the relation of the individual to his environment as that of a self-active and relatively independent unit, more or less capable of maintaining and sustaining itself among the forces surrounding it.

Closely connected with the passive view of human nature is the hedonistic theory of individual behavior which still obtains, to some extent, in the social sciences. According to this theory the individual is moved to action wholly by

pleasure or pain, using those terms in the large sense of agreeable or disagreeable affective states. The organism being considered passive, it was supposed by the advocates of this theory that it could not move until some stimulus impinging upon it gave rise either to a pleasant or an unpleasant feeling. If the feeling was pleasurable, then the organism was attracted toward the stimulus and action was developed; but if the feeling was unpleasant, the organism was repelled from the stimulus and action inhibited.

The view of the organism as active with reference to its environment, however, has destroyed the foundations of this theory. We no longer need to suppose that it is the impact of some stimulus upon the organism which is sensed as pleasant or unpleasant, which leads to action. Psychologists, on the contrary, are now unanimous in their opinion that activity is antecedent to feeling, and that feeling merely accompanies or, at most, modifies activity. Thus the hedonistic view of human nature which made it the puppet of pleasure and pain, shoved hither and thither, now by this feeling, now by that, must also be given up. Hedonistic sociology, economics and ethics, which were, perhaps, the main types prevalent among English speaking peoples in the nineteenth century, will have to go by the board with the hedonistic psychology.[1]

The egoistic view of human nature has also crumbled under recent psychological criticism. As long as the passive and hedonistic psychology held sway it was possible to regard every act of human nature as essentially selfish, or, at least, self-regarding, since the theory was, as we have seen, that every act was simply the outcome of the pleasant or unpleasant feeling felt by the individual. But with the

[1] For full criticism of the hedonistic psychology, see Meyer's articles in the *Psychological Review*, Vol. xv, on "The Nervous Correlate of Pleasantness and Unpleasantness," or Bernard's "Transition to and Objective Standard of Social Control" (also published as a series of articles in the *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. xvi).

more biological theory of human nature which we have just set forth, it is seen that activities may be as easily other-regarding as self-regarding. Particularly is this true of the original tendencies of human nature fixed in us by natural selection. It was as easy for selection to create hereditary structures, and therefore innate tendencies toward action, favorable to others as to self. It is a psychological error, therefore, to derive the altruistic tendencies of human nature from the egoistic. Both egoism and altruism are probably equally original in human nature, although the necessities of the struggle for existence have made the egoistic tendencies in man, as well as in all other animals, by nature the stronger.

It follows also, from what has been said, that the individualistic view of human nature, the view that the individual is a quite independent and self-contained entity, must be given up. We have seen that the individual has been produced through the operation of the organic forces which have evolved his species; that he has nowhere developed in isolation, but everywhere in association with his fellow beings; and finally, that natural selection has established in him activities which concern the members of his group even more than they concern himself. Thus even the instincts and appetites of man link him to his fellowmen. The most egoistic of his natural impulses is found upon psychological analysis to have been modified by association. Even the feelings, which seem so intensely individual, give value to the life and actions of others not less than to the life and actions of one's self. All of this is the result of organic selection. Man becomes, however, a social creature, a member of his group, even more through what he acquires after birth than through what is given him by birth. It is obvious that language, thoughts, habits, standards, values, even perceptions and conceptions, are all modified and conditioned, if not wholly given, by the individual's

social environment. Most of the things which go to make up the mind of the adult, therefore, have been acquired by the individual through his life in society. Indeed, we may say here again, as we have already said, that mental development and social development, both in the individual and in the race, seem so inextricably interwoven that it is almost impossible to separate them.

The Different Psychological Aspects of Behavior. If the passive, the hedonistic, the egoistic and the individualistic views of human nature have been overthrown, what must be the positive view which we may accept? The reply is that science shows the individual to be a self-active unit, fashioned by the forces of an organic evolution which has been, at the same time, a social evolution; that is, the individual has been developed as a member of a group and the environment to which he has had to adapt himself has been largely an environment of his fellow beings. Mind, in particular, in the human individual has been developed chiefly as an instrument of association. Its main function has been to adapt the individual to his group through communication, suggestion, imitation, sympathy — in brief, mental interaction. Mind has functioned thus quite as much to adapt the group to its life conditions as to adapt the individual. The greater part of consciousness has been taken up, so far as we can discover, always with the relations of individuals to one another, with the mutual adjustment of their activities, and with the control of those activities. Let us examine now the different levels of individual behavior with which the social psychologist is concerned.[1]

First of all, we must remember that we must start with the inherent, relatively automatic activities which are born

[1] A good analysis of the different inherited and acquired "controls" over conduct or behavior will be found in Bagley's "Educational Values," Chaps. I–V.

in the individual and are the result of his psychological constitution. These are the reflexes and instincts. Before consciousness existed the only control which we can think of which was exerted over these activities was that of the pressure of environment. Environment might suppress or eliminate some altogether, or simply modify others. These modified activities we call the acquired habits, and in the more complex organisms, like the human individual, they constitute the bulk of the activities of the adult. The modified activities, which we term habits, are thus to be thought of as a second level of behavior; and if we lived in a static world, perhaps no higher level of behavior would develop.

But in a world of quick changes other "controls" over activities than the external ones of environmental pressure and selection were needed if higher forms of life were to develop and higher types of adjustment were to be realized. Internal controls of behavior had to be developed. These internal controls over behavior are the two forms of consciousness, cognition and feeling. Cognition, or the awareness of stimuli in the environment, evidently functions to adapt behavior to the conditions in the external world. Feeling, or the awareness of the agreeableness or disagreeableness of an activity, evidently functions to adapt behavior to internal conditions. Feeling and thought are thus the two conscious controls over activity; and beside the levels of instinctive and habitual behavior, we now get the levels of behavior which are accompanied by thought and feeling.

Of course this is merely a psychological analysis, and in the adult human individual it is very rarely that we can find examples of purely instinctive behavior, purely habitual behavior, purely intellectual behavior or purely emotional behavior. It is helpful, however, to make this analysis, not only because it shows the complexity of the individual's behavior, but it also reveals to us thought and feeling as forms

of internal control over activities. It shows us, also, that thought and feeling enter into that part of behavior which we call adaptation. Our mental life, in other words, centers around habit and adaptation. It begins in activity and it ends in activity. Consciousness comes in as an instrument of control over activity. The forms of consciousness which we call feeling and thought are evaluations of activity by the organism, the one evaluating activity with reference to internal organic conditions, the other with reference to the environment. As we have already said, they function to control activity or behavior in those complex situations in which the physiological mechanism of the body working by itself is inadequate to secure adaptation.

Just as the mental life of the individual centers around habit and adaptation, so also does the social life. Just as mental processes in the individual appear in the transition from one habit to the other at those points where purely mechanical means of adjustment are inadequate, so inter-mental processes in society appear in the transition from one form of social activity to another when unconscious means of reciprocal adjustment on the part of individuals prove inadequate. Communication, suggestion, imitation, discussion, the whole process, in fact, of interstimulation and response between individuals, comes in to mediate and control the process of social adaptation. The social life must, therefore, be interpreted psychologically in the same general terms in which we interpret the mental life of the individual, that is, in terms of interstimulation and response, habit and adaptation. Let us now consider the part which instinct, habit, feeling and intelligence play in the social life considered as a process of habit and adaptation.

The Rôle of Instinct in Society. By instinct, as we have already said, we mean the response of hereditary structure to stimulus.[1] Instinctive activities or tendencies

[1] See Hobhouse: "Mind in Evolution," p. 53. A more elaborate

are, accordingly, those which are given us by heredity or birth. They are unlearned activities or tendencies in us, apart from all training or experience. They are manifestly but the psychological side of heredity. However, individual hereditary peculiarities which express themselves in behavior are not usually termed instincts, though they may be properly included within the broader term of "native impulses." By common consent, the term instinct is confined to those hereditary activities, or native reactions, which characterize a race or a large group of individuals. Generally, indeed, all instinctive reactions are similar throughout an entire animal species.

We may emphasize that if psychology is to be based upon biology we cannot escape, in any psychological view of society, the concept of instinct or its equivalent. We have seen that the nervous system has a relatively definite hereditary structure, and corresponding to this hereditary structure there are relatively definite preorganized activities which need only some appropriate stimulus to set them off. The only questions which may reasonably be raised by the social psychologist regarding instinct are those, as we have already said, which concern the number, variety and modifiability of the human instincts.

Now, while there is no exact agreement among psychologists as to the number of different human instincts, it seems certain that the number of instinctive reactions in man are greater than in any other animal, simply because his nervous system is so much further evolved and its hereditary structure so much more complex. For this reason human in-

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definition of instinct (excluding simple reflexes) would be as follows: "An instinctive activity is a group of reflexes organized toward some definite goal and accompanied in their expression by a conscious correlate of more or less clearness and attended by an affective tone of greater or less intensity" (Colvin: "The Learning Process," p. 35; compare McDougall: "Social Psychology," p. 29).

stincts are more plastic and modifiable than in any other species of animal. They are, indeed, but little more than a complex series of native reactions which are modified by experience and built up into permanent habits through the influence of successful adjustment. The part which they play in the social life is that of furnishing certain primitive or original tendencies which make for adjustment between individuals and their environment, whether the environment be physical or social. They furnish, therefore, the simplest coördinations or adaptations between individuals, such as those of sex, parents and children, imitator and imitated. For understanding the real springs of activity in social life and the beginnings of social relationship they are all-important; for no matter how complex our social life becomes, it is all based upon the modification of hereditary nervous structure, that is, upon instinct.

When we take the simpler forms of the social life, we have no difficulty in seeing this. The family, for example, is a typical institution in which the instinctive element is very pronounced. Here we have at work not only such typical instincts as sexual and parental love, but also such as imitativeness and acquisitiveness. These examples are sufficient to show that human instincts have to be taken into account by the social psychologist and sociologist at every step and that they must not be conceived of in the simple, hard and fast way in which popular natural history has pictured the workings of instinct in such lower forms of animal life as the bees and ants. Rather, human instincts are always modifiable, and sometimes vague and indefinite. They have to do, however, with the beginnings of practically all social activities and relationships. Being the original motor tendencies of human nature, they may, from the point of view of social psychology, be considered the primary forces in the social life.

The Rôle of Habit in Society. Racially persistent

activities that come to us by heredity are, as we have just seen, called "instincts" by the psychologist; the modifications of these activities which arise through experience or the influence of the environment are termed habits. From the physiological standpoint habits are, then, modifications of hereditary nervous structure acquired by the individual during his lifetime; or, we may call them the acquired connections in the nervous system in distinction from the original connections which are inherited.

As we have just said, habits are due to the modifying influence of the environment, but we must not think that this means that the habit is formed by the mechanical action of the environment upon the individual. On the contrary, as we have already explained, the individual selects the stimuli in the environment to which he responds upon the basis of his own inner constitution. When he has responded successfully to new stimuli in the environment and adapted himself to them, a habit is established. This habit becomes persistent after several similar responses to similar stimuli, and soon may become apparently as much a part of the nature of the individual as his original tendencies. It becomes, as people say, "second nature." Such fully matured habits become the basis for still further modification of behavior by further adaptation. Thus are built up the countless habits of the mature individual.

Both for the individual and for society habit is of supreme importance. Individual character in the adult must be regarded mainly as due to the process of habituation. In other words, what we mean by character in the individual is very largely a matter of habit. This is especially true if we include in our terms not only the grosser external acts of the individual, which we ordinarily term behavior, but also his internal mental attitudes, ways of thinking and feeling, and, in short, the whole "set" of his nervous system.

What we call social organization at any given time is also

very largely a matter of habit. Social organization is merely the result of the whole mass of reciprocal, habitual adjustments which the individuals of a group maintain among themselves. The psychological fact of habit is thus the main carrier of all those forms of association, or of social organization, which rise above the merely instinctive level. Habit thus becomes the chief raw material on which cultural evolution must act. The higher stages of human culture or civilization, in other words, have been built up by the gradual development in human groups of higher and higher types of habit. The social order of even the very highest civilization is almost entirely made up of habitual types of reaction acquired by each individual, and which serve to hold each individual in orderly relations to all the other individuals of his group.

Man's capacity to acquire an indefinite number of habits is thus the very basis of cultural evolution, or civilization. Whether this capacity has natural limits or not we cannot say. Some writers in social psychology have held that man can never remain permanently adjusted to a very complex civilization; that habit is not second nature, but something very much weaker than original nature. There may be, of course, some truth in these views; but for all practical purposes it may be safely held at present, from the psychological knowledge which we now have, that there is no form of society or stage of civilization, which has thus far become established, to which man cannot adapt himself. Nor do the original tendencies of human nature itself, barring a few which are connected with the functions of nutrition and reproduction, seem stronger than habits which have been long established. At least we may successfully maintain that there is no sufficient scientific evidence, at the present time, to necessitate the acceptance of the contrary conclusion.

If the world were static, as we have already said, instinct

and habit would be sufficient to carry on all life processes and to control behavior. But both instinct and habit adjust the individual only to past environments, and in a rapidly changing world they are quite inadequate to control behavior. Instincts adjust us only to the conditions of life as they existed almost before civilization began, and certainly to no conditions higher than what the cultural anthropologists term "barbarism." When a man acts upon the basis of his instincts purely, therefore, even though the instinct is an altruistic one, he acts as a barbarian or even an animal would act. Something very much higher than instinct is evidently needed for civilization. This something higher, as we have already seen, is supplied, in the main, by man's capacity to acquire habits. But even habit adjusts us to the environment of yesterday rather than to the environment of to-day. Habits, too, therefore, are inadequate for a constantly changing social life such as civilized man now lives in. Habits must change with changing conditions. Old habits break down, new habits must be built up. This is, of course, the process of adaptation of which we have already spoken. It is in this process that the inner controls over behavior, which we term feeling and thought, mainly manifest themselves. Let us see the part which each of these plays in the social life.

The Rôle of Feeling in Society. By feeling we mean the agreeable or disagreeable tone of consciousness which accompanies an activity. As we have already said it is the subjective valuation which the organism gives to an activity. On the neural side it seems to mark the reënforcement or weakening of a nervous current concerned with some activity by the lower and more vegetative nervous centers. When the nervous current is augmented or reenforced by these lower nervous centers, the feeling experienced is that of pleasantness or comfort. When it is

weakened or diminished, the feeling is that of unpleasantness or discomfort. Now the lower vegetative centers usually reënforce the nervous currents or activities which are the expression of the original tendencies of human nature.[1] The feelings which accompany the satisfaction of an instinct are, therefore, generally pleasurable. Again, these lower centers also come in time, generally, strongly to reënforce habitual modes of activity; and hence the feelings which accompany habitual activities are also usually pleasant. From this it follows that peculiarities of individual constitution, of health and of habit, often powerfully influence feeling, and make that which is agreeable to one person disagreeable to another. In short, because feeling is the reaction of the organism to an activity or a stimulus, it is quite a subjective and individualistic matter. It is the value which the individual, as such, attaches to an activity; or, as one psychological writer has happily phrased it: "it is the *me*-side of the whole complex of conscious processes involved in adjustment."[2]

Now, to understand the way feeling works as a control over activity is, evidently, very important for the social psychologist; because feeling represents, in a peculiar sense, the individualistic element in the social life. While we have gotten rid of the hedonistic psychology which made "pleasure" and "pain" the sole motives to action and which made feeling the original or primary form of consciousness, yet feeling does play a very important part in human social life. On the one side, it is often a powerful conservative force in our social life because it reënforces habitual activities. Customs, institutions, folkways are embedded in feeling and it is often very hard to get feeling to sanction a change. Indeed, the whole process of adaptation in a complex environment is usually difficult and dis-

[1] Compare Bernard: *Op. cit.*, p. 18.
[2] Miller: "The Psychology of Thinking," p. 64.

agreeable. Hence a hedonistic standard of behavior adopted by individuals or groups, usually makes it much more difficult to bring about rational changes or adaptations in the social order.

On the other hand, just because feeling strongly reenforces purely instinctive or animal activities, it is often apt to prove a dissolving force in society for higher types of behavior and of social order. This is especially the case when some institution has proved to be needlessly suppressive of original human nature. Hence, the appeal to feeling has always been a successful method of overthrowing despotic and oppressive institutions. Unfortunately, the same appeal can be more or less successfully made for the overthrow of wise and salutary institutions, for the simple reason that the strongest feelings are connected with our instinctive or animal activities. Thus, the anarchist makes his appeal to feeling not less than the liberator. Whoever would have us live by our emotions, however, would hurry us back toward the life in the wood of our savage ancestors. The appeal to feeling is socially justified only when the appeal is to our sympathetic or altruistic feelings. As these latter are attached to our altruistic impulses they can be successfully enlisted to aid in bringing about the highest forms of adaptation between all parts of humanity.

But in every case feeling must be respected in society and, if possible, enlisted on the side of both social order and progress, because it is a powerful modifying influence in the life of the individual. It is not the primary force in the social life, as the hedonistic sociologists once argued; but it is, nevertheless, a powerful influence. It forms a very considerable element, if not the core, in both interest and desire. Even egoistic feeling, therefore, must be respected, if we are going to be successful in bringing about changes in society. Feeling, as we have said, in a peculiar

sense stands for the individual, and the individual may not safely be ignored in any social arrangements. Moreover, the feelings which are attached to instinctive and habitual activities help, as we have seen, to maintain the existing order in a social group. It is only in the process of adaptation or change that feeling becomes a danger in society, and that for the simple reason that it is an insufficient guide for action in complex situations.

The Rôle of the Intellect in Society. By the intellect we understand the objective, cognitive side of the mind which is concerned with the adaptation of the organism to its environment. Under the various aspects of sensation, perception, conception and reasoning, it evaluates activity with reference to the environment. All of these mental processes, so far as we can discover, come in as elements or factors in the adaptive processes of behavior. The distinguishing mark of man as an animal seems to be that he has passed through many more stages of intellectual evolution than the other animals. It is the high development of the intellectual side of his mental life, as we have said, which marks him off from other species. While in the other animals we find sensation, perception, recognition and other relatively simple phases of the intellect quite fully developed, in all normal human adults there are, in addition, more or less fully developed powers of abstract reasoning and constructive imagination. This is probably due to the fact that man has developed the power to form what is known as free or independent ideas; that is, ideas not attached to particular concrete activities or situations. This has given man a capacity for adaptation to complex environments, such as no other animal possesses. With him the intellect evaluates activity not simply with reference to his present environment, but also with reference to all possible future environments, which the organizing tendency of the mind can bring within the grasp of imagination or reason. By means of

his superior intellectual development, his mind is able to take account of factors neither present nor tangible to the senses, remote perhaps in both space and time. Thus the most highly developed phase of the intellect, the reason, aids in adapting man to a much wider environment in space and time than such simple cognitive processes as sensation, perception and recognition could possibly do. Indeed, its goal may be said to be nothing less than the adaptation of man to the universe itself.

Yet we must not think of the intellect as something apart from the feelings and the instincts. There is, indeed, in human nature no such divisions as psychological analysis might lead the immature student to suppose. Such divisions as we have made must be thought of rather as different aspects of the living, functioning organism, than as entirely different processes. Instinct and habit and adaptation are but the more objective sides of the same processes which express themselves on the subjective side as feeling and intelligence. On the other hand, it is equally a mistake to think that these processes have no independence whatsoever of each other. The intellect, for example, seems to have gotten its development very largely as an aid in carrying out the instincts and in satisfying the demands of feeling. Nevertheless, we are not justified in concluding that the intellect is always the mere servant of the instincts and emotions, as some psychologists have said. For the intelligence (or the neural processes involved in intelligence) seems to have come to have a survival value of its own, over and above instinct, habit or emotion. Thus in civilized man there can be no doubt that we find the intellect not infrequently in opposition to instinct, habit and feeling. This is probably due to his rapidly changing environment. Hence civilized man can depend less and less upon instinct, habit and feeling; for him the intellect, especially the reason, has become the chief guide of life.

In spite of the fact that the place of the intellect in the development of life and mind is fairly clear, its rôle in the social life of man has been and is a subject of vigorous dispute. It would seem tolerably clear, however, that the intellect, as the latest phase of mind to develop fully and as something in its full development quite peculiar to man, could not have had much to do with the origins of human society. Those origins must be sought mainly in human instincts, in habits molded by the environment, and in the "trial and error" method of adaptation. Neither has the intellect, apparently, much to do with social organization or structure after it has once become fixed, for that is largely a matter again of instinct and habit. Intellect enters into social life, then, chiefly in social change or adaptation; and increasingly as humanity has outgrown, or found insufficient, the "trial and error" method of adaptation. Nevertheless, as we have already seen, intellect in its peculiar human form was already in evidence when the human stage was reached in man's evolution; and it was the intellectual elements, from the first, which gave human society the distinct and peculiar traits which differentiated it from animal association. The first outcome of the large brain of primitive man in reaction upon his social life, as we pointed out in the preceding chapter, was language or articulate speech. Now language must be regarded as chiefly an intellectual creation. It not only reacted to further the intellectual development of man, but it became the vehicle of tradition, by which each generation could hand down to its successors its store of knowledge, beliefs and standards. Thus language, in making possible tradition, made possible civilization. The whole structure of human civilization thus presents itself as largely an intellectual product. The intellect, then, must be regarded as the main creator and guide of cultural evolution. The fact that no other animal species has undergone cultural evolution is, indeed, sufficient proof

that man's superior intellectual endowment is the chief factor in this process.

The rôle of invention and discovery in human society illustrates further what we have just said. Invention and discovery have been the means by which man has slowly conquered the forces of nature and harnessed them to his use.[1] The simplest inventions and discoveries were doubtless often accidental; but the fact that invention and discovery exist to but a limited degree among the animals below man shows that practically all of man's inventions and discoveries were due to his superior intellect. They have involved the making of hypotheses and the testing of those hypotheses; that is, they have depended upon creative imagination and constructive reasoning. Now invention and discovery must not be confined to new combinations of physical forces; for new social arrangements, or adaptations, may be equally products of the imagination and reasoning used as instruments of the social life. Thus the great regulative institutions of human society, such as government, religion, morality and education, have from the start had a very large intellectual element in them. Their nonexistence in the forms below man is again practical proof of this. Finally, science and art, which in the broad sense of those words have played such an important part in man's social life from the very beginning, are chiefly intellectual creations. The importance of the intellect in human social life, thus, is the importance of language, religion, morality, government, science and art; for these achievements of man can scarcely be thought of as existing apart from his intellect.

All this is illustrated by the part which individuals of exceptional intellect have always played in human social life. Even among savages intellectual ability is found to be one

[1] For collateral reading on this point, see Ratzel, on "Invention and Discovery" in Thomas: "Sourcebook for Social Origins," pp. 426–435.

of the things which count most in social leadership. The genius is the man who can think ahead of his group, and so produce inventions and discoveries which become instruments of progress. Now, while the genius is doubtless mainly a product of biological variation, yet his work is the distinctly intellectual one of producing new ideas and concepts which his group may find useful in making new and higher adaptations. The superior intellect of exceptional individuals in society, in other words, has always been the means of producing the new instrumentalities of mastery over nature on the one hand, and over human nature on the other.

Progress, or new and higher adjustments in social life, has thus been very largely the work of the human intellect. Quite justly we may regard the intellect, therefore, the progressive force in human society, the active agent of progress. Moreover, we have a right to believe that through the rationalization of knowledge, or science, man will be enabled to more and more master nature and to control his own nature. We are justified from the past history of mankind in relying upon the intellect for the mastery over forces both without and within us. Increasingly social adjustments have been made and perfected upon the basis of science. We may rightly regard the intellect or the reason, then, as the ultimate guide of life, whether for individuals or for groups.

While we must repudiate the intellectualistic view of human society as at all adequate, from a scientific standpoint, or even any view which would make the social life mainly an intellectual affair; yet the functional view of the intellect as the latest and most delicate instrument of individual and social adaptation compels us to recognize it as an increasing factor, as human social evolution proceeds, in social change and in social life generally. Especially must we recognize the importance in human social life of those

intellectual elements tinged with feeling which we term ideals, standards or values. These, because they embody elements of feeling, may be factors either in social organization or in social progress. As Sumner shows: when social habits have been reflected upon by a group and sanctioned, they become social standards, whose pressure upon the individual is but little short of all-powerful. These Sumner calls the *mores*. But social standards, or ideals, may also become instruments of progress when thought out and accepted by a small element in the group and spread among the mass by suggestion, imitation and communication, by oral or written speech.

The intellect, then — that is, thought, ideas, ideals, standards — must be regarded as a powerful modifying influence in human society. If we have any right to consider feeling as a "social force," we have an equal right to speak thus of intellect, even though it is only a modifying and directive factor. Thought is not the content of our social life, or in any sense the social reality; but it is the instrument by which human society has secured its highest adaptations. Thought when fused with impulse forms will, or intelligent purpose, which more and more is guiding the destiny of civilized human society. The intellect, then, must be regarded as the final control over the activities of society.

The Social Character of the Individual Mind. We have seen that the mind of the individual has been evolved very largely as a social instrument, an instrument of adjustment in group life. This, indeed, so far as we can judge, has been the history of mind from its very beginning. As we have seen, life has been group life because of biological necessities from the very beginning. The mind has been used as a link between different members of the same species since mental life appeared. It has functioned, in other words, to adjust individuals to their group and to their species from the start. Social life, in the strict sense, as a

specialized form of group or collective life, was made possible, indeed, by the appearance of mind. It should not be surprising, therefore, that we find the psychic elements of life, as far back as we can go in mental evolution, a chief means of binding individuals of the same species or group together. Instincts, emotions and sensations of one individual organism often seem made to fit into corresponding mental processes of another individual, and so to bind all together in a larger unity. The mind thus seems to be social in its nature from the start and to be largely both a product of, and an instrument of, association.

We cannot doubt the social character of the individual mind.[1] While consciousness exists only in the individual, every aspect of consciousness has been socially conditioned. This is true even of the racially inherited aspects of consciousness, the instincts, emotions and practically all native impulses. The higher human instincts and emotions, especially, show very plainly their reference to the social life, and function quite as much with reference to the life of the group as they do with reference to the life of the individual. The acquired traits of consciousness practically all come to us through our social environment. From it we get not only our knowledge, our beliefs, our ideals, but even our precepts and concepts, in the strict sense of those terms. It is in the "give and take" of the social life that we learn and develop practically all of the phases of consciousness of our adult life. In a word, mind has been developed through interaction of mind with mind in the carrying on and controlling of common life processes. Mental life belongs, therefore, quite as much to the group as to the individual. If mental processes in the individual are concerned with the control of life activities, it is not less true that the intermental processes among the individuals of a

[1] See Mead's article on "Social Psychology as Counterpart to Physiological Psychology," *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. vi, pp. 403–408.

group, such as suggestion, sympathy, imitation, communication, are concerned with the carrying on of the common life of the group. Just as we may regard thought and feeling in the individual as instruments of adaptation, so we may regard these forms of mental interstimulation and response as instruments for the mutual adaptation of the individuals of a group carrying on a common life. The individual has been developed as a part of a larger life process; hence also the mind of the individual has been developed as a part of an intermental life which functions to control the activities of a group.

These statements must not be interpreted to mean that the individual's mental life is wholly submerged in that of his group. Biological variation alone would prevent this. The self-active character of the individual organism also militates against this view of the mind of the individual. So far as science can discover, there is no complete social determinism of individual consciousness, or even of individual activity. To view a social group as a simple mass is hardly short of absurd, considering what biology and psychology have taught us regarding the nature of the individual. The truth is, rather, that the individual gets his development, both physical and psychical, in the main, from his connection with a larger life, the life of his species and of his group. This does not prevent him, however, from developing variations of his own, both physically and mentally. If this were not so, indeed, progress would be impossible, save through the action of natural selection upon groups. As it is, however, the variations, originalities and inventions of the individual react upon his group. If they are found to be socially useful they may be taken up, through suggestion and imitation, as acquired traits, or habits, by the whole group. As we have seen, philosophical individualism, the belief that the individual is an original and underived entity, finds little support in modern psychol-

ogy; but it has an element of truth in it, which is of great practical import, namely: that the individual is a relatively independent center of energy, and can, and should, develop an independent personality. Human society is not a simple mass, but is made up of relatively independent, autonomous individuals. The key to its activities is not, therefore, in some principle which simply applies to the mass as a whole, but rather in the laws and principles of individual behavior. It should not be forgotten, however, that individuals, in society, form a mutual environment for each other, and that the human element in the environment of the individual is, under all normal conditions, by far the most important element.

The Active Factors in Association. We may now summarize what has been said in this and in the preceding chapter regarding the factors which are at work in human association. It has been a tendency, among social psychologists, to recognize only the psychic factors as truly social, and even among these only the acquired psychic traits which are the result of cultural evolution, since these alone can be considered as having originated *within* human society. But the scientific question which concerns us is not how certain forces originate, but what factors do we have to take into account in explaining psychologically the social life of mankind? As soon as we put the question in this form and take the evolutionary point of view, we see that the physical factors, such as climate and race, loom large. Indeed, over long stretches of time, the geographical factors of climate, food and soil, and the biological factors of heredity, variation and selection, seem the significant factors. At any given moment, however, the influence of these physical factors expresses itself in the social life through the impulses, feelings, and ideas of individuals; for it is only through these psychological elements that any kind of social life is maintained, as we have already said. Hence the social

psychologist may rightly emphasize the psychic factors, provided that he keeps in the background environmental and biological forces as the basis upon which the psychic processes take place and which continually conditions and modifies them.

As original active factors in human association, we must, then, recognize the following:

I. *The physical factors*
   (a) Geographic environment, including climate, food, soil, natural resources, topography, etc.
   (b) Biological forces, heredity, variation, selection, etc.

II. *The psychical factors*
   (a) Impulses, both hereditary (instinctive) and acquired (habitual).
   (b) Feelings, both hereditary (emotions) and acquired, and both pleasant and unpleasant.
   (c) Intellectual elements, including sensation, perception and ideation (conception, imagination, reasoning, etc.).

Derived, complex factors, compounded out of the simple, original factors, are very numerous, and have never been satisfactorily classified from a psychological point of view. Thus we have, as a result chiefly of the operation of man's intellect upon physical nature, the whole *technology* of civilization, such as roads, houses, tools and machinery. This results in a new, artificial physical environment for man, even more important for his social life than the geographic environment. Compounded mainly out of feeling and intellectual elements are *beliefs;* out of feeling and impulses are *desires;* out of feeling, impulses and intellectual ele-

ments are *interests*. These last, which supply normally the motives for the reflective activities of civilized men, have been classified by Professor Small as: (a) health interests, (b) economic interests, (c) social interests (including political interests), (d) intellectual interests, (e) esthetic interests, (f) moral interests (including religious interests); or, in six words, health, wealth, sociability, knowledge, beauty and rightness. This is a convenient functional classification of human interests or motives; and something like this classification is a practical necessity when we speak of the different classes of institutions and activities of human society in their mutual relationships. It must be noted that Professor Small proposes this classification as an objective rather than a psychological one, as he defines interest, in a practical sense, as something objectively at stake.[1] The classification is perhaps sociological rather than psychological, and it serves to remind us that there are great social complexes of practical activities, or institutions, in every human group, such as industry, government, education, art and religion, which also may be rightly spoken of as "social forces," though they are manifestly very complex in their origin.

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CHAPTER IV

THE NATURE OF SOCIAL UNITY

THE PSYCHICAL NATURE OF THE UNITY, OR SOLIDARITY, OF SOCIAL GROUPS. We have defined a society, in the full sense of the word, as a group of individuals carrying on a common life by means of mental interaction. Now this means that society is that type of collective life in which psychical elements function in the carrying on of common life processes. While the unity of a social group is fundamentally one of life activities, it is important that the student see, from the beginning, that this unity, while primitively biological, becomes more and more psychical as social evolution advances.[1] The interconnections between the individuals of the group, in other words, become more and more a psychical matter. At first sight, modern psychology may not seem favorable to this conception of the social group as a "psychical unity"; for psychology thus far admits no direct connection between the minds of individuals. Each mind is, so far as we know, wholly unconnected with other minds except through the intervention of physical media. Each mind responds, however, to physical stimuli, and among these stimuli are the symbols of thought and feeling created in the physical medium by other minds. These are reacted to and mentally interpreted. Thus mental interaction is possible.

It will be noted, however, that there are no direct *causal*

[1] The argument for the psychical unity of social groups must not, of course, be taken to exclude full recognition of a physical basis of unity. See the note on page 9 as to the correlation of the physical and psychical in the social life.

connections between one mind and another. But on account of development under similar biologic conditions, the mind, or nervous system, of all the individuals of a given social group responds in like ways, in general, to like stimuli. Moreover, as we have already seen, natural selection, from the first, has favored the development of groups of individuals who tend to react in similar ways to similar stimuli. Thus, from the first, the interactions of the group of like individuals would tend to become orderly; and selective processes would continue to favor groups in which orderly and definite forms of interstimulation and response became more and more developed. The processes of habit formation in a group of individuals living in a common environment and carrying on common activities, would, moreover, tend in the same general direction. Thus, through the operation of natural selection and habit, the action and reaction of mind upon mind, through the intermediation of physical stimuli, tends to become an orderly, well-defined and continuous process. This process, which we know in sociology as the "social process," but which we ordinarily call communication, imitation, suggestion, sympathy, etc., is found, upon analysis, to be made up of psychological elements, such as impulse, instinct, habit, feeling, emotion, desire, sensation, perception, imagination and reasoning. It is thus, through various forms of mental interstimulation and response, that groups of relatively independent individuals can act together. Hence, it is through the means of these psychic elements that groups of individuals function as units. It is not inappropriate, therefore, to describe the social group as essentially a psychical unity, even though its unity is one primarily of activity, rather than of strictly mental elements. What we mean is that the process of interaction between individuals in a social group is dominantly a psychical process, in that its dominant elements are psychical.

More accurately, of course, the unity of a social group must be described as "psycho-physical." But this statement would be equally true of the mind of an individual, since we know of no purely psychic processes which exist apart from physical processes. When we speak of the mind of the individual as a psychical unity, we do so because the significant elements in the individual's mind are psychical. So, also, when we speak of the unity of the social group as psychical, we mean only that the significant things regarding it, the things which make it a social group, are psychical. Without mental interaction there could be no social life, as we understand that phrase. Mental interaction is, then, the significant thing to which sociologists and social psychologists alike must give attention in the study of the social life. Mental interactions make up, indeed, practically all social phenomena. There could be no unity in the social life without the functioning of psychical elements, because, in a word, there would be no social life.

Social Coördination. The significant thing for the scientific student of society, however, is not that mental interactions between individuals exist, but that they are regular. Their regularity is, indeed, practically as great as that of the physical causal series itself. It is this regularity which makes the social sciences possible; for, as yet, we have discovered no way of tracing, except as a matter of pure hypothesis, the physical causal series in all of its ramifications and complexities in our social life. This statement may be disputed by some sociologists of the day. But it is safe to affirm that no purely physical interpretation of society, save in a few of its aspects, is anything more today than an ambitious program. The social sciences are, at present, and apparently will long remain, psychological sciences, tracing regularities in social activities, that is, in the forms of interstimulation and response among individuals, rather than in purely mechanical series.

Now, individuals, to carry on a common life, must coördinate their activities; that is, they must mutually so adapt their activities that these are brought to a unity of objective aim. Such a coadaptation of the activities of the individuals of a group may be called a social coördination. It is this coördination of the activities of individuals, of course, which makes group action possible. It creates the unity of the group. In proportion as coördinated activity in a group develops, in that proportion social organization and social life develop. The coördinations between individuals of a group that persist — become habitual — form the substance of permanent social organization. The changing of the form of coördination, or of coadaptation, between the individuals of a group is what calls forth, very largely, the conscious life of the group, just as the conscious life of the individual centers about the process of individual adaptation. If we take the standpoint, therefore, of the social coördination, that is, of the reciprocal adaptations of the activities of a group of individuals, we shall have no difficulty in understanding social processes from the point of view of psychology.

The social psychologist, in other words, must start his interpretation of the social life with the study of social activities. He cannot get back of social activity and have anything left of social life. He must start with the group *doing something*. A social group is a unity only through the interconnection and reciprocal relationships of the activities of its members. It is the coördination of individuals in activity, then, which is the outward sign of social relationship, social organization and social life. If we can trace out the mechanism of the origin, development, forms and functions of these coördinations, or coadaptations, of individuals, we shall have an adequate social psychology. As a recent writer has said, in effect: the essence of social life is coadaptation; just as psychology tries to tell how

millions of brain cells are coördinated to think and act as one human brain, so social psychology tries to tell how millions of brains coördinate themselves to think and act as one human society.[1]

Objective Expressions of Social Coördination. Social coördination may express itself in manifold ways in our social life; for it is evident that even the visible forms of mutual adaptation between individuals are multitudinous. The objective expressions of social coördination cover, indeed, practically all of the visible uniformities of our social life. Social coördinations, in an objective sense, are simply the regular modes of social activity in a given group of individuals. In those large human groups which we term nations, or peoples, we may call the enduring social coördinations "folkways." But, since these regular modes of social activity are not by any means confined to large groups, but are found in the smallest groups as well, the most appropriate general name which we can give to them, when they are persistent, would be "social habits." Every family group, for example, illustrates the whole matter of social adaptation, or social coördination. The activity of each member of a family group is coördinated in very definite and regular ways with the activities of all the other members of the group.[2] In the large groups which we term peoples, however, there are advantages in calling the regular modes of social activity by some definite sociological term such as "customs" or "folkways." More strictly, perhaps, a custom is to be defined as a social coördination which has persisted long enough in a people to gain a certain prestige. Again, human institutions may be regarded as objective expressions of social coördination. They are

[1] Davis: "Psychological Interpretations of Society," p. 9.

[2] Take the description of the family group in Chapter IV of Ellwood: "Sociology and Modern Social Problems" for illustration, amplifying it from personal knowledge.

groupings, or relations, of individuals which have been reflected upon, sanctioned by their groups and established by authority. As we have already implied, the whole matter of social organization is simply a matter of the types of adaptation, or of social coördination, that persist among the members of a given group. The external form and life of the group, looked at statically, is simply an expression of social coördination; so, too, are all the forms or modes of association.

The types of coördination between individuals are as complex as human life itself. It is not scientifically possible, on this account, to make an exhaustive enumeration or classification of the types of adaptation, or coördination, between individuals. Certain great types, however, can be made out, and these we shall speak of, from time to time. Thus, there are the concrete forms of association, beginning with the family life and going up to cultural groups, each of which may show a multitude of varieties.[1] There is more hope in getting some sort of exhaustive enumeration and classification of the types of social relationships if we abstract the forms, or modes, of association from their content, as Professor Simmel has done. Then we get such abstract forms of relationship between individuals as equality, superiority, subordination, imitator and imitated, and the like. Through such abstraction, we can reduce the essential forms of social relationship to a few types. The student should note, however, that the concept of social coördination, or social coadaptation, covers all possible, more or less persistent relationships between individuals. Hence social coördination does not, necessarily, imply cooperation, or mutual aid, between individuals. Its form may be often that of exploitation or even of mere mutual

[1] For illustration of the variety of forms in the family alone, read Chapter VI in Ellwood: "Sociology and Modern Social Problems," Revised Edition.

toleration. The group, nevertheless, will retain its unity, its activities will remain coördinated, if some type of adaptation between the individuals of the group persists.

Subjective Accompaniments of Social Coördination. The study of the subjective accompaniments of social coordination is not less important, for the understanding of our social life psychologically, than the study of its objective expressions in folkways, customs, institutions and social organization. These subjective expressions are to be found in the mental attitudes which individuals of a group maintain toward each other or in what have been called "the social attitudes." If a group of individuals are to carry on successfully certain common activities, through interstimulation and response, they must maintain certain psychical attitudes toward each other which will favor the quick and effective response of each to the stimulus which the activity of the others affords. Hence certain habits of feeling and of cognition must develop in the group to facilitate interstimulation and response among its members. Common feelings, ideas, beliefs and valuations, in other words, must develop as controls of the common activities of the group. The family group again illustrates the matter. The mental attitude of the members of the family toward one another is an expression of their common group life and group activities. Corresponding to their habitual modes of action are certain habitual feelings, or emotional attitudes, and certain common ideas and beliefs. Certain standards and ideals more or less consciously control the life of the group. Thus the social coördinations of husband and wife, parent and child, are accompanied and controlled by appropriate emotional and intellectual processes.

There can be no question but that the function of common feeling, ideals, beliefs and valuations, in a social group, is to control the behavior of the members of the group toward one another and toward their common environment.

Hence the significance of the psychic processes (or of the neural processes which they represent) in our social life. Human social groups, especially, are characterized by the large feeling and ideational elements which enter into their life. In animal groups, where the interactions of the individuals are almost wholly instinctive, these mental elements might perhaps be disregarded as of no great scientific or practical importance. But in human society these subjective accompaniments of social coördination become the chiefly significant things which we must know in order to understand and control social life. In modern nations, for example, unity of action and of life is secured largely through certain political ideas and beliefs shared by most of the people, and through certain sentiments, like patriotism and national loyalty. The unity, even of such small and relatively instinctive groups as the family, will be found in human society, if carefully examined, to depend largely upon certain feelings, standards and ideas accepted not only by the members of that special group, but also, perhaps, by the social life in general by which it is surrounded.

The study of these subjective accompaniments of social coördination is important, moreover, for the understanding of the unity, or solidarity, of human groups, because they exert both a unifying and a dissolving effect upon groups. Certain feelings, for example, draw individuals together and seem to act as a sort of social cement, so to speak, between them. Such feelings we may call "coordinating feelings." They include especially the class of feelings which are ordinarily called sympathetic, although other types of feeling may also, under certain circumstances, favor the coördination of individual activities. Similarly, certain ideas and beliefs tend strongly to unite men in groups, and these we may call "coördinating ideas." Ideas, for example, of a common country, of common interests at stake and the like, function to draw men to-

gether. Especially must be mentioned, among the coördinating ideas, the ideas and ideals we call "moral." The virtues bind men together in harmonious relationships, and the ideas which stand for them function, of course, in the same general direction. Many other ideas, however, under various circumstances have a cohesive power upon groups. Indeed whether a feeling or an ideal will function in a unifying or disintegrating way in the social life quite entirely depends upon circumstances. There are undoubtedly certain feelings and ideas which are dominantly unifying or "coordinating," while others are undoubtedly disintegrating in their dominant tendency. Yet many other feelings and ideas seem quite neutral: at times working toward the unity of social groups, at other times tending to break them up, according to the circumstances. Thus the idea of "food" may under certain circumstances lead men to coöperate, while under other circumstances (when there is not enough food to go around, for example) it tends toward conflict and the disintegration of the group.

The student will note, however, that we have not been discussing the causes of social unity, but only its objective forms and expressions and its subjective accompaniments. We shall deal with the active factors which enter into social unity under a later heading.

Social Habits. We have called the coördinations, or adaptations, which persist in a social group "social habits." Habits in the individual may be defined, in biological terms, as pathways in the nervous system, as we have seen. When we speak of social habit we do not, of course, mean that there is a "social organism" with a "social nervous system." We mean only that certain coördinating activities of individuals in a group persist. However, the basis of these persistent activities in groups is habits in individuals; and with but a slight extension of the word habit to mean simply "persistent activity," it may be applied either to

groups or to individuals. In social psychology there is manifest advantage in keeping the term habit for the persistent activities of groups, because it shows at once the psychological basis of these activities in individuals. We may, of course, call social habits "folkways," or "customs," in the larger human groups. In any case it is well to remember that the corresponding individual fact is that of acquired habit. Back of the social habit and of the acquired habit in the individual lies, of course, the native impulses of individual human nature. But none of the social habits or customs of civilized human society, as we shall see later, can be directly ascribed to these native impulses. Human instincts furnish only a basis for social coördination which is modified by many circumstances in the group life and its environment. It is only in animal societies that we can hope to find social habits of such simple and inflexible character that we can quite safely ascribe them entirely to the workings of instinct. In human society every individual has to *acquire,* therefore, the habits of his group, that is, his social habits, or folkways. Hence it is, that human groups have developed definite forms of interstimulation and response, such as oral and written language, and superior types of suggestion and imitation, in order to make it possible that every individual may acquire the habits of his group. The beginning of human communication, and indeed all of its development, has had reference, as we shall see later, to the unity of group action. If human societies had no need of acting together, that is, of coördinated activity, definite forms of communication would probably never have developed.

Conflict Within the Social Group. When individuals have once become united in the common activities of group life, conflict can develop among them only through the failure, or breaking down, of their social coördinations. This is, however, what is continually liable to happen; for

social habits have to constantly change in a changing environment, such as most human groups are exposed to. Individuals are exposed unequally to life conditions. Hence they will be exposed to different stimuli and will respond differently. Individuals also constantly vary in their organic constitution, and on that account their responses also will vary. Hence, social habits in a mass of individuals are liable constantly to vary, and the group must devise means to control the habits of individuals or else their activities will fail of harmonious coördination. Any failure on the part of the group to keep its machinery of social readjustment and social control in the highest state of efficiency, means that social conflict is apt to break out between the members of the group.

Some degree of conflict within a group, whether small or large, is of course a normal accompaniment of social life. There is no such thing as a social order which remains unchanged. The conditions of life change and the social order which worked well yesterday will not work today. The habits, customs and institutions of society must gradually be modified, therefore, if the group is to remain adjusted to its life conditions. Normally, however, this process of readjustment goes on so gradually in a group that serious forms of conflict do not develop between its members. The modification of the forms and practices of the group are brought about by such peaceful means as mutual criticism, free discussion and voluntary agreement upon policies and leaders. But where these means of affecting social readjustment are lacking or imperfectly developed, or where, for any reason, inflexibility may develop in some portion of the group, especially in its dominant elements, trouble is bound to result. For under such conditions a conflict of habits arises within the group and there is a failure to construct a new and harmonious coördination between its members, adapted to the new life conditions.

It is here that much of the tragedy of social life comes in, for it is here that the opportunity for hostility between members of a once unified group arises, and the possibility of the more or less complete disintegration of the group. Members of a family group, for example, often take on certain habitual attitudes toward each other which work well for a number of years; but the conditions of life change and, for various reasons, certain members of the family may fail to modify their attitudes in accordance with the new conditions. As a consequence, the old adjustment is maintained too long. It finally breaks down, and through lack of mutual understanding and sympathy, a new harmonious adaptation fails to be realized, and the family suffers more or less complete disintegration, which might have been avoided if the unity of its life had been maintained by the constant readjustment of the activities of its members in accordance with life conditions.

It is the same in the wider social organization of nations and peoples as it is in the more intimate relations of family life. Unless the unity of these groups is maintained, by constant readjustment of the habits and attitudes of all classes to accord with life conditions, conflict between classes is bound to develop. Normally, a people's institutions are continually changing; old forms of social organization and institutional life may become gradually so modified, by the free intercommunication of ideas, free public criticism and the untrammeled formation of a rational public opinion, that a new institution springs, with scarcely a noticeable break, out of an old one. There may be, of course, in all this process, as we have just said, some degree of inevitable and necessary opposition between the parties and sections within the nation. But the necessary changes, nevertheless, are effected by peaceful means — sometimes, indeed, without any high degree of consciousness on the part of the individuals of the group as to the direction of

change. Individuals may participate in discussion, may receive suggestions and may imitate, may accept new ideas and beliefs, may even select leaders, and yet be quite unconscious that they are constructing new institutions or a new type of social order. This is the type of peaceful social change which characterizes the most harmonious social life in which the machinery of social readjustment and social control is kept at its maximum of efficiency.

But if inflexibility develops within a national group, either through interference with the mechanism of social readjustment — namely, free public criticism, free discussion, the untrammeled formation of public opinion and the free selection of leaders to carry out public policies — or for any other reason, then social habits and institutions are maintained too long. When they finally break down, as they must sooner or later if not modified to meet new conditions, conflict of a serious sort between the classes and parties within the nations is liable to develop. Thus the unity of the national group may be, either temporarily or permanently, more or less destroyed. It is from such conditions as these that serious class conflicts and those disturbances within the national group, which we call revolutions, result. These we shall consider more in detail in another chapter. Here we would emphasize only that serious conflict within a social group is a relatively abnormal condition, which results from the failure of its members to maintain their social coördinations, or coadaptations. Conflict of one social group with another is, of course, an entirely different matter.

Social Maladjustment. The revolt of a large number of persons to an established social order is not to be considered a case of social maladjustment, in the strict sense of that term. It is rather the sign of the bad working or breaking down of social habits for a portion of the popu-

lation. Usually, it is the forerunner of social reconstruction. By social maladjustment, we mean rather the more or less complete failure of certain elements in a population to adjust their activities to the normal social habits of their group. Such maladjustment of individuals in complex societies may arise from many causes. It may arise from abnormal individual variations, springing from causes more or less independent of social conditions. These may give rise to individual defects in body or mind which result in the social maladjustment of the individual. However, the bulk of social maladjustment, in modern civilization, probably results from faulty social arrangements. It is especially due, on the one hand, to lack of adequate social control over the habits and character of individuals; and, on the other, to defects in the economic organization of society.

To control individual character completely, it would of course be necessary for society to exercise control over the individual's heredity. In all probability this will be found in practice to be, for some time to come, a very difficult matter; but it should be comparatively easy for modern, civilized society to control the acquired habits and character of individuals. The regulative institutions of society, government and law, religion, morality and education, exist to control the acquired character of the individual, and to help him successfuly adapt himself to the habits and standards of his group. The failure of these institutions of social control necessarily expresses itself in the failure of many individuals to adjust themselves successfully to the social life. In the same way, defects in objective economic conditions and arrangements may make it impossible for the individual to adjust himself successfully to the institutions and order of society in general. Moreover, these conditions may destroy the individual's power of social adjustment through compelling him to live in such circumstances

that his normal bodily and mental development cannot be secured, or becomes impaired. Through such external conditions in the environment, as well as through lack of education and the failure to get proper social standards, the individual may develop habits which put him so far out of adjustment with his group that he becomes more or less parasitic or even antisocial in his nature. Thus we have the genesis, in modern civilized society, of disproportionate numbers of dependent persons on the one hand, and of delinquent persons on the other, along with a class of more or less hereditary defectives.[1] It is evident that imperfect social arrangements, especially faults in economic organization on the one hand, and in the training of the young on the other hand, are responsible for the large number of these social misfits in modern civilization. Such socially unadjusted persons, if their number is sufficiently increased, menace the very existence of the societies of which they are a part; for besides the burden which they impose on the normal part of the population, there is always danger that the social degeneracy which they represent will spread to a majority of the population, rendering the whole group incapable of complex adjustments or of a high degree of social efficiency. It is evident that it must be the task of scientific philanthropy to remove the causes of social maladjustment so far as it can, to reclaim to society as many as possible of the socially unadjusted classes, and finally, to segregate from free social life those that it cannot reclaim. The student should note, therefore, that the significance of philanthropic activity in a social group, is, in part, that it functions to maintain the unity of the group, to prevent its dissolution and disintegration through the action of conditions which are destructive to the social life.

[1] For collateral reading along this line, see Chapters XIII and XIV of Ellwood: "Sociology and Modern Social Problems." Compare also Devine: "Misery and Its Causes."

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CHAPTER V

THE NATURE OF SOCIAL UNITY (*Continued*)

We have seen that it is the coördination of individuals in activity which makes the unity of a social group. We must now examine the active factors which bring about and maintain social unity. To some extent, we have already done this in our discussion of the origin of animal association and of human society. We have also noted more or less the function of the various elements which enter into social coördination, and which are accordingly factors in social unity. Again, the whole matter of the unity of human society in both space and time is such a fundamental question in sociology that we shall not be able to get away from it completely in any part of our discussion of the psychological factors in human social life. Therefore, we shall at present attempt only to indicate in outline the different sets of factors which affect the unity of social groups when viewed statically.

The Factors in Social Unity. We find, upon analysis, no less than seven different sets of factors which affect the unity of social groups, even when we take a static, or cross-section, view of their existence — namely: (1) external environment, (2) biological conditions, (3) instincts, (4) habits, (5) feelings, (6) ideas, (7) institutions of social control. Let us now take up and discuss these various elements in social unity, in the order named.

(1) There can be no doubt concerning the very great influence of external conditions in bringing about the unity, or solidarity, of groups. Indeed, these conditions are so

obvious that the chief danger, in a scientific study of society, is that they will be overemphasized. It will be well, therefore, if the student can see from the first that these conditions are among the least variable of the factors which affect social unity, and hence cannot be appealed to, as a rule, to explain the fluctuations in group unity which occur in relatively short periods of time. This statement is equally true of the second and third sets of factors affecting social unity which we shall discuss. It is also to be noted that the so-called pressure of external conditions rarely works directly and mechanically upon human groups. Rather it affects their unity only indirectly through changing biological conditions, habits, instincts, feelings and ideas. External conditions may change these latter in two ways, either through exerting a selective influence upon them, or through acting as modifying stimuli. In the first case, the effect of the environment is seen only after a series of generations, but in the second case, its effect becomes perceptible at once through the modification of habits, feelings and ideas.

Aggregations of individuals occur only where external conditions of climate, soil, food and geographical location are favorable. Dense human populations have from time immemorial characterized fertile river valleys, indented seacoasts and, in general, situations where natural resources are abundant.[1] These conditions favoring aggregation undoubtedly favor social unity; but, as active factors, their influence upon social unity is more often negative than positive. That is, if these external conditions are not favorable, groups tend to be scattered. Thus, a food supply sufficiently abundant permits the growth in numbers of social groups, and by permitting close contact between in-

[1] A good summary of the influence of geographic factors on the social life will be found in Hayes: "Introduction to the Study of Sociology," Chap. III.

dividuals gives biological forces, instincts, habits, feelings and institutions their opportunity to knit the group together. On the other hand, an insufficient food supply makes it difficult, if not impossible, for these other factors to function toward group unity, and tends to disrupt even the most closely knit of human groups. The case is the same with practically all the other natural conditions upon which human groups depend for the material means of life. The least that can be said of them is that they must be favorable to aggregation if social unity is to have any chance to develop.

Besides these relatively fixed conditions in the external environment, however, there are other environmental conditions which exert a decided positive influence upon social unity. These conditions are, in brief, the dangers in the environment which beset groups. As Professor Ross says: "Danger tightens and security relaxes the bonds of all social groups." In primitive times the danger from the brutes below man doubtless served as a powerful stimulus to keep primitive families and hordes close together. To some extent this is true in the tropics even at the present day; but within historical times, no danger has threatened human groups comparable to that offered by conflict with other human groups. Among all the things in the environment of a human group, the most important are other human beings who may form possibly hostile groups. From the time that man became supreme over the rest of the animal world, human groups have been involved in a life and death struggle with other human groups. Only those human groups could survive, in this war with other groups, that developed a high degree of solidarity, or unity, among their members. Moreover, those groups that developed the highest efficiency in the conscious coöperation and coördination of all their members would have an advantage over other groups. Here we see two sets of forces work-

ing for group unity; one, a selective process which would tend to eliminate or disintegrate groups lacking in unity and coördination; the other, a process of more or less conscious habituation and control, purposefully undertaken by the group, to protect itself against its enemies. Both processes would tend to promote enduring social solidarity. The first process would do so through the development of instincts favorable to group solidarity, such as imitativeness and organic sympathy. The second process, which is probably the more important for human groups, would lead to insistence on the part of practically all members of the group on the importance of coördinated activity, and to the establishment of social machinery in the group to bring this about. Through experience, the more intelligent groups of individuals would realize that some centralized control is necessary if the group is to succeed in successfully defending itself against the aggressions of other groups.

Now undoubtedly, in human history, the highest degree of coördination, unity and solidarity in the larger human groups has resulted from war; in other words, from intergroup conflict. Cultural anthropology plainly shows that the higher forms of social organization, of government, and even of morality, are very largely products of war. This cannot be denied, even though we may fully recognize that, at a later stage of development, war, or even unregulated competition between human groups, is inimical to the development of the solidarity of mankind as a whole. Whatever promise social psychology may hold out of developing human social solidarity on the basis of higher factors in the future, it cannot be denied that the stimuli arising from intergroup conflict and competition have been most potent in promoting the unity of human groups in the past. Peace and security need not, perhaps, under all circumstances relax social bonds; not at least when humanity comes to understand that its struggle with the nonsocial and anti-

social forces of nature and human nature demand as high a degree of "team work," of conscious coördinated activity, as the struggle of rival human groups. Nevertheless, we must recognize the part which intergroup conflict has played in producing social unity. We must remember too, that this conflict of human group with human group has been essentially a matter of the external environment; it has been, for the most part, a conflict for the material means of subsistence, or at least for the domination of those material things which groups have estimated to be necessary for their existence.

(2) Of not less importance among the material or physical factors working for group unity are biological conditions. Without biologic similarity, at least the amount of similarity that we find within the limits of a species, we could have no such thing as social unity. Similar biological constitution makes it possible for individuals to respond in like ways to like stimuli, and thus coördinate their activities. Biological differences within the *normal* limits of the species also usually function to aid group unity (although in humanity this apparently is not so as regards racial differences), for such differences aid in developing division of labor and functional interdependence among members of a group. It is chiefly the biological facts of sex and age which, as Aristotle long ago remarked, function to promote harmonious association. These biological conditions, as we have already seen, create a natural interdependence among individuals; therefore, under normal circumstances, bring about some degree of social unity. The reproductive process, especially, necessitates a division of labor between the sexes and an interdependence in life processes. As we have already pointed out, however, it is more the biological fact of the necessity of prolonged parental care, than it is sex, which has been a unifying influence in social groups. We have already discussed this matter so fully, however, that

here we need only refer to what was said in Chapter II. Other internal biological conditions favorable to the solidarity of groups will be sufficiently dealt with under succeeding heads.

(3) The instincts, as we have already seen, are activities based on hereditary connections in the nervous system. It is evident that similar instincts, giving rise to similar responses in similar situations, would favor unity of group activities. That special instincts favorable to group life exist in man and in many other animals, cannot be denied. Indeed, the instincts of all animals of the same species fit into each other, so to speak, so as to furnish certain original coadaptations which are necessary for the maintenance of the life of the species. Living in groups is a matter of the utmost biological significance; and consequently those species that have survived through living in groups have had fixed in them, through natural selection, instincts favorable to one form of association or another. Such are the instincts connected with sex and the family life which we have already discussed. In addition, man seems to possess, in common with many other animals, certain instincts which favor living in larger groups than the family. Whether gregariousness is a true human instinct, as many psychologists think, or not, it is certain that a number of the native impulses of man function in a gregarious manner. The dread of solitude and the love of company shown by all human beings, whether savage or civilized, children or adults, work in this general direction. The love of the approbation of others also would seem to indicate a more or less gregarious nature in man. But perhaps the strongest evidence in this direction is the strong imitative tendencies shown by man. Now, as we shall see later, much of the imitation in human society springs from reflection rather than from native impulses. Nevertheless, it is worth while to note that all of the strongly imitative animals are, with-

out exception, gregarious, and we may assume for the present, without further discussion, that their imitativeness is an offshoot of their original gregariousness. The passion to do as others do, to fall into line, which is so strong in all types of men, must be considered a true instinct.[1] Now, while all imitation in society is not of this type, yet it is evident that imitation, whatever be its origin, is one of the most important unifying factors in human social groups. Tendencies to imitate tend to make uniform the activities of groups. Mutual imitation is the great means in human groups of making acquired habits uniform. The propagation of *acquired* uniformities from one individual to another is, indeed, impossible without imitation in some form. Hence, imitation is the indispensable means by which groups, carrying on common life processes mainly by means of acquired habits, bring about uniform, concerted action whenever necessary or desirable. Now, a natural tendency to do as others do, to fall into line with one's group, would make most of this imitation relatively easy and unconscious, saving, for the most part, the labor of thought and judgment on the part of the individual members of the group. Of such a character seems to be the larger part of the imitation which we find in human society. One can scarcely doubt, then, that there is a natural imitative tendency which has much to do in facilitating coördination and unity in human groups.

[1] Compare Colvin: "The Learning Process," p. 13: "Another sense in which 'imitation' is used may be described, for lack of a better term, by the name 'instinctive imitation,' i.e., the impulse to copy without the consciousness of purpose. This sort of imitation is found in herds of animals, in groups of children, and in mobs of adults. The flock of sheep follow their leader quite without any purpose of imitating his movements. Children manifest the same general tendency in their plays and games. . . . It is possible because of this to stampede conventions, lead bands of men to the cannon's mouth, and even to change the fashions of speech and dress." See Chapter X of this book.

(4) Habits, or activities based on acquired connections in the nervous system, manifestly have much to do with the unity of groups. Similar habits in the individuals of a group tend to insure uniformity of action. Moreover, the habituation of individuals to each other in a common environment, or in common work, tends to bring about mutual adjustment. Habitual coöperation in any work draws people together, because it establishes coördinated activity and coördinating interests. In one sense, the whole matter of social unity is a matter of securing coördinating habits in individuals. Coördinating feelings and ideas, customary and conventional imitation, and institutions of social control all work together to this end. At any given moment the unity of a group, then, is a matter of habit. A high solidarity of the group means that coadaptive habits have been successfully established and have become fixed; while conflict within the group means, as we have seen, the failure to develop such habits.

(5) The factors which we have thus far enumerated might be called the original or primitive factors in social unity, since they are found in all social groups whatsoever. Many sociologists, of the present, would apparently take into account no other factors in considering social unity. However, as we have already pointed out, in human life those controls of activity which we call feelings and ideas are much in evidence; and in discussing the unity of the human groups, while they must be acknowledged to be modifying, rather than original factors, in some respects they are the most important factors which the social psychologist has to consider. Even though they come in only to reenforce or modify original and acquired tendencies, still so much in human society has been built upon them that they deserve all the consideration which the psychologically inclined social thinkers have given to them. Feeling, in the forms of emotion and interest, reënforces or tends to in-

hibit instinctive and habitual activities. Similarity of feeling thus tends to uniformity of activity within a group. But this is not all. Some feelings draw individuals together; others pull them apart, as it were. Thus feelings of antipathy and hatred, reënforcing instincts of conflict and avoidance, tend to dissolve social bonds. Feelings of love and sympathy, on the other hand, reënforcing altruistic impulses, greatly strengthen social bonds. Even if, from the strictly scientific point of view, we must admit that these feelings are mere accompaniments of activities of conflict and cooperation, still what we have just said is practically correct; for the neural processes, at least, which these feelings stand for, do actually reënforce the activities which we have just mentioned. The practical importance attributed to feelings, in our social life, cannot be regarded, then, as a scientific mistake. Of course, the feelings favorable to social unity, as we have already said, are mainly the feelings which we call sympathetic. Instinctive or organic sympathy functions to reënforce powerfully the unity of small groups based largely upon instinct. Thus, the natural affection of the members of a family group for one another is a strong bond of unity in the group. Reflective or rational sympathy reenforces the unity of larger groups based more upon habits. Acquired sentiments of interest and loyalty may thus help to bind together the very largest human groups. Indeed, the study of the sentiments, or the systems of combinations of emotion, interest and desire, in large human groups may be made to throw a powerful light upon the social life. While the hedonistic sociology of the nineteenth century is a thing of the past, yet sociological science may easily go too far in the other direction, in leaving the feelings altogether out of account.

(6) The characteristic control over action which man has developed is the concept, or free idea. Cognitive processes of a low order undoubtedly work toward group unity,

even in the association of animals below man. Thus, "consciousness of kind" may be assumed to awaken instincts of coadaptation between members of the same species. Perceptions of resemblances and of differences seem to work as means of attraction or repulsion throughout the animal world. Animals of like kind not only associate, but recognize that they are of like kind, and this knowledge reënforces their tendency to associate. Again, animals, as well as men, seem subject to mass suggestion. Suggestion serves to diffuse similar mental states throughout a group, and these states work out in similar or imitative activities. However, it is neither the consciousness of kind nor suggestion which differentiates human society from animal association. Rather it is the large use which human societies make of those conceptual processes which we commonly call ideas, ideals, standards, beliefs, opinions and the like. These make for the human individual, when put into words or other signs and symbols, an artificial, psychic environment, which constrains all his actions quite as much as the physical environment. Thus the child, at a very early age, may be taught to image, we will say, the policeman, though he has never seen him; to fear him, and to act as though he were a present object. In the same way, he may be taught to fear God and to act as though God were an object in the real environment. Thus civilized man lives, so to speak, in an environment of images, a "subjective" environment, which is not less real to him than the environment of sensory stimuli.

While ideas and beliefs may often function to disrupt, it is by this same power that they function to unite men. Certain ideas, ideals and standards, as we have already pointed out, especially do this. These are the ideas which are connected with the life of the group as a whole or with the harmonious adaptation of individual members of the groups to one another. Here comes in, of course, the im-

portance for social unity of personal acquaintance and mutual understanding between the individuals of the group. Without this mutual understanding, human individuals can scarcely adjust themselves to one another in complex relations. Social groups, therefore, of a complex nature, to maintain their solidarity, have to undertake all sorts of means to promote acquaintance and understanding between their members. In the larger human groups, elaborate machinery of intercommunication exists to this end. For the same reason, human groups must establish confidence and mutual trust between individuals which compose them. The individuals of a group must form a stable environment with reference to each. They must be able to count on the right conduct of their fellow members under all circumstances, or the group will tend to disintegrate. Hence, social standards have to be set up. These standards, or "mores," of the group are more than mere habits. They are rather beliefs, ideals, and values impressed upon the individuals to reënforce the habits of which the group approves. They thus tend to pass into legal and moral codes and religious beliefs, the machinery of social control, by which human groups, especially, maintain their solidarity, and which we shall next consider. The beliefs and ideas by which men are gotten to control their behavior in the interests of the solidarity of their group are usually called "moral"; but the student need hardly be told that they are moral only when they function to bring about the solidarity of humanity. The beliefs and ideas by which smaller groups promote and maintain their solidarity, such as factions, parties, classes and even nations, may be decidedly immoral.

On account of the importance of ideas, beliefs, standards and values for maintaining social solidarity, all human groups have a fund of such intellectual elements constantly in circulation to guide and control the behavior of their in-

dividual members; and this fund of ideas is constantly being added to, as the group reaches more or less rational judgments concerning new situations. This fund of ideas, beliefs and standards in a social group is sometimes spoken of as the "social mind," [1] though strictly, this term should be applied to the whole psychic life of the group, both as a process in time, and as a psychic complex at any given moment. The ideas, beliefs, standards and values in circulation in a social group at any given time are, however, the outstanding features of the psychic life of the group. Manifestly, if these intellectual elements, in circulation within the group, are similar and harmonious, they conduce to unity of group action; but if on the other hand, they are greatly dissimilar or inharmonious, they tend to produce conflicts within the group and to destroy its unity of action. It is evident that one of the great problems before the vast, complex societies of modern civilization is: how to secure sufficient uniformity of beliefs and values in their population to assure them of unity of action when confronting a common problem. Some nations of the present have but recently experienced difficulties of this sort. Intellectual differences in a population, or in any social group, if too pronounced, are unfavorable to the order and solidarity of the group. This truth, which the modern world has apparently yet to learn, we shall revert to when we come to discuss the problem of social order.

(7) The unity, or solidarity, of large human groups is especially maintained by a set of institutions whose business it is so to modify the environment, habits, feelings and ideas of individuals as to make them conform to the needs of the common life of the group. These are the so-called regulative institutions of human society, or the institutions of social control. They are, of course, an out-

[1] For elucidation of this term, see Cooley: "Social Organization." Chapters I and II are especially commended.

growth of man's higher intellectual and social development, and must not be thought of as something separate from the six sets of factors in social unity which we have just described. Their importance for the unity of human groups is, however, so great, that they demand separate consideration. They are the chief means of constraining or controlling the activities of the individual in human society, and they probably have much more to do with the formation of his habits and ideas in high civilization than all other influences, objective and subjective, combined. The pressure which they put upon the individual to conform his conduct to that of his group may, of course, exceed the limits of wisdom. Nevertheless, we must recognize that solidarity and order in vast and complex human groups are impossible without such special institutions for social control. However much they may seem to hamper the freedom of the individual, the constraint or discipline which they impose is of prime importance for the unity and survival of all larger civilized human groups.

Roughly, the chief institutions of social control may be classified as those of government and law, of religion and morality, and of education. Government and law are directly coercive upon the individual in their usual manifestations. They have to do with the overt acts of the individual; they coördinate and control the activities of individuals with reference to matters of common defense, of internal order within the State, and of social welfare generally. While government, according to cultural anthropology, originated largely through necessities of military defense and aggression, yet, in all civilized states, its main function has been to secure internal order in the population and to promote social welfare generally. In a certain sense it may be considered the social group itself organized to achieve these ends. The weakness of government and law, as institutions of social control, is that it has not been found

practical to extend them directly to the control of the motives of the individual or even to the formation of his habits. The control of government and law, in other words, is almost necessarily limited to the external acts of the individual. While despotic forms of government have attempted to do very much more than this, yet in general they have not succeeded over long periods of time, and particularly not without invoking the aid of other institutions of control. In general, the State can only successfully control the inner nature of the individual through securing the aid, either of religions, with their attached systems of morality, or of education. The free societies of modern civilization tend to use only the latter, leaving the church entirely free with respect to its religious and moral teachings. While the power of government and law as an instrument of social control is limited, yet, in all cases, it is the agency of last resort to restrain the behavior of the individual in relation to his group. It stands, therefore, for the minimum of conformity on the part of the individual to his group, rather than for the maximum. Nevertheless, government and law must be considered the chief means by which human societies coördinate and integrate the activities of their members, and so maintain unity and order.

The supernatural sanction of religion has, in all human societies, been found to be one of the most effective means of maintaining their solidarity. Religious sanction, very early in human history, comes to attach itself to habits of action which the group believes to be safe and to conduce to individual and social welfare. In this way, religion powerfully reinforces the customary order of social groups, so much so that Ward declared it to be "the force of social gravitation that holds the social world in its orbit."[1] Re-

[1] See his article on "The Essential Nature of Religion" in the *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. iii, pp. 169–192. For brief reading on the social function of religion, see the author's article

ligious sanctions, however, attach themselves not simply to custom, but also to ideal moral standards. Indeed, moral ideals for the masses, in every civilization, have hitherto gotten their chief significance and sanction from religion. The self-sacrifice and self-control which high moral standards demand get their justification to the individual only in some sort of religious faith. The higher types of religion are thus powerful means of promoting good will among individuals. They are, moreover, preventives of social pessimism and the social decay which is apt to result from pessimism, for they combat the idea that the misery and suffering of life are without meaning and value. They encourage hope and loyalty to social ideals; thus they give stability to character in the adult, and make possible high and stable types of social relationship. This seems to be especially true of Christianity, the distinctive social merit of which seems to be that it stimulates especially the altruistic impulses and feelings of the individual, upon which, we have already noted, the higher and more complex types of social unity depend.

Religion thus becomes a powerful instrument of social control through its support of moral ideals. Now, moral ideals are simply social ideals of a certain sort. The moral ideals of low civilizations are not usually greatly in advance of the actual social life, but through intellectual development and the popularization of ethical religions, moral ideals come in time to represent an ideal social order. They function not only to maintain the folkways, or social habits, but also, through holding up a certain standard constantly before individuals, to secure higher types of social coördination. The virtues recognized by a group, therefore, may not only bind its members together in harmonious relation-

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on that topic in the *American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. xix, pp. 289–301; or Blackmar and Gillin: "Outlines of Sociology," pp. 239–267.

ships, but also promote a greater social solidarity than the group has yet realized.

Systems of education have always been utilized by human groups to promote social solidarity. Even very primitive human groups take formal means, such as initiation ceremonies and the like, to impress upon the young the value of the groups' customs and usages. Through all human history, society has made use of this means of securing the conformity of the individual to the habits of his group. Religion and morality, and even government and law, have worked very largely, as means of social control, through systems of education. The psychological reason for this is of course obvious, for the educative process is fundamentally a control over the process of habit formation in the young. Now, while in all human groups there are opportunities for conflict of habits of individuals, it is evident that these opportunities greatly increase with the size and complexity of the group. Hence, the increasing importance of the education of the young, as social and cultural evolution advances. Many more habits have to be acquired by the individual, and, unless the whole process of education is controlled effectively by the group, there is much greater chance of socially unfavorable habits being acquired. Systems of formal education, with differentiated educational institutions, have to be created by complex human societies to fit individuals for membership in such groups. These systems of education may work under the fiction that they exist for the training and development of individuals as such, regardless of the social life; but their real purpose must be to control the process by which individuals acquire habits, so that, as adults, they will be efficient in carrying on the social life and will coördinate their activities harmoniously with their group. The highly individualistic education of the nineteenth century did, however, often produce bad citizens, rather than good, and re-

sulted in many inharmonious adjustments in modern civilized society. A fully socialized education has still, therefore, to be realized by our civilization. It is, perhaps, the one thing most needed for promoting a true human solidarity at the present time, although government and law, religion and morality, need hardly less to have their social efficiency increased. Of all of these, however, a flexible, socialized, educational system would seem best adapted for securing progress as well as order in human society.

Social Disintegration. It will be noted by the student that the factors which are effective for promoting social unity are also the ones which are effective in producing social disintegration. Unless environmental, biological, psychic and social factors are favorable, the unity of the human group cannot be maintained. When these same factors become unfavorable, social groups tend to disintegrate. The forces that make social unity also unmake it. We have tried to note the conditions under which geographic factors, biological forces, instincts, habits, feelings, ideas and social institutions of control are favorable to social unity; and incidentally we have noted some of the conditions under which they are unfavorable. In general, it may be said that the higher types of social unity require a corresponding development in the intelligence and character of the individuals concerned. Hence, in the complex civilized societies of the present, the vital element in social solidarity is probably the institutions of social control, which are designed to control the formation of habits, and so of character, in the individual. The failure of government, or of religion, or of education, means the failure of the individual to get proper adjustment to society; at least it does in many cases.[1] The system of social control is, therefore, all important for the unity and survival of the great

[1] For illustrations of social disintegration, read Chapters VII and VIII in Ellwood: "Sociology and Modern Social Problems."

civilized societies of the present. But this does not mean that the individual can be disregarded in the social life. On the contrary, these agencies of social control have meaning only as they are applied to, and function with reference to, the character of individuals. In one way or in another, they function to modify the environment and instincts, to build up the habits and feelings and to establish the ideas and ideals, of the civilized human individual.

Social evolution, therefore, cannot, and does not, proceed independently of individual development. The character of the individual marks the limits of social organization at any particular time. If the mental and moral character of the individuals composing the group cannot be raised to meet the requirements of a high type of social organization, then social organization must inevitably drop back to a lower level. Again, if, through the failure of the machinery of social control to be effective, the character and intelligence of the constituent individuals of a national group, for example, are unable to meet the requirements of the existence of their group, then such a group must disappear; and there is a chance that in such a process of social dissolution the people themselves, who compose the nation, may likewise disappear. The failure of the machinery of social control, in one or in all of its forms, is probably, therefore, the chief cause of both minor and major disintegrative processes in all civilized societies. Whether it be the disintegration of the family, or the disintegration of a nation or a civilization, the disintegrative process, in every case, is rooted in the failure to control habit, and so mental and moral character, in individuals. Of course, this conclusion does not preclude the possible working of a "reversal of selection" in human society, undermining its biological foundations, so to speak; but even such a reversal of selection implies the failure of the machinery of social control, in practically all cases. Only the great cyclic changes of climate and of other geo-

graphic factors, natural calamities and the like are outside of the power of the machinery of social control. But such factors do not appear to be the significant things in the life of the civilized nations of the present. Their solidarity and survival is mainly dependent upon the efficiency of their institutions of social control.

This conclusion is confirmed by the observation of the behavior of so-called "interest groups" within larger societies. In any large society individuals are necessarily exposed, as we have seen, to different stimuli, or unequally to the same stimuli. This fact, along with inevitable variation in the original nature of individuals, tends to cause large groups to break up into smaller groups, whose interests and habits are more harmonious. These subordinate social groups are usually called parties, factions or classes; but in social psychology, since interest is the subjective side of activity, they may be properly styled "interest groups." They are composed, as we have already said, of those whose habits — and hence whose interests, ideas and values — vary in certain distinctive ways from the rest of the larger group of which they are a part. Now, such interest groups play an important and necessary part in the life of great complex societies. In the form of parties and sects, they initiate and further political and moral changes in the group as a whole. In the form of classes, they represent certain great permanent interests of the group.[1] Through competition with other minor groups, each interest group achieves organization and a relative degree of solidarity in the way which we have already described. Such organization and solidarity of minor groups presents no peril to the larger

[1] "Class interests are the driving forces which keep public life centered upon essentials. They become dangerous to a nation when it denies them, thwarts them, and represses them so long that they burst out and become dominant." Lippmann: "A Preface to Politics," p. 282.

group, of which they are a part, as long as the machinery of social control and of social adjustment remains efficient. They are a danger only when the interests which they represent are ignored or merely repressed by those who actually have the power of the machinery of social control in their hands. When thus merely repressed or denied, interest groups are apt to take on a revolutionary character, and to become serious disruptive agencies, which threaten the unity of the larger group. If, on the other hand, the "interests" of minor groups are recognized by the agents of authority and proper adjustments are made, on the part of the whole group, to "accommodate" these interests, then there is rarely serious disintegration in the group. For interest groups will rarely carry their egoism to the point where they threaten the life of the whole group.[1] They do this, as a rule, only when they have no adequate part in the control of the life of the whole group; for the loyalty of their members, under ordinary circumstances, is much greater to the whole group than to the respective parties, factions or classes to which they belong. Only when the machinery of social control is inadequate to adjust and harmonize the different interests of complex societies, therefore, do interest groups menace the solidarity of social life. The extent to which they may become dangerous to social solidarity as disintegrating agencies will be seen when we consider the theory of social revolutions.

Group Will and Group Individuality. All human social groups elaborate what may be called a "group will"; that is, as we have already implied, they act to a certain extent as individuals, and develop a sort of individuality or quasi-personality. Indeed, this necessarily follows from what has been said concerning the activities of individuals of a social group being coördinated in certain definite ways to

[1] Compare Ross: "Foundations of Sociology," pp. 272–90.

carry on a common life. This means, as we have seen, that the activities are brought to a unity of aim, and therefore, of purpose. In human groups, the aims of group action become conscious and, in time, also deeply accentuated by habit. Moreover, as we have seen, the strain and stress of competition of group with group tightens the bonds of groups and unifies them. When groups, in the face of great difficulties, attempt to do certain things, they can only do them successfully by the closest coördination of the activities of their individual members — by what we, in ordinary language, call " team-work." Now, this implies great collective control, on the part of the group, of individual activities. It means that each individual must, to some extent, lose his personality in his group; that is, subordinate his activities, more or less completely, to those of the larger unit. Under such circumstances, groups develop a definite direction and purpose in their activities, and a definite unified character. In other words, they develop a group will and a group individuality. Thus, social groups may come to have quite as distinct characters as individuals. The individuality of national groups is apt to be especially pronounced on account of the relative independence and high degree of unity of those groups.

The student will note that the phenomena of group will and of group individuality are an outcome of the coördination of the activities of the individual in the group, in certain definite ways. We mean nothing more by these expressions in social psychology than that the activities of the members of a group are coördinated in certain definite ways, with perhaps a conscious aim in view, and that these coordinations have become so habitual that they give a relatively fixed character to the group as a whole.

From the fact that groups behave as individuals do, with reference to their life conditions, it follows that groups may develop tendencies to aggrandize and exploit, and to accept

no standards but success and self-interest; that is, they may develop group egoism. Indeed, all social groups, like individuals, tend to consider their own collective life as of paramount importance; hence, the danger to humanity of the egoism of nations, races and classes. All human history has illustrated the egoism and greed of national groups. The egoism of "interest groups" within the nation has, especially in periods of social disintegration, been scarcely less pronounced. Parties set themselves too frequently above the country which they are supposed to serve. Religious denominations and sects have repeatedly, in history, been guilty of making the interest of their sect the practical criterion of right conduct. All institutions, indeed, tend to make themselves an end in themselves, apart from the larger social life of which they are a part.

From these facts, the somewhat plausible theory has grown up, that the unity of larger groups is nothing but a "balance of egoisms" of smaller groups. The solidarity of the national group, for example, is claimed to be nothing but a balance of competing "interest groups," and its government, or political structure, simply the result of the egoistic pressure of one group upon another. It has been claimed, by the Austrian sociologist, Gumplowicz, for example, that the structure of the governments of modern nations has actually arisen, historically, out of an unmitigated conflict of classes and races; and that governments in practice represent nothing but an equilibrium or compromise between such conflicting interests. The Marxian socialists also advocate a similar view. We have seen, however, that in opposition to this doctrine of the unlimited egoism of "interest groups" we must place the fact that under normal conditions the members of such groups have their activities far more coördinated with the larger social whole of which they are a part, than with their subordinate groups. In other words, under normal conditions, the whole

personality of the individual is not surrendered to his class, or party, but his deeper loyalty is given to his national group. Recent history has abundantly illustrated this. In time, it is to be hoped that the whole personality of the individual will be surrendered not even to his national group, but that a deeper loyalty may remain to humanity as a whole. It is, at any rate, a fact that a larger and larger proportion of the inhabitants of civilized nations are seeking to coördinate their activities, not simply with their class, their nation or even their race, but with humanity as a whole. There is no justification, therefore, for the doctrine of the absolute egoism of groups, any more than there is for the doctrine of the absolute egoism of individuals. Human nature is such that, under proper circumstances, it can, and does, respond to the needs of the largest possible human group, humanity as a whole. The solidarity of humanity is not a mere idle dream; social science shows that it is a realizable fact.

The Forms of Association. We have already seen that a form of association is simply a type of coadaptation between individuals. It is unnecessary to enlarge upon the fact that the form of relationship affects the behavior of individuals, because it stimulates in very diverse ways their original or acquired natures. The form of the organization of a social group, therefore, affects the whole life of the group. Not only is the unity and efficiency of the group as a whole affected by its organization, but the acquired characters of the individuals composing the group are also greatly affected. Thus, in a large degree, the form of the social life makes the character of individuals. The behavior of the same individuals will be very different, for example, if they associate upon a basis of equality, than if they associate as master and slave. Concerning the practical importance of the forms of association, then, there can be no doubt. The whole history of human progress

has been, to some extent, the history of trying different forms of association, of testing forms of social organization. And undoubtedly, one of the greatest practical tasks of social science must be to discover those forms of association which are most likely to call forth the highest and best development of human personality.

There is also a large theoretical value in the study of the forms of association. The study of a typical form of association like the family, for example, may be made to illustrate most of the principles of social development. Hence, the theoretical importance of classifying the different forms of the social life. Any such classification will, however, necessarily fall far short of completeness at the present time, both because of the complexity of such forms, and because of the developing character of the social life.

Perhaps the most important distinction to be made among forms of association, for theoretical purposes, is the distinction between forms which involve personal presence and those which do not. Forms of association which involve personal presence seem to be the bearers of the most vital elements in social life. Psychologically, the stimulus of the presence of other individuals seems necessary for the development of those instincts, habits, feelings, ideas, and ideals which make the substance of the solidarity and continuity of all human groups. On account of their importance in the transmission and development of the vital things in social life, Professor Cooley has aptly termed the groups which involve the face-to-face association of individuals, "primary groups."[1] Such groups are the family group and the neighborhood group. Along with certain minor groups which may form within these, such as play groups and groups of friends, these simple "primary groups" are found in all stages of human development. In

[1] For collateral reading on the importance of such groups, read Cooley: "Social Organization," Chaps. III, IV.

primitive society we find the neighborhood group in the form of the horde, and later, of the clan, or kinship group. Such larger groups, made up of closely associated families, may be called "communities," although the word is also employed to designate genetic groups of any size. Now, these small primary groups, the family, the neighborhood community, and other groups which involve face-to-face association, are manifestly the natural environment for the development of the social traits of the individual. They are, in other words, the natural medium for the development of our social life; they preserve its unity in time, and hence we shall have to consider them at length when we consider the problem of social continuity. But in the meanwhile, how shall we classify "communities," whether large or small?

According to the theory of social unity, which we have just set forth, natural social groups or "communities" will fall into four chief classes, according to the basis of control or unity in the given groups. The first, or lowest form of association, will be that in which the unity of the group rests chiefly upon instincts and upon the correlated selective processes of the natural environment. Communities of this sort are wholly below the human level. As the basis of control over the collective life in them is instinctive, they can achieve no very complex type of social adaptation. The second form of association is that in which the unity of the group is chiefly a matter of habit, that is, of custom and tradition. All existing savage communities of mankind are of this type, and we have every reason to believe that it represents the primitive human social condition. As the basis of control over the collective life in such societies is mainly habit, they are rarely progressive, or progress very slowly. All such human groups are also small in the number of their individual members, and usually very simple in their organization. In a certain sense, of course, human

groups never escape the necessity of basing their unity mainly upon habit. Custom and tradition play a large part, even in the most progressive, civilized human groups. Nevertheless, other elements do enter into the higher stages as increasingly important, and the basis of control becomes something else than the mere process of habituation. A third form of association is that in which the unity of the group is a matter chiefly of despotic power, exercised by a small group of individuals over a larger group. Communities of this authoritarian type characterize the social life of barbarism and of lower civilization. They could not arise, of course, until the machinery of government had become established. They establish and maintain their unity through a fear-inspired obedience, which finally establishes habits of solidarity. This fear-inspired obedience may, of course, be theocratic, as well as political, in character. Authoritarian societies are the most prominent types of national groups which have persisted down to the present time. Nevertheless, a fourth and higher type of association is emerging among civilized nations, that in which the unity of the group is secured through such indirect means of social control as the education of the young, social standards and moral ideals. The free, democratic communities of the present are coming to be of this type. This last form of association is evidently a type into which the most civilized human societies are only beginning to enter. Whether it will succeed or not, will depend upon whether such indirect forms of social control as education and social standards will suffice to give the individual habits which will adapt him harmoniously to his group, so that the requirements of social existence can be met.

The classification which we have just given is evidently one of "communities," or of large genetic social groups. Besides these forms of association, however, there are, in human societies, many artificial forms of association cre-

ated for achieving some special end. The natural, genetic groups composed of both sexes and all ages, such as families, hordes, tribes, villages, cities, commonwealths and nations, Professor Giddings calls "component societies." We can perhaps very properly use the word "community" to designate such groups whose members are linked together more or less by the *involuntary* bonds of physical heredity and environment. The artificial, purposive groups formed within such communities for the carrying on of some special activity, or for the achieving of some particular end, Professor Giddings calls "constituent societies." They are usually made up of members of the same sex and approximately of the same age, though there is a tendency for this to be less and less the case. Such are political parties, industrial corporations, trade unions and associations for religious, philanthropic, scientific, educational, recreational or ethical purposes. We may perhaps call these "*voluntary* associations," though they are often nearly identical with those minor groups which we have termed "interest groups." On the whole, it is the "communities," or natural genetic groups, which are of most sociological interest, although the artificial functional groups in human societies also illustrate important principles in human association, which we can not afford to overlook. These artificial functional forms of association are, indeed, peculiar to human communities, and are one of the distinguishing features of human association, created, as we have already seen, by the higher intellectural development of man. They therefore modify the whole basis of social unity and of social life.

Professor Giddings has made another classification of "communities" which is especially suggestive, as it points out different psychological processes as the active basis of social unity.[1] First of all, he divides all societies into In-

[1] See his "Historical and Descriptive Sociology," Chap. III.

stinctive and Rational societies; the Instinctive being limited to the bands, swarms, flocks, and herds of animals, the Rational to human groups, since, as he rightly says: "there is no human community in which instinctive . . . response is not complicated by some degree of rational comprehension of the utility of association." These combinations, however of instinct and reason, are of many gradations, and a particular combination found in any given human community, establishes for it the dominant mode of relation between individuals. Upon this basis, Professor Giddings would classify human communities into eight distinct types, as follows: (1) the Sympathetic type of community in which the chief social bond is sympathy, and which is exemplified by a homogeneous community of blood relatives; (2) the Congenial type of community in which the social bond is similarity of nature and agreement in ideas, as illustrated by the *Mayflower* band; (3) the Approbational type of community, in which the social bond is a general approbation of qualities and conduct, as illustrated by the frontier settlement; (4) the Despotic type of community, in which the social bonds are despotic power and fear-inspired obedience; (5) the Authoritative type of community in which reverence for authority is the social bond; (6) the Conspirital type, in which intrigue and conspiracy are the social bonds; (7) the Contractual social type, in which the social bond is a covenant or contract, as illustrated by the Achean League; (8) the Idealistic social type, in which mutual understanding, confidence, fidelity, and an altruistic spirit form the social bonds. While this classification refers primarily to the type of social life of natural genetic groups, yet it is evident that it may apply equally well to minor voluntary associations. It is also evident, as Professor Giddings says, that to a certain extent these different types of society or forms of association overlap, and that communities of the higher type may, and

usually do, include examples of the lower types among their component or constituent groups.

Many other classifications of the forms of human association have been made of equal value with those just stated. Thus a very important classification of the forms of association is the division into *sanctioned* and *unsanctioned* forms. The sanctioned forms are types of relationships between individuals, which have been reflected upon by the mass of the group in which they occur, and established by the authority of the group. They are institutions. They are not found in the social groups below man, because social sanctions arise only after self-consciousness has appeared. In all human groups, however, there are many unsanctioned forms of association, although the tendency of civilization is to "institutionalize" all the more important forms.

The spontaneous, unreflective forms of association between human individuals, such as the playground group, the gang, the mob and the like, retain great interest for the social psychologist because in them we may frequently discern the original, unreflective tendencies of human nature. The institutionalized form of association necessarily takes on an artificial character, as it is a result, not only of reflection, but of social coercion, and accordingly it may obscure the working of original factors or tendencies.

An enumeration, description and comparison of the different forms of human association is manifestly one of the desiderata of sociology and social psychology. Studies in this direction have undoubtedly both practical and theoretical importance. However, the matter is not so important as some sociologists have apparently thought, since the principal types of human association have already been described, classified and compared. These form a sufficient basis upon which to develop a scientific knowledge of human social life, and we may safely leave the further description and

classification of these forms to the anthropologist, historian and demographer.

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

CHAPTER VI

THE NATURE OF SOCIAL CONTINUITY

Social continuity is the unity of society in time. The principles and factors of social unity, in general, are also to be seen at work in social continuity. Nevertheless, as these factors work somewhat differently in social continuity, and as human society alone shows cultural or historic continuity, it will be necessary for us to give separate consideration to this phase of social unity.

The Physical Basis of Social Continuity. The physical basis of social continuity is the continuity of life itself, which we call heredity. The continuity of the germ cells, from which each new individual springs, insures the inherent traits of the stock being passed along from generation to generation. Thus, all of the original physical traits of the race are preserved; and inasmuch as these organic traits include a nervous system with relatively definite organization and capacities, we have transmitted, by heredity also, as we have already seen, certain inherent traits of a mental character. Thus, every normal human individual is born with the typical human instincts, with the human capacity to form many acquired habits upon the basis of his native impulses, with the capacity to feel pleasure and pain, with the capacity to think and to reason, etc. It is evident that without these inherent powers and capacities, furnished by heredity, there could be no such thing as social continuity. The similarity of organic make-up and of mental constitution of practically every human individual, is what has made historic social continuity possible. Among these hereditary similarities we must especially emphasize

the similarity of human instincts, a similar capacity on the part of human beings to form habits, and similar capacities to feel, think and reason. While these inherent powers and capacities which make up human nature may vary somewhat between individuals, as we have seen, yet it must be emphasized that in human society they remain practically similar. Moreover, they have been similar as far back as we can go into human history or even into the remote, prehistoric past. As we have already seen, it is improbable that there have been any considerable changes in the physical or mental constitution of man since the end of paleolithic times in Europe.

Another physical basis of social continuity is, of course, the continuity of the physical environment. While the continuity of life itself, through heredity, is manifestly the chief thing, since the physical environment of the social group may be changed, yet the continuity of the physical environment helps in no small measure to preserve social continuity. Thus, the same geographic environment may help to preserve habit and custom over short periods of time, while its selective influence, operating over relatively long periods of time, may fix in a stock certain inherent traits which have been favored by that environment. The technical modifications which man has made in his geographic environment, however, are of even greater importance in preserving social continuity. Thus, roads, canals, bridges, railways, houses and other buildings, favor the continuity of habit and usage in a population. Indeed, the whole technology of civilization may, from one point of view, be considered a mass of alterations in the physical environment which favor the continuity of habit, and so of social life. All of these things provide similar stimuli, which usually give rise to more or less similar reactions in individuals, and thus make for social unity and continuity.

Custom. As we have just implied, continuity of acquired habit, from generation to generation, may, at least from one point of view, be regarded as the main element in human social continuity. Not only through habituation to a common environment and technology, but also through more or less unconscious imitation of their elders, children take on the acquired habits of previous generations. This process of the transmission of habit from generation to generation is, moreover, made more certain in human society by the pressure of various agencies of social control. Children are compelled, by various means of discipline, to acquire the habits of their elders. While this process is a very complex one, and cannot be understood apart from communication and tradition, yet the element of mere habituation is very large, and perhaps even the chief element to be emphasized from a psychological standpoint.

We must remember, above all, that the environment into which the child is born is chiefly an environment of human individuals who have certain relatively definite modes of behavior, and maintain certain definite relationships with one another. In other words, the child is born into a relatively definite social organization. By his mere capacity to form habits alone, he is destined to take on, therefore, the modes of conduct of his social group, and so continue its social life. The group organization may be, indeed, such as to make necessary that the individual act in certain ways if he is to gratify his own inherent desires. In mere social structure alone, therefore, apart from any modifications effected in the physical environment, there is a tendency to continue itself through habit. Custom, along with racial heredity, has always been the main physiological basis of social continuity, and doubtless must always continue to be. We say "physiological," because, as we have seen, strictly speaking, custom is merely social

habit which persists from generation to generation, with more or less conscious social sanction.

Social Tradition. Heredity, physical environment and acquired habit, will account for all of the continuity which we find in social groups below man, even the most developed; but they will not account for the cultural or historic continuity of human societies. Here another element enters in, made possible by man's higher intellectual development, and oral and written language. This element is tradition, by which we mean, in the sociological sense, all knowledge, ideas, standards and values handed down from the past. The chief vehicle of tradition is manifestly language, and it is therefore directly dependent upon man's power to form concepts, or free ideas. So far as we know, no animal group has been able to form a tradition. Tradition is thus the distinguishing element in the continuity of *human* society.[1] All that is peculiar in the social evolution of man depends, in one sense, upon tradition; for it is the development of tradition which has made human culture, or civilization. The complex habits of the higher stages of cultural development, in other words, could not be built up and maintained in human groups without an accumulation of knowledge handed down from the past. As Professor Hobhouse happily says: "Tradition is, in the development of society, what heredity is in the physical growth of the stock. It is the link between past and future, it is that in which the effects of the past are consolidated, and on the basis of which subsequent modifications are built up."

To see just the effect of tradition upon human social life, let us consider, in a very elementary way, the origin and development of civilization. The simplest tool, as we

[1] For collateral reading on the influence of tradition in the social life, read Hobhouse: "Social Evolution and Political Theory," pp. 34–39; also Ellwood: "The Social Problem," Chap. II.

have seen, requires knowledge and skill in its making. This knowledge is transmitted from one individual to another, and through long practice the making of a particular type of, let us say, a stone tool, is perfected. By accident or invention another type is discovered. The knowledge of this invention is then spread, and it is perfected. And so the process goes on; bit by bit the primitive group acquires knowledge and skill and transmits it. This is as true as regards the relations of individuals and the organization of the group, as it is of material culture. Thus, knowledge, ideas and standards are slowly accumulated, forming a fabric of civilization. In other words, man builds himself up out of the perceptual world, with which he began, into an *ideational* world.

The matter may be perhaps best illustrated in the mental growth of the child, in whom an analogous development takes place. The child's world is at first a world of sensations and perceptions. But when he becomes able to speak and to use language, he gradually enters into another world, a world of ideas, of knowledge of things remote from him, and perhaps even inaccessible to his senses. The perceptual world grows of less and less importance in guiding his behavior, while the world of ideas which comes to him through oral and written language, or even in some measure, through his constructive imagination and reasoning, becomes of greater and greater importance in controlling his conduct. Thus the adult civilized man comes to live mainly in an ideational world.

Now human society must have begun like the child, with a world which was mainly one of percepts. Primitive man, in other words, began without definite knowledge and without definite beliefs or standards. But as soon as his powers of abstract thought and articulate speech began to develop, he could accumulate knowledge and pass it along to his fellows. The world of ideas thus began to take the

place of the world of mere percepts; for the knowledge and beliefs passed along by one individual to another enormously increased the number of mental images which the memory of each individual could call up. Now primitive man, like ourselves generally, did not discriminate sharply between his world of ideas and his world of percepts, his world of mental images and his world of real objects. He reacted to both the same, even though there were, in his ideational world, images of which there was no counterpart in his world of sense perceptions. Successive inventions and discoveries gradually increased the fund of knowledge, ideals, standards and values which were handed down from generation to generation, until finally, in modern civilization the ideational world has come to be dominantly the one in which man exists, and which, therefore, controls the formation of his habits and his conduct.[1]

Now, it is evident that all of this has been a development of social tradition in the sociological sense of that phrase. The growth of tradition, that is, the accumulation of knowledge, ideas, beliefs, standards and values, has gradually substituted a psychic environment for an environment of real objects. This does not mean that civilized man has a smaller world of real objects, but only a larger world of ideas; and that he approaches his world of real objects with certain values which he has gotten from the social tradition behind him. Higher civilization is, therefore, in many respects, the substitution of what we may call a "subjective environment" for an objective environment. Every developed type of civilization, therefore, is dominated by certain ideas, beliefs or standards, which give it, so to speak, its particular form and color. These ruling ideas or ideals may be called the "psychic dominants"

[1] For abundant illustrations of the building up of modern civilization through the handing down of traditions, see Marvin: "The Living Past."

of the civilization. They do not, of course, make the social life, but they are important instruments in its development. As instruments of adjustment, they have to change when the social life changes, for they are the "controls" of social activity. They are the dominant elements in that body of social tradition which furnishes the real environment[1] to which the individual reacts.

Tradition thus furnishes the basis for cultural or historic continuity. Without it, there could be no such thing as social progress, for it is tradition which preëminently makes us, in a cultural sense, the heirs of all the human past. Taken together with custom, it has been called "social heredity," though it is obvious that this term suggests a wrong analogy, for the method of its propagation is not biological but psychological. Nevertheless, tradition and custom are quite as important in human society, especially in cultural evolution, as heredity is in the biological realm. With only trifling modifications, what Professor Cooley says of communication is true of tradition also: "By the aid of this structure," he says, "the individual is a member not only of a family, a class, and a state, but of a larger whole, reaching back to prehistoric man whose thought has gone to build it up. In this whole, he lives as an element, drawing from it the materials of his growth and adding to it whatever constructive thought he may express."[2]

Equally finely Professor Hobhouse says: "The tradition of the elders is, as it were, the instinct of society. It furnishes the prescribed rule for dealing with the ordinary occasions of life, which is for the most part accepted without inquiry and applied without reflection. It

[1] Objectively, of course, the "real environment," in this case, is the signs, symbols, etc., which carry social traditions in books, papers, spoken words, etc.

[2] "Social Organization," p. 64.

furnishes the appropriate institution for providing for each class of social needs, for meeting common dangers, for satisfying social wants, for regulating social relations. It constitutes, in short, the framework of society's life, which to each new generation is a part of its hereditary outfit." [1]

Tradition, however, represents, in social life, not instinct, but habit. Its basis is really certain habitual ways of thinking and of feeling, which are passed from individual to individual through some form of mental interaction, such as language or suggestion. It functions, moreover, to establish and control habits of behavior in the individual, which the experience of the group, in the past, has led it to approve. There is only an analogy between tradition and heredity or instinct; but there is substantial identity between tradition and habit. Social tradition is an habitual way of thinking and feeling which persists from generation to generation.

While the basis of many social traditions is unreflective, and while tradition always represents an adjustment to the past rather than to the present, yet it is obviously unwise for any nation, or even any individual, to discard all the knowledge, ideas and beliefs of the past as worthless. No one, indeed, can do this. While some individuals pretend that they take nothing from the past, they mean only that they have broken with certain traditions. In other respects, they are as much controlled by tradition as any one. The scientific attitude toward tradition would seem to be that the ideas, beliefs and standards which have served society in the past have a presumption in their favor. Traditions long maintained, especially, must have had some social utility. They are at least roughly adjusted to social needs, or else they would not have existed so long. It is the business

[1] "Social Evolution and Political Theory," p. 34.

of common sense and of science to pick the socially useful out of what has come down to us from the past and utilize it for the building up of the present.

But just because tradition is one expression of habit in human society, it has its dangers. When habits become inflexible, as we shall see in a future chapter, social disaster almost inevitably results. Now, social traditions are not only themselves social habits, but they become enmeshed in many other habits. The whole structure, organization, and institutions of a group may be such as to favor certain traditions and to oppose any change in ideas, beliefs or standards. It is this which makes long standing traditions often extremely coercive in human societies. Inflexible traditions of this sort are very manifestly a danger to the group in which they exist; for change is the law of life. Social continuity is after all no more important than social change. The most normal type of social progress, we shall see, consists of continuity with change.

The Social Mind. In a strict sense the term "social mind" is used in social psychology and sociology as a convenient expression for the psychic life of society. Individuals alone think, feel and will in the strict psychological sense of the terms. But society carries on its common life by means of the interaction and coördination of the thinking, feeling and willing processes of its individual members. There is such a thing, therefore, as a collective mental life in a social group, even though there is no such thing as a social mind in the same sense in which there is an individual mind. The term "social mind," therefore, expresses the mental unity of our social life. Now this mental unity of the social life exists not only at a given time, but it is continuous. Indeed, the continuity of the existence of the group is necessary for any elaboration of the social mind. Its growth, like that of the individual mind, consists very largely in an accumulation and elab-

oration of experiences. The content of the social mind is very largely, therefore, tradition, which, in the social life, has often been compared to memory in individual life. It is tradition which makes it possible for a group to have a history. The knowledge of its past in any group, moreover, reacts very strongly to intensify its solidarity and continuity. A regiment of soldiers, for example, while its personnel is continually changing, yet if tradition preserves its history, will develop an *esprit de corps* which will give it true social continuity. In the same way the tradition of a past life in every human group intensifies the mental life of the group and helps to make all of its life continuous.

The development of science will also illustrate what we mean by the social mind, and the part which tradition plays in forming it. We may borrow again the words of Professor Hobhouse: "Science is more than the living knowledge of any individual. It is social knowledge or social thought, not in the sense that it exists in the mind of a mystical social unit, nor in the sense that it is the common property of all men, which it certainly is not, but in the sense that it is the product of many minds working in conscious and unconscious coöperation, that it forms a part of the permanent social tradition going constantly to shape the thought and direct the efforts of fresh generations of learners — that, in a word, it has all the permanency and potency which the individual has not. We might easily apply the same reasoning to other departments of thought, to philosophy, to religion, to the literary and imaginative representation of life, and to the common sense knowledge that at once expresses and helps to form the experience of ordinary men in ordinary relations. The thought of any society at any time is a social thought. This social thought forms the point of departure for individuals who are brought up in it, perhaps go beyond it and contribute some-

thing fresh of their own, perhaps fail fully to assimilate and fall short of it." [1]

The Social Function of Primary Groups. So important is tradition in human society that in practically all stages of civilization we find certain institutions whose special work is to be carriers of tradition. In modern civilization these institutions are especially schools, churches, libraries, museums and the like. However, the real carriers of tradition are not these specialized institutions, but the primary groups of which we have already spoken, especially the family and the neighborhood groups. If human society had to rely upon schools and libraries to conserve its mental life, its continuity on the psychic side would be very imperfectly developed. The family is perhaps the chief institutional vehicle of tradition in human society. It has been such in all stages of civilization, and, as long as it continues to be the chief environment of children of tender years, it will doubtless continue to be so. In the family the child learns his language, and in learning it, he gets with it the fundamental knowledge, beliefs and standards contained in the tradition of his civilization, or at least of his class. So much does the child get his essential social traditions from his family life, that many educators claim that moral instruction can never be given adequately in our public schools, but that the real foundation of the moral tradition must be gotten while the child is yet of tender age from his family circle. The same thing is perhaps true of the traditions regarding work, government, law, religion and many other social activities. There can be no doubt, at any rate, that the essential traditions of our social life are preserved and passed along in the face-to-face association of primary groups. The meaning of essential traditions is clearer in these groups to the young because they

[1] "Social Evolution and Political Theory," p. 95.

are accompanied, to a large extent, by actual behavior correlated with the tradition. In other words, these groups are also the carriers of custom, in the sense of definite habits of social behavior. The child therefore can get the meaning of a certain tradition regarding government, religion or morality, for example, from the family life, better than he can from the printed page or even the spoken word. He can get the meaning, too, better in the close and intimate relations of the family group than he can in the more partial and uncertain associations of the school or the neighborhood.

It is for these reasons that we must regard the family group, when stable and well organized, as the most suitable and natural environment for the development of all the natural powers and capacities which the child will need in his social life. It is the group, in other words, which has the greatest power to socialize the child and to adjust him, even to the requirements of a high civilization. This is all the more true because, as Professor Cooley has shown, the primary ideals of human society spring from the primary groups, especially from the family.[1] It is from the family group that we get, in the main, our notions of love, service and self-sacrifice; and we learn these ideals in the family the more effectively, because the life of the normal family group usually illustrates the practices which these ideals stand for. Taking these primary ideals from the family life, we apply them to the social life generally, and even to humanity at large. The family, then, we may say, is the natural medium for the development and transmission of the ideals and standards of the social life. It has been the cradle of civilization in the past, and something like its organization seems to be the normal goal which men set up for society at large to realize. Two traditional ideals

[1] "Social Organization," Chaps. III, IV.

which are potent in our civilization, for example, the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man, are quite sufficient in themselves to illustrate the importance of the family as a maker and conserver of social ideals.

In the same way, we have received from our neighborhood group the ideals of freedom, fair play, justice and good citizenship. The very ideal of social solidarity itself comes, as Professor Cooley shows, from the unity experienced in these small primary groups. Inasmuch as these groups have certain universal traits which are found in all stages of civilization, there is certainly much to be said for Professor Cooley's idea that what we ordinarily call "human nature" is largely acquired there. It is certain that in such groups, at any rate, the primary social traits of human nature receive their development. The preservation of the family and the neighborhood group in their full vitality and social efficiency is, therefore, a very important matter for civilization. Their decay cannot be regarded as otherwise than a matter of grave social concern. For it is these primary groups which chiefly preserve social continuity, and within which are developed the social characteristics that enable the individual to adjust himself to higher groups and institutions.

Custom Imitation. The primary groups are of special importance in human society, not only because they are the best preservers of social traditions, but also because it is within them that imitation has its greatest chance for effective work. Tradition and custom imitation are, indeed, inseparable. If one generation accepts certain beliefs and ideas given to it by the previous generation, it usually retains the habits and customs which were correlated with these beliefs and ideas. Now, the family group from its very nature is, above all other human groups, fitted to hand down, from generation to generation, definite habits and customs. The prolonged immaturity of the child, as we

have seen, especially fits him to acquire the habits of his group. He takes these on, not only by a natural tendency to imitate his elders, but also because the organization and discipline of the family group is usually such as practically to compel him to acquire the habits of his parents. The prolonged association of the child, therefore, with the members of his family group is a prime factor in the continuity of human social life. Without a prolonged and plastic childhood the peculiar type of social continuity which we find in humanity, through tradition and acquired habit, would have been impossible.

The neighborhood group is another group in which all the arrangements for human living are such as to favor custom imitation. In nearly all such groups, until very recent times, tradition and custom have reigned supreme; and in the rural neighborhood there is still, frequently, to be found very strongly compelling influences to make the individual follow, in practically all things, the custom of the group.

It is manifest that the imitation of elders, whether upon the basis of instinct, of social suggestion, of social control or upon rational grounds, is one of the chief means of securing continuity in human groups, and that the most favorable conditions for such custom imitation are those of the face-to-face association which we find in the family and in the neighborhood group.[1]

Static Societies and Civilizations. For the reasons just mentioned, the family and neighborhood groups have often been accused of unduly fostering conservatism in the social life, and so stationary civilization. But the face-to-face association of these groups certainly can not be charged with having such an effect under normal circumstances. The real causes of static conditions in certain hu-

[1] For collateral reading on custom imitation and static social conditions, read Ross: "Social Psychology," Chaps. XII–XIV.

man groups must be sought outside of the association which normally characterizes the family and the neighborhood groups. They are causes, resident partly in the physical environment, partly in human nature and partly in the form or type of social organization. Cultural anthropology and sociology are not yet able definitely to answer the question, in all cases, why certain human groups have remained, for a long time, in a relatively static condition, while others are characterized by rapid change. It is certain, however, that physical and social isolation has played a large part in fostering static conditions in certain human groups. Thus, human groups, isolated from other groups on islands, or by mountains, deserts or other practically impassable barriers, have generally tended to remain stationary. In the same way the social isolation, produced by difference of language, racial antagonism or clannishness, results in the indefinite preservation of social usages and customs. Nothing seems to break up the sway of habit and custom like the multiplication of contacts between human groups. Social continuity is not destroyed by the contact of any group with a wider world and the changes necessitated by adjustment to such a world; only normal social growth is promoted. Social isolation, on the other hand, whether the result of physical or cultural causes, prevents the wholesome competition between habits, customs and institutions which usually results in the selection of the best. Perhaps the greatest reason for the survival of certain peoples in the savage and barbarian stages of culture down to the present time has been the fact that nearly all of these people were isolated from the main developments of human life, side-tracked, so to speak, in out-of-the-way places.

The chief causes of the nonprogressiveness of semicivilized and civilized peoples, however, must be sought in their institutions of social control. Religion, government and education have often been such in human history as to

favor static social conditions. Thus, ancestor worship, teaching the reverence of the dead, of parents and of elders generally, has been one of the most powerful influences making for the perpetuation of customs and a stationary condition of civilization, of which we have knowledge in human history. The long stagnancy of Chinese civilization, for example, seems to have been due chiefly to ancestor worship. Despotic governments, with the aid of authoritative religions, have also been frequent causes which have blocked normal social growth. Finally, in the hands of the authorities of church and state, education has frequently become one of the chief instruments by which normal social changes have been prevented.

We must, of course, allow also for the tendency in ordinary human nature for habit to dominate. The intellect, as we have seen, is one of the latest developed phases of human nature, while habit is as old as life itself. The intellect, which is the chief instrument of individual and social adaptation, comes in, as a rule, only when habits work poorly. The inertia of the mass of mankind, under ordinary conditions, brings about, therefore, the dominance of habit, and so of custom. It is only crises, emergencies, new situations, which call forth the constructive activity of the intellect.

There is, of course, also a possibility that different human types vary in the readiness with which they make changes, though we have no conclusive scientific evidence upon this point. Some races in history seem to have been less progressive than others, and we must admit that it is more than a possibility that in some types of mankind there is a stronger, more venturesome pioneering spirit which is favorable to change. This is certainly the case with individuals, though it may not be true of masses of men. In one way, however, race has certainly an effect upon the more or less stationary or changing conditions of the cul-

ture of a group, and that is, indirectly, through the fact that physical differences of race tend to keep distinct ethnic groups apart, and so favor social isolation and social stagnation in the way already described.

Social Assimilation. The social life is continually taking up into itself new elements. This is, indeed, the method of social growth, and in no way destroys social continuity. The new elements may even be so assimilated and organized into the life of the group that only slight, unintended changes result. This process is known in sociology as social assimilation.

In part, these new elements come from variations within the group itself, but they come largely from other groups also. Foreign elements, that is, outside persons with their habits and ideas, may be absorbed in great numbers into a group without affecting its social continuity. Sometimes the persons of other traditions and customs lay aside, largely, their former habits and are absorbed into the group through their assimilation of its traditions. More often there takes place a process of mutual accommodation, in which the absorbing group takes up some of the traditions and customs of the foreign element. This is easily done if there is not too wide a difference in the habits of the two groups; for, as we have already seen, one method of normal social growth is by borrowing ideas and institutions from other groups. The ideas and usages brought by the foreign element will, therefore, tend to be taken up by an assimilating group in so far as they are harmonious with the total traditions of the group.

Where there are too great differences in the traditions of the groups, however, mutual accommodation is impossible, and the tradition of one group or the other has to be given up, or else a relatively separate group is formed by the foreign element, to preserve its own tradition. Between barbarous groups and civilized groups, when they come

into contact, for example, there is usually little or no accommodation. Either the barbarous group gives up its traditions for the traditions of the civilized group, or else it tries to preserve them by forming a separate group.

On the other hand, when persons from groups of equal or similar culture mingle together, there is usually mutual accommodation with respect to their customs and traditions. In such a case, the traditions of the assimilating group usually absorb certain elements from the traditions of the foreign group, without in any way breaking the continuity of the social life, but rather enriching its content.

The assimilation of diversified, but not too dissimilar, elements under such conditions manifestly promotes social progress. On the other hand, when the traditions and habits of intermingling peoples are so dissimilar that they cannot successfully assimilate, the representatives of these different traditions tend to draw apart into separate groups. Social isolation of such groups, even though they occupy the same territory, as we have already seen, favors social stagnation. Thus the social results of the intermingling of peoples of different types of culture may be very diverse under differing circumstances.

Where a foreign element is successfully assimilated in a group, certain other conditions than those which we have named must exist. There must, in the first place, be a certain degree of sympathy and consciousness of kind between the foreign element and the assimilating group; otherwise there will be no mutual approach. There must also be common work and common occupations, or the division of labor will tend to prevent assimilation. Caste and class lines must not be too sharply drawn in the assimilating group, or else they will be drawn against the foreigner. In short, there must be frequency of contact between the foreign ele-

ment and the population of the assimilating group along all social lines, so that there may be opportunity for mutual understanding, exchange of ideas and imitation of behavior. It is manifest that free democratic society, in which there is substantial equality between all members in respect to legal rights and economic and educational opportunities, should show greater power of social assimilation than other types of social life; and this history illustrates. The wonderful power of assimilation which the people of the United States have hitherto shown in respect to their foreign immigration has been due to this fact. Professor Ross mentions also five other features of American social life which have given it great assimilative power, namely: (1) the toleration of the American people for other traditions and customs than their own; (2) the individualism, which puts the position of each individual in society upon a basis of his own personal worth; (3) the cult of progress, which leads even the custom bound to seek to adjust themselves to a changing future; (4) the conferring of equal political rights; (5) equality of educational opportunities, molding the young to American traditions and detaching them from those of their parents.[1]

The conditions of successful social assimilation are evidently, in the large, the same as the conditions of social unity, and it is unnecessary, accordingly, to discuss them further. The student may once more be reminded that social continuity, in general, is simply the unity of society in time. The conditions for successful social assimilation must be, therefore, the conditions which are favorable to the acquiring of relatively similar habits, similar ideas and similar standards by all members of the group, and to the coördinating of their activities and traditions into an harmonious whole.

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[1] "Social Psychology," pp. 241–243.

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CHAPTER VII

SOCIAL CHANGE UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS

All social groups have continually to adjust themselves to new conditions in their environment; and so the relations of individuals themselves must also change. Even the most static human groups undergo some change. The habits of living, which are adjusted to the conditions of today, will probably not be adjusted in their entirety to the conditions of tomorrow. Moreover, as we ascend in the scale of social evolution, change becomes a more and more striking character of the social life. Social changes are of two sorts, unconscious and conscious, the former characterizing more largely the lower stages of social evolution; the latter becoming increasingly characteristic of the higher stages.

Forms of Unconscious Social Change. Let us note some of the forms of unconscious social change because they are the bases upon which conscious social changes are later developed. First of all, we have the changes which are brought about in human society by the processes of organic evolution. These are: first, the changes which are effected through the evolutionary process, that is, the processes of natural selection, in the hereditary qualities of individuals. More important, by far, in all recent human history, however, have been the social changes effected by the selection and survival of certain groups, as the result of competition with other groups.[1] The result of this

[1] The working of this process, under conditions of peace, can best be seen through the study of the comparative vital statistics

natural selection of groups, as we have already pointed out, has been the elimination of groups of weak organization and with little power of intelligent coöperation, along with the selection and survival of groups of better organization and highly developed power of intelligent coöperation. Thus, natural selection has operated indirectly upon the individual through the group. While there is some natural elimination of biologically unfit individuals in human groups, and hence biologically unfit types, there can be no doubt that, in the main, the stress of natural selection in humanity has fallen upon groups and even upon cultures. All of the social changes resulting from the natural elimination of individuals and groups are, of course, quite unintended and usually even unconscious.

Another type of unconscious change in human societies is the change that results from the slow modification of social habits and institutions through the failure of one generation to imitate or copy a previous generation exactly. The gradual modifications of language, for example, seem often to be of this character, and there can scarcely be any question but that all social activities undergo similar changes.

The most frequent sources of unconscious social changes, however, are the unintended changes brought about in the relationships of individuals by such factors as the increase of population, a new physical environment, a new cultural contact, a new discovery or a new invention.[1] Factors like these often bring about, more or less mechanically, extensive readjustments in the relations of the individuals of a group, which, while they may not be unconscious, were unintended, and hence not especially guided or controlled

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of nations and classes. Read Chapter IX of Ellwood: "Sociology and Modern Social Problems."

[1] Illustrations of unconscious social changes of this type may be found in Ellwood: "Sociology and Modern Social Problems," Chaps. VI, VII.

by the conscious processes of the higher brain centers. It is this sort of unconscious, or unintended, social changes which are most in evidence in civilized human society. They are not only a frequent reflex of new mechanical inventions, but also of new laws and of new scientific discoveries. In these latter cases, however, consciousness usually enters in as a guiding and controlling factor. Indeed, the tendency is to bring all the unintended social changes under the control of consciousness.

One can say, in a general way, perhaps, and be approximately near the truth, that all social changes start in an unconscious way; that they are then brought to consciousness, and later conscious efforts are made to guide and control them. In other words, social changes start, as a rule, with some change in the environment or in the inner make-up of the group, which makes old social habits and institutions no longer well adjusted, or even altogether unworkable. Thus, changes in the mere numbers of a group may make some social custom, adapted to a smaller group, unworkable. In some cases where the new adjustments to be made are slight, or take place very slowly, they may not come vividly into the consciousness of the members of the group. But when the changes are great, rapid or complex, they come into the consciousness of the members of the group, and some attempt to control them usually takes place. Thus is developed the various phases of what is usually called by sociologists and social psychologists, "social consciousness." Inasmuch as rapid and complex changes are more characteristic of social and cultural evolution in their later than in their earlier phases, human history has been, in the main, a movement toward a higher degree of social consciousness. As we have just said, social changes are both more rapid and more conscious as social evolution advances. And these two facts are evidently causally connected.

Conventionality Imitation. Before taking up in detail, however, the question of the method of conscious social changes, let us note the part played in practically all social change, except that brought about by the selection of the environment, by what is known as conventionality imitation. By this we understand the imitation of contemporaries, while by custom imitation, it will be remembered, we mean the imitation of ancestors. Conventionality imitation plays an especially large part in the unintended, more or less unconscious changes in civilized society. New inventions, new ideas and new types of behavior are largely diffused in human groups by this imitation of contemporaries. But when such new variations in social activity have become spread by imitation, many unintended changes in the social life as a whole may result. Thus, the general adoption of the telephone by the families in a rural community may result in certain unintended changes in the life of the group as a whole.

Conventionality imitation in a society usually proceeds from the social superior to the social inferior. Thus, standards and ideals in a society usually work down from a superior few, only gradually becoming diffused among the mass of the group. This may take place so slowly that the social changes accompanying this process may not be highly conscious. On the other hand, this principle of the imitation of the leader, or of a social élite, is also seen in the most rapid, complex and highly conscious changes in society. In discussing the mechanics of these highly conscious social changes, it must not be thought that members of groups always perceive fully the social situation or the meaning of accepted programs of action. Even in such changes, the part which suggestion and imitation play in the mass of a group is very considerable. The fullest degree of consciousness regarding the changes which take place in human groups is always reserved for a compara-

tively small number of intellectual leaders, who may be termed the "social élite." It has always been thus in human society and, for reasons which will soon be apparent, it will probably always so remain. The mass of the group participates in the "social consciousness" only sufficiently to understand the general social situation, and to select policies and leaders to whom are intrusted the execution of policies.

The Mechanism of Conscious Social Changes. Social life as a whole, we have seen, is carried on by various forms of mental interaction between individuals. The habitual relationships of individuals are modified, or even radically changed, by means of mental interactions. Thus, old social coördinations that no longer work well are gotten rid of, and new types of adaptation between individuals are built up. Now, the mechanism of this process is found in the various forms of communication and in other simpler forms of the interstimulation, such as suggestion and imitation. In human societies the various forms of communication make up the chief part of the mechanism for effecting conscious social changes, especially communication in the form of oral and written language. If human societies had no need of acting together and making common adjustments in their environment, as we have already said, such definite forms of communication would probably never have been developed. They are the means by which conscious coadaptive processes have been perfected in human society. In other words, these higher forms of communication have their origin in the needs of, and exist for the sake of perfecting, the social life.

Let us outline, in a few words, how the various forms of communication come in to mediate the processes of readjustment in human society. When anything goes wrong with the working of a social habit, criticisms of the social situation are communicated from one individual to another.

As a rule, public criticism marks the bad working of some social custom or institution. Discussion then develops, at first of a critical nature, and later in the way of the formation of a general opinion in the group. Through discussion, the useful elements in the old situation are selected out from those that are working badly. New ideas are formed upon the basis of this discussion, and when certain of these have been selected as the basis for a new policy or a new coördination of the group, we have what is called the formation of a public opinion. In order to carry out this public opinion the group selects certain individuals that are judged to be especially fitted for this task.

All the working of this mechanism for effecting conscious social changes is especially well illustrated in modern democratic nations in their methods of effecting political changes. In the United States, for example, preceding a presidential election, those elements in the population who have felt the bad working of the policies of the administration in office, voice their dissatisfaction in the public press, through public meetings, and through private conversations. Country-wide discussion results, then there is the gradual formation of a public opinion, the formulation of party programs, and a selection, among these and their leaders, by a majority or plurality vote. This process illustrates, in an organized and formalized way, the method of highly conscious changes in society generally, only we should remember, of course, that the principle of "majority rule" is a relatively late invention in social life, and is not even yet extended to all spheres of social activity.

The significance of this simple description of the method of conscious social change will become evident as we proceed. For we shall see that all parts of this mechanism are essential to normal social life. For the present, before we elaborate details, it will suffice to point out that this process of normal growth or change in social life is very

like the process of mental growth or development in the individual. The individual develops his mental life by constant readjustment to his environment, by the constant replacement of habits which no longer work well by habits which show a superior adjustment. In this process of building up new habits the individual uses the mental processes of attention, discrimination, the association of ideas, judgments of value and the like. So, in our social life, in building up new customs and institutions, the processes of communication, discussion, the formation of public opinion, the selection of social policies and social leaders, are but so many steps in the process of conscious social readjustment. Hence, the importance in our social life of the opportunities and means of free communication, free public criticism, free discussion, untrammeled formation of public opinion, free selection of social policies and social leaders. Let us note, finally, that as in the individual we find the highest consciousness in the transition from one habit to another, so in the social life we find the greatest use of all of this machinery of mental interaction and intercommunication in the transition from one form of institution or association to another. Social consciousness, as well as individual consciousness, evidently centers about the fact of change or adaptation in life.

Social Consciousness. In a sense, all consciousness is social, that is, its particular content is derived from our social environment or at least conditioned by that environment. The social psychologist, however, uses the phrase "social consciousness" for several relatively specialized phases of individual consciousness. Professor Cooley uses the term as the opposite of self-consciousness, that is, the awareness of others rather than of self.[1] Out of the awareness of others grows, of course, an awareness of the

[1] See his "Social Organization," pp. 8–12.

group as a whole and of its general situation with respect to other groups and its environment in general. From this social consciousness naturally arises, when the group as a whole has to perform some more or less difficult task, a conscious state in which each individual in the group is conscious of the relation of his activities to the activities of the whole group. This is the condition which is usually called social consciousness, in the popular social literature of our day; but it is evident that it might better be called a state of "social self-consciousness." For it implies a heightening both of the individual's consciousness of himself and of his consciousness of others.

We may take the municipal ownership of some public utility as illustrating this stage of social consciousness. The group as a whole may decide to take over and operate such a utility, without being highly conscious of the adjustments to be made by all members of the group. At first, the municipality may not succeed well in the conduct of its new enterprise. Scandals arise in connection with public ownership; but after one or two campaigns the mass of the citizens become educated regarding the matter, and the probability is that the community thereafter will be more or less successful in the management of the enterprise. It is evident, however, that such success is gained only through the mass of the citizens devoting a certain part of their time, energy and consciousness to the conduct of public business; and that continued success will be assured only if this continues to be done.

Now, it is evident that what is called social consciousness in human groups has to do with the adaptation of the group as a whole to some situation, just as individual consciousness has to do with adaptation. It is only by developing such a state that the activities of the members of a group can be accurately coördinated in the way required by a complex social life. The more complex groups, therefore,

show more social consciousness. The city group shows more than the rural group, and the civilized group more than the uncivilized. Such a state of social self-consciousness makes possible a better collective adaptation of all members of a group to the conditions of social existence. Hence, the desirability of developing this social self-consciousness to the highest degree because it is only thus that human societies can gain collective control over the conditions of their existence. The social sciences themselves, indeed, are but one manifestation of the development of increasing social self-consciousness with the end of collective control over the conditions of life. Now, it is evident that systems of intercommunication, oral and written language and all of their vehicles, such as the press, the telegraph and the like, public discussions, the formation of a public opinion, are all means for developing social consciousness and getting it to function in the control of social activities. The whole process, in other words, is one concerned with social change, or the readjustment of social habits, and from this point of view we shall have no difficulty in understanding the meaning and function in our social life of such processes as public discussion, public opinion and social leadership.

The Function of Public Discussion. Public discussion has two functions: first, the criticism of habits, institutions and policies, and secondly, the construction of new policies upon which to build new habits and institutions. Discussion works in the social life, therefore, very much as the processes of discrimination and association of ideas work in the individual mind. Its first function, as public criticism, is to pick out those elements in social habits, institutions and policies which do not work well. It is discussion of this sort which, as Bagehot says, breaks up the old bonds of custom.[1] It serves as an instrument to break up

[1] "Physics and Politics," Chap. V.

old habits and institutions in a group because it points out wherein they work poorly. It leads the whole group to discriminate the different elements in the social situation. It therefore prepares for change.

The next step in the discussion is, of course, to pick out the elements in the old situation which are still valuable, and which may be utilized in the construction of new social habits and institutions. In this phase of its development, discussion places a premium upon intelligence. The individual in the group who can point out how the old elements can be readjusted in a way to meet the demands of the new situation easily and certainly is the one who can usually get a hearing. Thus, ideas gradually get associated and combined until the stage is reached when a public opinion is formed.

It is evident that, if the process of public discussion is to do its work well, there must be freedom of thought and freedom of speech. Where public criticism of social habits and institutions is not tolerated, it is evident that their faults cannot be brought to the attention of the group. Tolerance of such criticism is therefore the first condition for the well-working of the machinery of conscious social change, or rational social readjustment. Again, it is only through the freedom of speech and of the press, and the tolerance of new ideas, that there can be the greatest opportunity for the coöperative working of the intelligence of the whole group in building up new social habits and institutions. Through free discussion, in other words, the richest results of experience can be brought to bear upon a given social situation, and there is the greatest chance of a wise and rational solution of the practical problem. Societies that have maintained free discussion have, consequently, in human history, been not only most progressive, but also most apt to show normal, uninterrupted social development.

The Formation and Function of Public Opinion.[1] The highly dynamic societies of modern civilization control their social changes by what we call public opinion. To some extent, savage and barbarous societies did the same; only in these latter the opinion of the group was so bound by traditions and custom that public opinion, in the modern sense, could get no great development. By public opinion, we mean a more or less rational collective judgment formed by the action and reaction of many individual judgments. Such a collective conscious opinion is obviously formed to mediate and control some change in the policies or institutions of the group. It implies, not so much that uniformity of opinion has been reached by all members of the group, or even by a majority, as that a certain organization and coördination of the opinions and judgments of the individuals of the group has been reached. This is probably true even in those primitive groups which act only upon the principle of unanimity, and it is even more true in modern societies under the principle of majority rule. Of course, there is a certain core of agreement among the individuals of a group, or at least among a majority, but there is no absolute uniformity of judgment. As Professor Cooley says, public opinion is "an organization of separate individual judgments, a coöperative product of communication and reciprocal influence."[2] It does not represent, therefore, necessarily, as some social psychologists have claimed, the judgment of the lowest member of the group making the opinion, or even the mediocrity of its average individuals. It may well represent the matured judgment of leaders and specialists, after these have reacted with their public.

Whether control by public opinion will be control by the worst or the best minds in the group, however, will depend

[1] For collateral reading on public opinion, see Cooley: "Social Organization," Chap. XII.

[2] "Social Organization," p. 121.

upon the circumstances of its formation, and the opportunities given for leadership to men of the highest intelligence. It will depend upon the appreciation which the group has of the judgment of the expert or of the superior mind, and that in turn will depend much upon the traditions of the group. It will also depend upon whether the conditions under which the opinion of the group is formed are such as to favor the wisest and most rational judgments circulating freely among the members of the group. Freedom of intercommunication and the encouragement of freedom of thought are necessary conditions for the formation of a public opinion of the highest degree of rationality. Without free speech, a free press and free discussion the highest development of public opinion is impossible, since it is formed by the action and reactions of many separate private judgments. Professor Giddings has rightly insisted that the highest type of public opinion depends for its development upon such conditions. He perhaps goes too far, however, in saying that in those countries where free discussion and freedom of assemblage are interdicted, there can be no true public opinion.[1] In such countries, however, public opinion, while it develops, is usually of a very low order of rationality; and hence is either powerless to effect social changes, or, if it succeeds in effecting them, they are apt to be unwise. The proper functioning of public opinion in a social group demands, therefore, the fullest development of the mechanism of free intercommunication. Such free functioning of public opinion is, on the whole, one of the best safeguards which societies have against social catastrophes, since it represents the free collective judgment of the group as a whole, and the most rational attempt it is capable of making to control collective action.

If the importance of a high development of public opin-

[1] "The Principles of Sociology," p. 138.

ion in social life is such as we have just indicated, then it is equally important that the whole machinery of its formation be kept not only free, but also uncorrupted and alive, so to speak, to its social responsibility. Now, in the large, complex social groups of modern civilization, the formation and guidance of public opinion is becoming increasingly a function of the press. To the modern newspaper and magazine belongs especially the preponderant part in the guidance and formation of public opinion. If the press is commercial, if it is managed even to serve individual or class interests rather than to meet social needs, it will as surely fail to create the highest type of public opinion as if it were unfree. Means and methods yet remain to be devised by which the press can be kept free, and yet, at the same time, brought to realize in the highest degree its social responsibility as one of the most important parts of the machinery of our whole social life. Owing to sensationalism, to party and class bias, and to commercialism, it must be admitted that, even in the most advanced civilized societies of to-day, the press is still far from being the instrument of rational social readjustment which our social life demands.

The social function of public opinion, as we have already said, is to mediate in the transition from one type of social activity to another. It is a selective process, which has to do with the construction of new social habits and institutions. As our social life comes more and more under the sway of conscious and rational processes, custom, laws and institutions come more and more to rest upon public opinion. It is probably a mistake to trace the origin of these back to the public opinion of primitive groups, because, as we have already pointed out, customs and institutions very often have their origin in the lower stages of social evolution from instinctive reactions, or even in some cases from accidental adjustments on the part of primitive so-

ciety. But in the later stages of social development, especially in free society, the rational judgment of the group, which we call public opinion, comes in to modify profoundly customs and institutions. In these stages public opinion is often the decisive element in establishing a law or institution; and in this sense the laws and institutions of democratic society may be said to rest upon public opinion.

In democratic societies, public opinion is, then, a force lying back of the power of all regulative institutions. It is to be regarded, perhaps, as the chief instrument of social control in highly dynamic societies, inasmuch as the other institutions of control, especially government, very largely rest upon it. Moreover, it seems to be playing an increasing part in controlling all social adjustments. If it can be developed to the highest degree of rationality as well as of power, the social life of the future may evidently expect much from it; for the most important problems before our civilization are capable of solution through the development of rational public opinion.

The Function of Social Leadership. Animal societies show social leadership but very imperfectly developed. This is doubtless because they have no rapid, complex adjustments to make. Human societies, on the other hand, show a high development of social leadership; and leadership in the social life steadily increases in importance as we ascend from the savage stage to present civilization. On account of the difficulty of the adjustments which they have to make, human groups have to organize themselves about definite leaders, men who take the initiative in thought or in action. Without such leadership human groups would show no more capacity to make wise adjustments than their weakest members. It is by the coördination as we have already seen, of the thought and the activities of all the members of the group with the thinking and acting of some leader, who thinks ahead and sets an example, that human

groups become capable of making superior adjustments. Nothing great is achieved in human society, therefore, without personal leadership. The individual is the source of variation in the social life in both thought and action. Certain individuals are therefore always better fitted than others in their group to cope with a new situation. The traditional knowledge, or beliefs, of the group and its habits of action may vary in their expression, in certain individuals, in such a way that it is greatly to the advantage of the group if this new variation is copied. Now, this element of variation from the level of the group, while existing in a slight degree in all individuals, manifests itself most favorably in exceptional individuals whose biological make-up is probable somewhat superior to the average of their group. These persons need not necessarily be geniuses, but merely persons with capacity for initiative and leadership. It is the acceptance of their leadership which makes conscious superior adjustments in human groups possible. The creative influence of personality in social life, therefore, can never be safely left out of account in sociology, even though for the sake of brevity, explicit reference to it may be omitted in discussing social changes.

On the other hand, it must be emphasized also that the social group always selects its leaders in one way or in another. It may select wisely or unwisely, but there is no leadership without the adhesion of the group to its leader. The probability of a wise selection of a leader is greatly increased where the freedom of the selection is untrammeled. This again depends upon freedom of choice, of discussion and of expression, which we have emphasized as the essential part of the mechanism of conscious social change and control. The leader is the one who is selected by the group to carry out its judgment, its will. The leader must be fitted by capacity and training, therefore, to direct the policy of the group; but more than this, he must know how

to handle men, how to get them to coöperate, and to coordinate their activities. For a leader is after all only one, and not the whole group. The success of enforcing a new policy or of building up a new institution will largely depend, therefore, upon the type of leader chosen. To this extent, there is sense in Emerson's remark when he said: "An institution is the lengthened shadow of a great man." Human institutions, as we find them, have usually had many "great men," or leaders, associated with them. But these great men were always selected to help carry out the will of their groups, in response to some social situation, which, from a scientific point of view, had far more to do with creating the new habit or institution than the "great man." Nevertheless, the leader is indispensable in consciously directed social changes and movements, and the better fitted he is for his task, the greater capacity he has, the better the chance of successful social achievement; and as we have already said, when the conditions for rational judgment on the part of the whole group are kept the best possible, by the free interchange of ideas, there is the best chance for the selection of the fittest men for social leadership; but beyond this, it is evident that the society that wishes competent leaders must find means of training them and selecting them in advance, as it were, before the situation arises in which their leadership will be needed. There is probably no lack of competent individuals in every civilized society with ample natural endowments for leadership. In such societies the higher institutions of learning are supposed to find and train social leaders, but they often perform their tasks, in this respect, along many lines of social action, in a comparatively inefficient manner. This is a matter of the utmost practical importance, because with expert leadership the capacity of civilized peoples for social progress might be increased almost indefinitely.

Social groups are always in continuous reaction with their

real leaders. Whatever power may be intrusted to the leader is, therefore, always more or less limited by the reaction of his group. Instances of giving absolute powers to social leaders in some lines, especially military and governmental, are not unknown in human history, though governmental absolutism has as a rule grown up by slow stages after successive delegations of power by peoples to their rulers. The most socially fortunate condition exists, of course, when the leader is closely coördinated with his group. When there is constant action and reaction between the leader and the group, the outcome is truly representative of the group's judgment and will. The most unfortunate thing about despotic leadership is that the outcome in such cases is not truly representative of the will of the group. The democratic method of selecting social leaders here again shows its superiority.

Social Decision. We have already discussed the group will as the coördination of the activities of the group in a given direction. The social judgment reached in public opinion normally issues in some collective action. There must be, therefore, some method of reaching a decision of the group after public discussion and the formation of a public opinion. The primitive democracies of savage and barbarous society almost always reach their decisions by unanimous agreement. But such unanimity is not possible in the great, complex societies of modern civilization. Hence, in most things, such societies are content to reach a decision through the agreement of a majority. Public policies and leaders to carry out those policies are usually selected by a majority vote. In such cases, the popular will, like public opinion, represents, not uniformity of will in all the members of a group, or even in the majority, but rather an organization and coördination of the many volitional attitudes of the members of the group, so that they issue in a definite, unified result.

With such methods of reaching a social decision, there is always danger, of course, that the result will be a compromise which satisfies none of the different classes or parties in the whole group. Hence, the will of the group will not be behind the change which has been made in some institution, and the whole situation will therefore remain unstable. This means that a definite social choice has not really been made, and is apparently one of the difficulties which confront complex groups which proceed in social adjustment upon the principle of majority rule. In most cases what is lacking here is the sufficient development of social consciousness regarding the situation by the group as a whole. With the more fully developed social consciousness, as a rule, a social decision is reached which is truly representative of the will of the group, and the social changes resulting settle down into habits and become embodied in the institutions of the group.

Critical and Constructive Periods in History. Periods of relative stability in social institutions are necessarily followed by periods of breaking down, of change and of disorganization, when life conditions change. These are regularly followed again by periods of synthesis, of reconstruction, and of stability. These periods need not, of course, coincide for all classes of institutions. A period of breaking down and of change in one class is not infrequently synchronous with a period of upbuilding or relative stability in another class. The complexity of modern civilized societies makes it impossible for movements toward change to go on equally in all phases of social life at once. Nevertheless, on account of the interdependence of all different phases of the social life, there is a tendency for the instability of one set of institutions to affect greatly the stability of all other institutions. Accordingly, historians have noted what they term "critical" and "constructive" periods in history. Periods of change are, as we have already seen,

necessarily periods of criticism and of disorganization; but if the social life is normal, these are succeeded by periods of construction and relative stability in institutions. Professor Lamprecht has recently restated this theory without, however, giving adequate recognition to the complexity of social life. He finds that human society is always organized about some dominant idea, or belief, which he calls a "psychic dominant." These dominant ideas, however, decay when the conditions of life change. There results a period of individualism and dissociation. After a time some new idea emerges which becomes the "psychic dominant" of a new historical epoch. Then comes a period of synthesis, reorganization and stability. According to Professor Lamprecht, this is the universal psychic mechanism of the social or historical process.[1] His theory evidently states, in non-psychological language, the alternation between habit and adaptation in society which we have been discussing. But, of course, it must be remembered that modern civilized groups have not one single "psychic dominant," or ruling idea, but many; and that there is no such clear distinction for the whole life of groups between periods of dissociation and of association, or reconstruction, as Lamprecht implies.

Confusion in Periods of Transition. A certain amount of confusion must be regarded as normal in the transition from one type of social habit or institution to another. Just as it is impossible for individuals to make changes in their methods of living without some possibility of confusion, so it is impossible for society to make such changes without some confusion. It is all the more impossible because it necessarily takes some time for a large mass of individuals to discover the new stimuli, or ideas and values, which are adequate for the building up of a new social coördination. In periods of transition in any phase of our social life we must expect some confusion, then, in regard

[1] See his work on "What is History?" Chaps. III, IV.

to the ideas and values by which men control their conduct. If the period is one of general social change or transition, there may be widespread confusion as to ideals of life. Such is evidently the condition of Western civilization, and even to some extent that of the whole world, at the present time. It is this confusion as to what ideas and standards should be taken as guides in social action which constitutes, from a psychological standpoint, the essence of many of our social problems. The confusion in respect to the family life in Western civilization today illustrates this. The old authoritative family of past generations has broken down. As an institution it will no longer work under modern conditions. As yet, however, the mass of the people have been unable to find any new ideas or ideals sufficient for the reconstruction of the family upon a stable basis. There is uncertainty and confusion as to what the new type of the family should be. Hence, the whole family life is in a state of confusion and distintegration today, a state which should disappear in time provided our civilization has not lost its power of making new and superior adjustments.[1] The danger in such periods of social confusion accompanying transition from one type of institution to another is, of course, that no agreement regarding the proper type of institution may be reached by the group and there will take place a reversion to a lower type of social adaptation.

Radicalism and Conservatism in Society. The alternation of habit and adaptation in the social life expresses itself in the character and actions of individuals. The individuals who adhere to the old habits of their group we call conservative, while the individuals who are in favor of change are usually called radical. In other words, some individuals of a group show more of the habitual or static aspect of social life, while others show more of the adaptive

[1] See Ellwood: "Sociology and Modern Social Problems," Chap. VIII.

or dynamic aspect. This is due partly to difference of individual organization and temperament, and partly to the fact that individuals are exposed unequally to the factors which make for social change. Whether particular persons are conservatives or radicals will depend upon the working of these two sets of influences. Temperament has, of course, something to do with determining whether a person is conservative or radical. Usually, however, the influence of the social environment, and especially of education, will be found to be most important. Of course, those persons for whom existing institutions work badly will, under ordinary circumstances, become the advocates of social change; while those who find existing institutions advantageous tend to become conservative.

Radicalism and conservatism are, then, simply expressions of the tendencies in the social life of habit and adaptation. This shows the absurdity of either extreme radicalism or extreme conservatism. No society could long exist in which habit wholly predominated, or at least it would expose itself to very grave dangers. On the other hand, no society that is in a constant process of readaptation, always without a settled condition of its institutions, can possibly achieve anything worth while. The most wholesome social life is evidently one in which a just balance is maintained between conservative tendencies, on the one hand, and radical or progressive tendencies, on the other; for both are necessary for that wholesome alternation of condition and change, habit and adaptation, which makes the rhythm of normal social development.

Of a somewhat similar nature are the manifestations of individualism and collectivism in a social group. In periods when social habits and institutions break down, there is opportunity for the individual to assert himself. At such times the individual becomes more or less free from the domination of customs, traditions and institutions. He is

thrown back more upon his own instincts, habits, feelings and ideals. On the other hand, in periods of social reconstruction and stability the adaptation of the individual to the social order, or his absorption in the life of the group, may become so complete that he may seem to lose even a great measure of his individuality.

Now, it is evident that what we call individualism and collectivism in the social life are just manifestations of these tendencies of the individual to free himself from, or become absorbed into, the life of the group. Like radicalism and conservatism, they are tendencies of the social life which express themselves in individual character and action. Like them also, they are based upon the alternation of habit and adaptation in social life; and finally like them, a just balance should be maintained between these two for the most wholesome sort of social life. If the individual is too completely absorbed into his group, he loses individual initiative, becomes a mental and moral weakling, and the group itself becomes static. On the other hand, if there is too great individualization, if the individual becomes too independent of his group, he sets himself up as a law unto himself. There results unending conflict between the habits of the individuals composing the group, unstable relations between them, and finally even social anarchy and the dissolution of the whole social order. If a society is to remain in a healthy condition, therefore, neither individualization nor socialization must be carried too far. Individualization must be such as to develop individual initiative, independent mental and moral character, and yet prepare the individual for the harmonious adjustment of his activities with those of other individuals. Socialization, then, should not aim at destroying individual initiative and freedom, but at creating in individuals a strong mental and moral character, which will spontaneously and harmoniously adjust itself to the highest needs of the social life.

The absurdity of either an absolute individualism or an absolute socialism, as a practical social theory, must be manifest. Individualism and socialism, like radicalism and conservatism, are abstractions from the social life process. Neither can exist in its pure form in human society. While the danger in Western civilization at the present time seems to be from excessive individualism, which at times seems to threaten to dissolve all existing institutions, yet it is evident that the other extreme, a socialism which would suppress individual initiative and lay no emphasis upon independent mental and moral character in the individual, is a possible danger which threatens the future. The solution would seem to be some form of education which, while socializing the individual, will at the same time develop a high type of individual character, thus assuring both stability and progress in our social life.

Dynamic Societies and Civilizations. The tendency for habit to predominate in the social life to the exclusion of adaptation, as we have already seen, manifests itself especially under very simple conditions of life, such as has usually existed in primitive and barbarous societies. Here the conditions of life are so unchanging that few crises or emergencies arise calling for a change in social habit. Under the powerful conservative influences of authoritative religion and of despotic governments, civilized societies may also become relatively static, as we have seen. But through the growth of population, migration and contact between peoples and cultures, the social life of civilized peoples tends to become dynamic. The necessity of constant readjustment gives opportunity for the individual to free himself. This liberates individual initiative and energy. Free thought, public criticism and public discussion are encouraged. Mental plasticity, and so plasticity of behavior, are developed in the individual. The selection of types of thought, of action, and so of customs and institutions, is made possible. Thus

the dynamic type of civilization emerges, and slowly a tradition of social progress is built up. With the development of traditions of progress along many lines of social activity, new and higher social adjustments become possible. But these conditions do not become static in the dynamic societies of the modern world, because the tradition of progress, once established in science and in the arts of life, opens up ever new vistas of higher and higher social adjustments. These ideas may not be realized until some new situation or emergency calls for their application. But they nevertheless exist as a part of the social tradition ready to be utilized as instruments of progress as soon as social customs and institutions work poorly. Thus the free, reflective interference on the part of man with social conditions and institutions does not necessarily tend to destroy social stability and order. On the contrary, even in the most progressive civilizations, social habits are not discarded as long as they work well. Thus we see that social progress, as Comte long ago proclaimed, is not opposed to social order. Neither is order opposed to progress, for it is the condition for the successful realization of higher adjustments. Dynamic civilization has, therefore, no inherent perils if it can maintain a well-balanced, progressive development of all the essential functions and institutions of the social life. The peril comes in dynamic societies, as we shall see later, from ill-balanced or one-sided development.

There need be no end, therefore, of a progressive or of a dynamic civilization. As fast as adaptation is secured to life conditions, there will be a tendency again for social habit to predominate; but in a progressive civilization, as soon as conditions change, whether in the objective environment or in knowledge and beliefs, adaptive processes will tend again to come in. Dynamic civilization thus means the establishment of an equilibrium between the social life and changing conditions.

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CHAPTER VIII

SOCIAL CHANGE UNDER ABNORMAL CONDITIONS

If societies could keep a high degree of flexibility in their habits and institutions, intelligently adapting them to meet all changing conditions, social development would probably present only the curve of normal organic growth. At least there would never be any such thing as the break-down of institutions or of social order. Unfortunately, however, this flexibility and plasticity in institutions and in social life generally are rarely realized. The very method by which human groups get their organization, through the habitual coördination of their activities with those of some leader, or governing class, upon the basis of a situation which is accepted as fixed, favors the development of inflexibility in institutions. Moreover, leaders and governing classes often find it to their personal interest to keep the social life as nearly static as possible. Hence they frequently interfere through the institutions of social control with the social mechanism by which conscious changes are brought about in human groups. It is our purpose, in this chapter, to consider social change under what we may call these abnormal conditions.

Social Immobility, Its Conditions and Consequences. The relatively static conditions of simple, primitive societies do not here concern us. For, as we have already seen, such static societies are in substantial equilibrium with their static life conditions. But this is not the case with those civilized societies which are in the competition of life, or, so to speak, in the main-stream of human evolution. In such a case inflexibility in habits or institutions means that

the group is thrown out of equilibrium with the constantly changing life conditions. Hence, such a society is liable to disaster. The social psychologist must accordingly give careful consideration to the conditions under which social habits and institutions may become inflexible. In a general way, this has already been indicated when we have said that it is through interference with the mechanism by which normally social readjustments are accomplished, that is, with the mechanism of conscious social change. The partial or complete destruction of any part of this mechanism, such as free thinking, public criticism, free discussion, the untrammeled formation of public opinion, free selection of policies and leaders, is bound to stop, more or less completely, the process of rational social readjustment. The normal process of social development is thus interfered with, and social growth checked or perverted. Usually this interference with the mechanism of social readjustment is effected through the institutions of social control. The short-sightedness or selfishness of the individuals in charge of these institutions leads them to attempt to block normal social changes. Thus governments become despotic and forbid free thought, free speech, the right of assemblage and even petitions by the people. Thus they may create immobility in institutions. Religions in human history have not infrequently so glorified the past, or sanctified existing institutions, as to make progress well-nigh impossible. Systems of education under the direction of authorities of either State or Church have often done the same. But beyond such interferences on the part of regulative institutions with normal social development, we must recognize the fact that the temper and attitude of a very large majority of a people may accomplish the same thing. Thus there may grow up in a large mass of people such an intolerance of free thought, free speech and public criticism of some institution, or even of the whole social order, that change in these is rendered

practically impossible. Intolerant, irrational public sentiments and beliefs may give rise, therefore, to inflexibility in habits and institutions in a society and stop normal social development. Whether racial character, in some cases, may not have something to do with it is a disputed question in social psychology; but in any case the establishment of a tradition of intolerance and inflexibility along some lines, probably through the skillful manipulation of a people by social leaders — political, economic, religious and educational — will account for most of the instances of social inflexibility supported by popular sentiment in civilized societies. The instance of popular sentiment in the South after 1830, opposing public criticism and public discussion of the institution of slavery, is probably to be explained in this way. It is well to remember, however, that conditions of fanaticism and intolerance can exist in very large bodies of men, and thus cause inflexibility in habits and institutions; also, that class interest, whether of the priviliged or the unprivileged classes, on account of the tendency to group egoism which we have already discussed, is liable to be intolerant, and to attempt to suppress public criticism of class policies and actions whenever it can, and thus detract from the flexibility and adaptability of the whole group.

Whatever the cause of social inflexibility, whether it be the impediments of despotic government, authoritative ecclesiasticism, inferior racial character, intolerant public sentiments or class interests, it is bound, if long continued, to produce social disaster. That disaster may come in two forms; it may come in the form of conquest, subjugation or absorption by a foreign foe; or it may come in the form of internal disruption and disorder, when the conditions of social life have sufficiently changed to make the old habits and institutions no longer workable. It is with this latter case that we shall immediately concern ourselves.[1]

[1] The theory of social revolutions, following, was first set forth

The Psychology of Revolt. As we have seen, the conditions of social life change, and, when societies have inflexible habits and institutions, the opposing forces accumulate until sooner or later the old habits are overwhelmed.[1] Under these conditions, the breakdown of the old habit may be sudden and the society, being unused to the process of readjustment and perhaps largely lacking the social machinery therefor, is unable for a greater or less length of time to reconstruct its habits and institutions. There ensues, for the reasons we have already mentioned, a period of confusion and uncertainty in which competing interests and classes in the society strive for the mastery. If the breakdown under these conditions concerns habits and institutions which affect the system of social control, we have the disorders which essentially characterize a social revolution.

The forces opposing the old institutions embody themselves, of course, in a party of opposition or revolt. This party is composed, in general, of those individuals whom the changed conditions of social life have most affected, in other words, of those individuals on whom the old social habits set least easily, and whose interest, therefore, lies in another adjustment. From these, of course, the attitude of revolt may spread by imitation among those to whom the old social habits are in any way poorly adapted, and finally among all who are susceptible, in any way, to the influence of suggestion. Thus the party of revolt grows until it comes to embody all whose ideal or material interests are in conflict with the existing order of things.

If the ruling classes are wise, they can, at this point, forestall a violent overturning of the existing order by making

by the writer in detail in an article published in the *American Journal of Sociology* for July, 1905. It was outlined in an article in the same journal in May, 1899.

[1] The motivation (cause) of revolt in large masses of men is always lack of adaptation. It may be in any phase of the social life — economic, political, religious, etc.

concessions. That is, they must themselves take the lead in the readjustment of institutions along the line demanded by the party of revolt. Thus open conflict between classes may be avoided and so-called "peaceful revolutions" effected. Historically this outcome has been more frequent than the resort to an open conflict between the privileged and non-privileged classes. If, however, only inadequate concessions are made by the ruling classes, if, in other words, the relative inflexibility of the social order is maintained, then the antagonism between this order and the new life conditions can be resolved only by open conflict between the ruling classes and the party of revolt. Thus come about those bloody struggles between privileged and nonprivileged classes for the possession of the agencies of social control, especially for political and economic power. These are "revolutions" in the narrow sense of the term. When successful, they are characterized by a change in the location of sovereignty, that is, by a shifting in the center of social control from one class to another, and often by changes in the fundamental ideas, beliefs and sentiments which accompany the social order. Superficially, such social movements are sometimes regarded as purely political, but evidently they are a phase of social evolution of peculiar interest to the sociologist and social psychologist, all the more so because a current social philosophy of the day regards this form or method of social change as a normal one for the social life. As typical revolutions, in the strict sense, the student may take the Puritan Revolution in England and the French Revolution, although all revolutionary movements and struggles will be found to conform, more or less closely, to the psychology of these changes which we are outlining.[1]

[1] For concrete illustrative material, the student may study England under the Stuarts, France of the eighteenth century, or Mexico during the last thirty-five years.

The Rôle of Destructive Criticism and Disintegrating Doctrines. As a reaction from the abuses of the old social order, negative doctrines regarding the values connected with many of its institutions spring up. These are taken, so to speak, by the party of revolt as weapons or instruments for attacking the established social order. Criticism, instead of having a constructive aim, frequently becomes absolutely destructive. While it may begin simply with pointing out defects in existing social arrangements, it not infrequently ends by indorsing anarchistic ideas. Ideas of this negative sort are not only weapons of attack upon the established order, but also the watchwords and shibboleths of the party of revolt. These negative doctrines may spread to practically all of the habits and institutions of the old order, and thus make it very difficult to reconstruct a new social order. Here again we find ideas playing a part in social change, this time, however, concerned more with the tearing down than with the building up of habits and institutions. The evident effect of these negative and disintegrating ideas is to weaken not only the old institutions, but at the same time the position of the ruling or privileged classes. No party of revolt has ever successfully led a revolution without making even larger use of these intellectual than of material weapons.

Anarchy and Mob Rule in Revolutionary Periods. The attack of the revolutionary party upon the old social order may result in its sudden, violent and more or less complete overthrow. Now the revolutionary party is rarely united upon a constructive program. Hence a period of social confusion and uncertainty, which is intensified if the overthrow of the old order has been sudden or by violent means. This may result in a general breakdown in the habits of social order in a large proportion of the population. This is especially apt to result if the overthrow of the old order has been accompanied by violence. Now, there

is always a tendency in an individual to reversion to simple, animal-like activities following the complete breakdown of a habit. This tendency becomes much more pronounced if the breakdown of the old habit is accompanied by violence. So, in the social life, if the breakdown of old habits and institutions is accompanied by a struggle between classes, there is apt to be a reversion of the whole social life to a barbarous or even animal level; for fighting, as one of the most primitive activities, greatly stimulates all the lower centers of action. Hence, revolutionary periods give opportunity for the brute and the savage in man to reassert themselves and to dominate many phases of the social life. The methods of attaining ends in revolutions are, therefore, often characteristic of much lower stages of culture. They are apt to be unreflective, extremely direct and crude. The resort to brute force is constant, and when attempts are made at psychical control it is usually through terrorism.

The conditions of confusion, excitement and reversion to animal-like levels of behavior in revolutions favor the formation of crowds and the rule of the mob. There is an absence, on the one hand, of the controlling habits, ideas and sentiments which secure order in a population, and, on the other, there is a general reversion in the mass to the unreflective type of mental activities. Under such conditions mobs are easily formed, and a suggestion may suffice to incite them to the most extreme deeds. The student here will find plenty of illustrations in the French Revolution, though all prolonged revolutionary periods have been characterized, more or less, by the existence of mobs. It is a mistake, however, to think that mobs initiate or carry through revolutions. Revolutions simply afford opportunities for mobs and other crowds to play a much greater part in the social life than they do in normal times; and this again is one of the dangers of revolutionary periods.

The State of "Chronic Revolution." The duration

of the period of anarchy and mob rule in a revolution will depend upon a number of factors. If the party of revolt is united upon a program; if the population is not too greatly divided and has not lost its power of rapid readjustment, a period of anarchy and confusion may scarcely develop. Under such circumstances the reconstruction of new social habits and institutions may go on rapidly under the guidance of the revolutionary party. Our own War of Independence may be taken as an illustration of this type of revolution. Too often, however, the revolutionary party is unified in nothing except its opposition to the old régime. It can find no principles or interest upon which it can successfully base a new social order. Moreover, the abuses and immobility of the old order may have left the mass of the population ignorant, degraded and without the power of intelligent adaptation. Under such conditions the period of confusion, anarchy and mob rule in a revolution may continue for a long time. During this time frequent attempts may be made to set up a stable social order without much success. The social state is evidently one which may be called that of "chronic revolution." The recent revolution in Mexico illustrates such an unhappy outcome. Usually the only escape from such a state seems to be the advent of a "strong man." In other words, social order can be reconstructed only about the personality of some hero and not upon the basis of ideal principles. Should the "strong man" not appear to restore order, the end, of course, will be the subjugation and government of the people by a foreign power.

The Sociology of the Dictatorship. The appearance of "dictators," in revolutionary periods, that is, men to whom more or less absolute power is intrusted, is not difficult to understand. Absolutism, as we have already said, in all political groups has historically developed through the stresses and strains accompanying prolonged war. Now, in that internal war called revolution, if it is prolonged, it is

evident that we have all the conditions favoring the rise of centralized, despotic social control. When the party of revolt are unable to agree among themselves or to effect the reconstruction of social order upon the basis of some ideal principle, the only hope of restoring social order lies in despotic, centralized social control. The revolutionary party naturally turns to such a policy to insure its own survival. It therefore seeks for some "strong man," usually a military hero, who will command the primitive sentiments of personal attachment and loyalty in the masses. The personality of such a hero affords the most natural stimulus around which a new social order can be organized when other means of constructing social institutions have failed; for cultural anthropology shows that primitively social organization was based more largely upon personal prestige and personal attachments than upon abstract principles of either social justice or social expediency.

We see, therefore, that the dictator of revolutionary periods is simply a social leader selected by his group and clothed with absolute power to restore social order upon the primitive bases of personal prestige and the exercise of brute force. The dictatorship in revolutionary periods does not arise because some superior man hypnotizes his social and political group, but because such a man is "selected" by the group as necessary to restore social order. The man so selected may be strong or weak, competent or incompetent. If such typical dictators of revolutionary eras as Cæsar, Cromwell and Napoleon had never lived, they would have had their places filled by other, though probably inferior, men.

Reaction After Revolutions. The reason for the frequency of reaction after revolutions is now manifest. After frequent futile attempts to reconstruct social order, the easiest thing is to go back to the old habits and order which existed before the revolution began. This is the more easy

because no revolution can be absolute; it is never more than a partial destruction of old habits and institutions. New habits, as we have seen, must be erected upon the basis of old habits, or of native reactions. What remains of the old social habits after a revolution must serve, then, as a foundation for new habits and institutions. If no agreement regarding a new social order can be reached, however, there is a necessary reversion to prerevolutionary conditions, if any social order whatsoever is to be established.

Such reactions are, of course, connected with the difficulties of changing collective habits, which we have already touched upon. In spite of our adoption of "majority rule" in modern democratic societies, it is evident that any radical change in collective habits necessitates the assent of practically the entire mass of a group. A change may be initiated and temporarily established by a majority, or even by a minority; but for it to become permanent in a free society, the mass of the group has to be brought sooner or later to assent to the change; otherwise a new party of revolt may form which will start a counter-revolution. It is not difficult accordingly to understand the reactions after the Puritan Revolution in England and the French Revolution. Reactions must, indeed, be deemed one of the reasons why the method of change through revolution is socially undesirable. Nevertheless the evidence of history seems to show that such reactions are usually only temporary. If the population keeps its power of intelligent adaptation, at some later time it will proceed, as a rule, to make effective, through peaceful methods, the social changes which it failed to realize through revolution.

Catastrophic Changes in Social Evolution. We have attempted to show that revolution is not a normal method of social change; rather, that it is the result of the breakdown of the normal means of social development; and that as a method of change it is accompanied by grave social

disadvantages and dangers. Nevertheless, the doctrine that we must expect social progress by revolution is now growing in popularity in Western civilization. Some socialistic thinkers have set forth the theory that just as we have organic evolution by mutation, so we must have social evolution by social mutations. This is, of course, not a new theory; it is essentially what Marx meant by his doctrine of "evolution through revolution." The comparing of this doctrine analogically to DeVries's mutation theory in biology gives it but little, if any, added strength. Social evolution, as we have seen, is not comparable either in nature or method to organic evolution. The argument for the catastrophic, or revolutionary, method of social change as representing the normal type of social development must, accordingly, stand or fall upon its own merits. It cannot be denied that social progress has often come, in the past, through revolutions; but it should be added that when these have involved bloody conflicts between classes it has come at fearful social cost. The wounds of such internal conflicts as the French Revolution and the American Civil War have perhaps healed, owing to the recuperative power in all life; but the good which they accomplished was bought at such price that most historians would doubtless agree that if the changes which they effected could have been secured in any other way it would have been socially preferable. The social ruin and disaster which has resulted from every revolutionary period in human history makes it one of the first and most incumbent duties of students of human history to point out a better way of social progress than by revolution.[1]

[1] Compare the conclusions of Lippmann: "Profound changes are not only necessary, but highly desirable. . . . A liberal people should welcome social inventions as gladly as we do mechanical ones. What it should fear is a hard shell resistance to change which brings it about explosively. Catastrophes are disastrous to radical and conservative alike: they do not preserve what was worth maintaining; they allow a deformed and often monstrous perversion of the original plan." "A Preface to Politics," pp. 284–285.

There are always distinct limits upon the use of force in human society. The violent seizure of power by one class, to accomplish its ends, can rarely take place without bloody conflicts between classes. This releases, as we have already seen, the primitive instincts of man which civilization with such difficulty controls. Violence, therefore, can rarely be successfully employed in the higher stages of civilization without defeating the very ends for which it is employed. Its employment starts a process of rebarbarization which is absolutely destructive of those higher social values which civilization has so painfully built up, and by which men have slowly learned to regulate their conduct. If long continued, then, violence must result in the total destruction of anything worthy to be called civilization. The method of social change through revolution must be regarded, therefore, as involving too grave risks to be tolerated by an intelligent people, if it is avoidable. All that can be said in condemnation of international war applies with tenfold force to civil wars between classes within a national group. But the question remains, how can they be avoided? If the method of social change by revolution is inevitable when normal methods of change fail, must revolutions not be expected in the future as in the past?

The Avoidance of Social Catastrophes. All that we have said implies that revolutions are impossible in a perfectly flexible and adaptable type of social organization. In a society in which intelligent public criticism, free discussion and free thought about social conditions and institutions are encouraged; in which there is an adaptable, flexible public opinion, alert for social betterment, ever active, and in which there is no impediment to the free expression of this public opinion through the selection of social policies and social leaders, there can be no danger of a revolution. That danger comes, as we have seen, when class interest, whether it be of the privileged or nonprivileged classes, interferes with

the free working of the mechanism of conscious social readjustment. The burden of responsibility for maintaining flexibility of social life through the free functioning of the mechanism of conscious social change rests, however, especially upon the ruling classes, that is, upon those who are in charge of the institutions of social control. If the governing class will keep in touch with the needs of all classes; if those in authority in government, in law, in industry, in education and in religion will seek first the public good; if they will seek to keep open the means of understanding and sympathy with all other classes; if they will keep free public criticism and discussion and all the means of forming rational public opinion and of selecting authorities to carry out the same, there will be no danger of revolution being resorted to in any social group.[1] But particularly is revolution inexcusable in democratic societies where the dominant classes are supposed to be the servants of the people.

The history of almost any modern nation will illustrate the principles just laid down, both positively and negatively. Perhaps the history of modern England will, on the whole, however, illustrate these principles better than that of any other nation. After experiencing two revolutions in the seventeenth century, and the revolt and loss of its colonies in the eighteenth, England succeeded in avoiding political and social revolution in the last decade of the eighteenth century and during the whole of the nineteenth century, although during that period almost the whole of Christendom experienced revolutions. This was undoubtedly due to the fact that during all of this period the Government of

[1] Compare Lippmann: "Social life has nothing to fear from group interests so long as it does not try to play the ostrich in regard to them. So the burden of national crises is squarely upon the dominant classes who fight so foolishly against the emergent ones. That is what precipitates violence, that is what renders social coöperation impossible, that is what makes catastrophes the method of change." "A Preface to Politics," p. 282.

England was in close touch with the social life of the English people. The adjustment was far from perfect, but it was sufficiently close to prevent any great development of revolutionary movements among the English people proper, although the very reverse was the case with the Irish people. The individual liberty of thought, the free public discussion and democratic methods of social control, which the Englishman developed in the eighteenth century, in other words, saved English society from revolution during the nineteenth century. The whole social spirit of England in the nineteenth century, its social freedom and plasticity, in a word, favored normal social development rather than revolution. The fact that English society has been perilously near social revolution within the past few years, just before the outbreak of the present European War, does not detract from, but rather adds to, the force of this illustration; for again the danger of revolution was averted by a whole series of social readjustments in the form of some remarkable social legislation.[1]

The experience of history must lead the sociologist to conclude, therefore, that needed social changes can be anticipated, and so revolution and social disaster avoided. There is every reason also to conclude, then, that social change through revolution is a pathological and abnormal method of change. Whether human societies will continue to resort to such a costly method of effecting social changes in the future or not, will depend, of course, upon the development of social intelligence. Here we see clearly both the value and the limitations of the social sciences. They cannot predict events far in the future, as the physical sciences can, because they are far too complex; but they can define the conditions under which social occurrences of a given type will take place. So, while they cannot foretell

[1] For elaboration see the work of Professor Carlton Hayes on "British Social Politics."

the social future, they may indicate the way of social health and security.

Reversions in Civilization. There is no reason, so far as the student of social life can observe, why social evolution should not be continuous and progressive, with only the rhythms which necessarily result from the replacement of old, by new customs and institutions. However, this has not been the actual course of human history. The breakdown of civilization at the end of classic antiquity was so serious and complete, that in the darkest period of the Middle Ages not more than a tithe of the knowledge of arts and science, and of the great cultural traditions in general of the classic world, survived. It is said, indeed, that such common knowledge as how to compute the square surface of a triangle had been completely forgotten. It was not until the latter part of the nineteenth century that all of the knowledge possessed by the Greeks and Romans, even in a technical way, was completely recovered. This example sufficiently demonstrates that serious setbacks, or reversions, in human culture are possible.[1] It may be said, indeed, that this breakdown of the civilization of antiquity was due to the fact that the territory of the civilized peoples of the Mediterranean was invaded by the barbarians of Northern Europe; that ancient civilization was essentially unstable because it was surrounded by barbarism, and that modern civilization is essentially stable because there are no longer any barbarians to threaten it.

Unfortunately, we have no scientific warrant for accepting this optimistic conclusion. On the contrary, a further searching of human history shows that human culture has in all ages been essentially a fragile affair, subject to numerous setbacks and reversions. Thus the anthropologist and the archaeologist find abundant evidence, in many places in

[1] For further illustrations, see Professor Flinders Petrie's work: "The Revolutions of Civilization."

the world, of buried or extinct civilizations. To be sure, so far as we know, all of these buried civilizations of the past were surrounded, when they flourished, by a ring of barbarism; but this fact does not seem to have been the main cause of their decay. On the contrary, internal disorder and disunity, in all cases of which we have knowledge, preceded the overthrow of the civilization by surrounding peoples of lower culture. It is a reasonable inference, therefore, that reversions in civilization of the serious sort are connected with the internal disorders in national and cultural groups which we have just been discussing, that is, with the failure of those groups to readjust themselves as a whole, harmoniously and successfully, to changed life conditions.

There is danger, then, that in periods of social transition and readjustment, social confusion and disintegration may go too far. If an adjustment on a higher plane cannot be secured by a whole population after the breakdown of a given social order, there must be an adjustment upon a lower plane; and this means some degree of reversion to a lower type of social order and of civilization. But if strife, confusion and anarchy continue long in a group, the reversion must be serious. Not only will there be a temporary reversion to barbarous levels of activity and conduct, but the great civilizing traditions may themselves be for a time forgotten. Such retrogressive movements are perhaps more liable to occur in high civilization than in lower civilization; for a high civilization is achieved only through the most delicate and refined instruments of social control; namely, through the influence of ideal social values and standards.

Let us see more minutely, therefore, the process by which is effected the disintegration of these ideal social values and standards, which are the necessary instruments for perfecting the higher and more delicate adjustments between individuals and groups. Usually their decay is first to be ob-

served in the private moral life of the individual. Then, owing to the conflict of interests in the population and the growth of antisocial doctrines, their decay is to be observed in the relations between classes, and finally between larger groups. Strife between groups representing opposing interests, as we have seen, then readily arises and is with difficulty overcome. The process is evidently one of the decay of those higher controls over behavior which civilization has devised, and which alone makes high civilization possible. There is no reason to think that there could be serious reversion to the lower levels of cultural and social behavior without the decay of the standards and values which have been set up as controls over conduct.[1] Once these have been broken down, however, strife and disorder promote still further social disintegration. The confusion that results may, for a more or less indefinite period, interrupt all of the higher activities of social life. Under such circumstances civilization "goes to pieces," because the whole energy of the population is spent in fighting. Thus the temporary tendency toward anarchy, which we see in all internal wars within groups, may be indefinitely prolonged and the great traditions of civilization may be broken down, and the social life come to rest again at substantially the level where it was before these traditions were formed. It is, at any rate, through such social disorder that history shows the civilizations of the past to have decayed.

It is easily possible for civilized societies to return, then, to the essential conditions of barbarism in their social life. Perhaps no complete return need be feared; for it would

[1] Professor Patrick's theory that all civilized conduct is essentially "fatiguing," and that we tend spontaneously to revert to barbarous and savage levels of conduct, is not in accord with the facts of history. On the contrary, such reversions in history seem always to have been preceded by greater or less decay of the ideal controls mentioned, that is, of the civilizing standards. See his "Psychology of Relaxation," especially Chap. VI.

necessitate centuries to break down all of the civilizing traditions in Western civilization. Nevertheless, it is easily possible that serious setbacks to Western civilization may result from the unstable equilibrium in which Western nations now find themselves. On account of the lack of a well-balanced progress and of social flexibility and plasticity, the classes and nations of Western civilization have been gradually drawing apart into hostile camps. If, through their failure to make rational readjustments of their mutual relationships, a series of international and civil wars should result, Western civilization would not only be stopped in its development, but would soon begin a rapid decline. This is all the more true because science has made war now so much more destructive of life, property and moral conduct than it formerly was. The higher civilizations, because of their greater knowledge, have more weapons of self-destruction, and may, therefore, if they do not develop harmonious adjustments between their various groups, more easily destroy themselves. However, this greater knowledge makes it also easier for civilized groups to adjust themselves harmoniously if they will. What our civilization evidently needs is to be awakened to a realization of the fact that there is greater advantage for races, nations and classes to live together harmoniously in relations of mutual service, than for them to endeavor to despoil one another.

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CHAPTER IX

INSTINCT AND INTELLIGENCE IN THE SOCIAL LIFE

We have already discussed instinct as an element in human nature and the part which it plays as a factor in social unity and in social change. It remains, however, for us to sum up its total influence on the social life of man, as this question has given rise to a considerable difference of opinion among students of human society. It is, of course, in a sense, the old question of the influence of heredity *versus* environment in the social life; for, as we have seen, the word instinct roughly stands for the hereditary tendencies or predispositions of man. In a sense also the question is largely the same as the question whether an intellectualistic interpretation of human society is justifiable or not; for to the extent in which we get rid, in our social theorizing, of adaptations made through the agency of the intellect, either now or in the past, to that extent we must go back to adaptations made upon the basis of organic reactions to the environment, whether these reactions be conceived as fixed or plastic.[1]

The social life of animal groups below man is usually recognized to be very largely upon an instinctive basis. If human society is an outgrowth of this animal social life, it must be quite evident that in the transition from subhuman to human society, there is nothing to cause the loss of the instinctive element, even though other elements in the social life are developed and gradually grow in im-

[1] "Organic reactions" must, of course, be based upon hereditary capacities.

portance. As we have seen, the instinctive or native reactions of man as an animal must have furnished the beginnings of his social life, just because they furnished one of the principle bases of animal association in general. We cannot deny this without throwing over the whole hypothesis of continuity between animal and human social life. However, the question still remains as to just the part played in civilized social life by human instincts, and it is to that question that we will now address ourselves.

Wrong Uses of Instinct in Past Social Theory. Crude recognitions of the part played by hereditary reactions, or instincts, in the social life of man have pervaded social theorizing almost since man first began to reflect upon the nature of society. A special "social instinct" has been invoked by one class of thinkers to explain the origin of human society. Other speculative thinkers have not hesitated to invoke a special instinct whenever they have met anything in human institutions which baffled them. Thus we have sometimes mentioned in social literature special "political instincts" of man, special "religious instincts," "economic instincts" and the like. The student need hardly be warned that such a procedure is highly unscientific, and that usually there is little of scientific fact in such theory. Even the use which the older economists made of such a concept as "the properties of human nature" is now recognized to be a speculative, rather than a scientific method; for modern psychology would resolve these "properties of human nature" into specific hereditary reactions to concrete situations, or else it would declare them to be not "human nature" at all, but acquired reactions built up through habituation to a specific environment.

Nevertheless, all modern psychology has united in showing the importance of instinctive reactions in the conduct of the individual; and remembering the general principle

that whatever is a part of the nature of the individual must express itself in the social life, we must, accordingly, in the psychological study of human society attempt to unravel the workings of instinct, or perhaps we may better say, of native impulses, in relation to intelligence.[1]

The Psychological Conception of Human Instincts. All of the persistent activities of a living creature may be divided into hereditary movement complexes, and acquired movement complexes; and modern biology informs us that all of the acquired modes of behavior are modifications of hereditary modes. Yet it does not follow from this that hereditary movement complexes are of the "hard and fast," inflexible type which some people associate with anything which has the adjective "hereditary" attached to it. Such hard and fast types of hereditary activities are found, to be sure, in the instincts of the lower animals, especially among the insects. To some extent they are also found in the hereditary reactions of the higher animals, including man. Such relatively inflexible types of hereditary reaction in man, however, and in most of the higher animals, are confined to such simple reflexes as sneezing, coughing, winking and the like. The complex reflexes of the higher animals, that is, their instincts, are usually flexible and plastic, and so modifiable; that is, in effect they are simply the beginnings, the raw material, so to speak, of habit. Such are

[1] It matters little whether we use the term "instinct," "native reaction," "inherited propensity," "original tendency," "innate disposition," or what not, to designate the racially hereditary element in social activity. In general psychology the distinction between some of these may be important; but not in sociology or in social psychology in their present development. The important thing in the social sciences is to distinguish the "learned," or "acquired," from the "original," or "hereditary"; and the individual variation from the racial characters. Accordingly, in this book, the word "instinct" will be used to cover all racially inherited reactions. Compare what Veblen says in justification of his employment of the word "instinct" under similar circumstances. "Instinct of Workmanship," pp. 1–3.

also the instinctive reactions of man; only they are more plastic and modifiable than those of any other animal of which we have knowledge. The hereditary reactions of man, accordingly, are not fixed and unalterable, but are subject to modification, according to changes in the environment; nor are these reactions always specific, but many of them seem, as Thorndike says, "vague, variable, and rough-hewn."[1] They are little more than a complex series of more or less generalized reactions which fit man to cope with his environment fairly well from the start, and which form the basis for the development of his character.

However, we do not get rid of the importance of instincts by finding that they are the raw material out of which habits are formed; for they still remain the basis upon which the superstructure of our social and mental life is built up. They remain this, whether we regard these hereditary reactions with Loeb as due to the "tropisms" of organic matter,[2] or due to inherited connections in the structure of the nervous system. In the former case there is perhaps more fatality about instinctive reactions than in the latter; for chemo-tropism must always work under given conditions, but this is not necessarily true of an inherited structure. Moreover, inherited structure may be modified by use, which would seem scarcely to be the case with chemo-tropical reactions. The bulk of psychological opinion, therefore, inclines to the view that instinctive reactions are due to hereditary connections, established in a nervous system of a given species by means of organic variation and natural selection, just as the grosser bodily traits of a species are established by the same means.[3]

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[1] "Elements of Psychology," p. 189.

[2] See chapter on "The Theory of Animal Instincts," in his "Comparative Physiology of the Brain."

[3] This is, of course, not to deny that chemo-tropisms are the original bases of all organic reactions, or that true chemo-tropisms underlie the most important human instincts. The relation of

If this is so, it might seem, at first glance, that instinct and intelligence have nothing to do with each other; that all instinctive reactions, established as they are by the forces of organic evolution, are necessarily "blind." This is, indeed, the popular view; but psychologists tell us that there is no necessary antagonism between instinct and intelligence. The instinctive impulse furnishes the end of action very often,[1] while the intelligence simply comes in to help the action to a successful issue, and so to satisfy the impulse. There is, therefore, no necessary antagonism between instinct and intelligence. A high degree of consciousness may, indeed, accompany instinctive activities under certain circumstances. Where the instinctive end sought is blocked, a vivid consciousness of the end in the form of desire usually arises, and following it, a consciousness of all the means which may possibly be used to gratify the desire. Of course, in such cases we no longer have the hereditary reaction, or pure instinct, working alone. What we have is the intellect functioning as an instrument to carry out the instinctive impulse, reënforced by strong feeling.

On the other hand, it is also easily possible for the intelligence to oppose itself to our instincts. The pure instinct, as we have seen, is an "hereditary movement complex," probably based upon inherited connections in the nervous system. But the intelligence, and in man the reason especially, is the highest organ of adaptation. Its business, therefore, is to modify hereditary responses to meet the environment. Hence the intelligence may frequently

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hereditary reactions fixed by selection to the original tropisms of organic matter seems to be somewhat similar to the relation of habits to instincts. See Jennings, *op. cit.*, Chap. XIV.

[1] Veblen even goes so far as to say ("The Instinct of Workmanship," p. 6): "Men take thought, but the human spirit, that is to say the racial endowment of instinctive proclivities, decides what they shall take thought of, and how, and to what effect."

have to act in opposition to the instinctive impulse to secure a proper adjustment of the organism to its environment. Thus it may be the master rather than the slave, of natural impulses, though it may often be used as the latter also.

The matter of the relation of instinct to other elements in the mental and social life will be clearer to the student if he is always careful to remember that the *whole emotional life is instinctive.* Love and hate, fear and trust, pity and revenge, and all the other emotions are simply feeling-sensation complexes attached to hereditary reactions — although not all instincts have attached to them distinct emotions. What we call the "passions" are simply the human instincts with their attendant emotions, roused to such a point that the intellect no longer has full control. Obviously the strongest "desires" experienced by men are expressions of their instincts; for the desires which are the result of acquired habits are, except late in life, comparatively feeble in their intensity, as compared with those which spring from the native impulses.

Now the part which emotion and passion play in the relations of individuals in social life is comparatively obvious. Though the working out of these primary tendencies of human nature may be very much obscured by the customs and institutions which hedge about the activities of civilized men, we know nevertheless, that they must be there as one of the strongest forces influencing human behavior. We see this even more clearly when we study the child and the adolescent; for in the child, especially, instinctive activities are clearly marked. But perhaps the safest way of detecting the instinctive element in our social life is by comparing the behavior of man with that of the higher animals; for most of the human instincts have their parallel or counterpart in the instincts of animals. While it is impossible to determine with any quantitative degree of exactness the

part which instinct, or hereditary predisposition, plays in the social life of man, yet it is obvious that its part as a spring of action, or primary motive, is very important. It is in this sense that we may characterize the human instincts as the primary social forces.

Human Instincts and Human Institutions. How any instinct, or inherited propensity, will work itself out in the social life depends, of course, upon the social environment, that is, upon the institutional organization of society. A preliminary question, however, is what share, if any, human instincts have had in shaping human institutions. Now we have seen that institutions are sanctioned social habits. Evidently other factors than instinct must enter into the formation of what we call an institution. This is at once indicated, indeed, by the fact that we do not find what we may properly call institutions below the human level. The organization of animal groups, however, as we have already seen, is almost wholly a matter of instinct, habituation to the environment playing only a minor part. But human social life and organization, as we have also seen, is genetically related with animal social life. Social organization was once quite entirely a matter of instinct, in other words; and even though human social organization may show many other factors at work, it is scarcely probable that instinct is still not an important element. This is made evident by the well known fact that there are many foreshadowings of human institutions below the human level. Thus the family group exists as a more or less permanent social unit, not only among certain of the anthropoid apes, but also among many other animals. The foundations of the family life of human beings, therefore, are evidently instinctive, though the family as we know it among existing peoples is always an institution established by the group through the sanction of certain modes of behavior.

What we meant when we said, in a former chapter, that

human instincts furnish the simpler coördinations or adaptations between individuals and so the basis of social organization, must now be clear. Indeed if we had reasoned deductively from the general psychological principle that native impulses furnish the raw material for habits, we should have reached the same conclusion. For institutions, as we have said, are habits, and so *human instincts are the raw material for human institutions in the same sense that they are for habits in the individual.*[1] Moreover, we must also remember that the sanctions given by social groups to the forms of social life which we call institutions, have often been in the past emotional, and so instinctive, rather than rational, though, of course, in the higher stages of civilization, the sanction becomes increasingly a rational one.

Our use of the family group as an illustration of the part which instincts play in forming human institutions suggests the fact that in all human institutions we find a number of instinctive reactions combined and working together. Thus, in the family group we see the sex and parental instincts combined, working in harmony with many other instincts. The particular combination made will in most cases, of course, depend upon the circumstances in the environment. In general, psychological as well as sociological research seems to show indefinite possibilities of combination and synthesis among the varied instinctive reactions. Instinctive reactions coalesce, run into each other, and reënforce each other in such complex ways in the actual social life of men that the only figure in external nature, perhaps, which we can find to express it is the coalescing, crossing and reënforcing of currents in a complex electric field. Not only do various instincts unite in certain modes of individual behavior and of social adaptation, but they

[1] For collateral reading on the rôle of instinct in human society read Wallas: "The Great Society," Chaps. III and IV, or McDougall: "Introduction to Social Psychology," Chaps. X–XIV.

shift in their combinations of one with another, so that in civilized society it is impossible to make out any very simple and clearly defined social activities which we may call instinctive. The matter is made still more complex by the fact that in all human societies instinctive reactions are conditioned by, and overlaid with a mass of habits which we term customs and traditions.[1]

But it does not follow, from all of this, that human instincts play no important part in human institutions and social organization. If once more we take the family life as an example, we find that the two great primary instincts of sex attraction and parental love practically dominate the family, whatever its varied institutional forms may be. Not only is sex attraction the basis for entering upon the family life in a free society, but the parental instinct is perhaps the largest factor in the stability of the family group among nearly all peoples. This is shown in the United States, where relatively free divorce exists, for example, by the fact that divorce is four and five times as common among childless couples as among those that have children. Indeed the rational control of sex and parental instincts through laws and moral standards relating to marriage and the family has always been, and probably will always remain, one of the most perplexing problems of civilization. It is evident here that the most that intelligence and social order can do to control such instincts will never free human society from their dominance in one sense; the most that can be done is to regulate their expression in ways which will work to social advantage. A wise society will, indeed, work with, rather than against, such fundamental instincts of human nature.

In the same way certain impulses toward living in groups

[1] This mutual modification and combination of instinctive reactions, and of these with habits, is called by some writers the "contamination" of the instincts.

larger than the family function in human social life and organization. As Professor Judd remarks: "There is among all the higher animals an instinct toward contact with members of the same species."[1] Probably he might have more correctly said that there are many native impulses which work in that direction. There can scarcely be any question, at any rate, that man shows strong gregarious tendencies. His sociability, as we have seen, though very narrow, is of an instinctive, rather than of a rational sort. This is demonstrated by the fact that there is relatively conclusive evidence that this sociability goes back to man's precursor, as well as by man's well-known abhorrence of solitude and his sheep-like tendency to follow his herd.[2] Now, while the large aggregations of man, from the primitive horde to the modern great city, may not be safely attributed to his gregarious tendencies alone, yet we may safely say that those tendencies are one very considerable factor in the situation, a condition, of course, rather than a cause of those aggregations and their accompanying institutional developments. Even more clearly, however, may man's instinctive sociability be seen to play a part in his play and recreation. From the play groups of children to the "functions" of the highest polite society, the gratification of the instincts of sociability is in evidence everywhere.

Here we may remark that the most generally accepted theory of play and amusement among psychologists is that these forms of behavior, usually social in character, rest upon an instinctive basis. Forms of play and amusement are held to represent, as a rule, the exercise of instinctive activities. It is for this reason that most forms of play and amusement are recreative in their character. They re-

[1] "Psychology," p. 217.

[2] The most suggestive treatment of the instinctive sociability of man, though often uncritical, in the recent literature of social psychology is to be found in Trotter: "Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War," especially pp. 18–65.

quire so little attention and effort that they rest the higher intellectual centers. The attraction of games of chance, of football and of dancing, is probably largely due to the fact that they appeal to certain primitive instincts of human nature.[1] Even the popularity of the romantic novel, the detective story, the sensational drama and the yellow newspaper rests upon the same basis. It is for this reason also that sports and amusements tend to develop on a relatively low moral level. The large element of instinct and the small rational element, in such activities, tend to make them almost inevitably, from a moral point of view, of a reversionary character. Hence, again, it has long been one of the great problems of civilized society to control play and amusement in such a way as not to injure the higher moral sentiments and social standards which civilization has developed for the ordinary relations of life.

Another instinct whose workings in human society can readily be observed by the student is that of pugnacity. Practically all of the higher animals show well developed fighting instincts. Most of them fight only when attacked, or when in competition for food or mates; some, however, as is well known, have developed their fighting instincts into predatory instincts. Many writers would class man in this latter group, but the evidence, on the whole, seems to place him in the former. The predatory tendencies of highly civilized peoples are probably to be ascribed to the development of predatory traditions in the stage of barbarism, which have not yet, unfortunately, been eradicated from our civilization. However, children and adults both show such strong fighting tendencies when attacked or in a competitive struggle, that we are forced to regard the instinct of pugnacity as a very strong hereditary tendency in the human species. This hereditary reaction, like many other instinc-

[1] Compare Patrick: "Psychology of Relaxation," Chap. II.

tive impulses, seems to differ in its expression in the two sexes. That it is stronger in the male than in the female is shown quite conclusively by the fact that little boys from the earliest years are more prone to fight than little girls.

Now, given a species with the fighting instinct developed at all, even in the way of self-defense, we should expect it to have an influence upon the institutional forms of the social life. Reflection would lead to the organizing and training of this reaction so that it would work for the good of the whole group, especially for the protection of the group against its enemies. Hence the development of military institutions, and since, as we have already seen, government has developed largely in connection with military institutions, the fighting propensity has had an indirect influence upon political organization. Within the group, the fighting instinct has always been an impediment to social harmony. The removal of unnecessary stimuli to the fighting instinct has accordingly always been one of the greatest tasks of social and moral reform, which concerns itself with the internal order of the group. While this problem has never been more than partly solved by the nations of the past, an even larger problem has arisen on the horizon of the present; namely, the avoidance of occasions for conflict between nations.

The fighting instinct is, however, socially, too valuable to be gotten rid of, even if that were possible. As in the case of other instincts we must try to discover ways of securing its expression in accordance with social advantage, and ultimately that means in accordance with the advantage of humanity at large. The fighting instinct does not need, ordinarily, to be exercised against human beings. Its legitimate exercise in civilized society is in combating moral and social evils which prevent humanity from realizing its ideals, rather than in actual physical conflict between individuals or groups of individuals.

Still another instinct of great importance in the social life of man is that of acquisitiveness, or greed, as it is sometimes called. Many animals below man show this instinct highly developed, though they have rarely the intelligence to exercise it successfully. Animals not only seize and store food, but sometimes have their feeding ground, from which they drive intruders. Some even appropriate objects and hoard them when they are of no particular use to them. Children and savages, as well as civilized adults, show similar tendencies. All peoples have personal property in the sense of personal belongings, at least in ornaments and in weapons. All groups of men lay claim to certain feeding, camping or hunting grounds. Now, this native reaction is evidently a condition of the development of private property as an institution, and also even, of public property.[1] Just how it will express itself will, of course, depend upon conditions. Private property, as an institution in the form in which the nineteenth century knew it, was, of course, a relatively late and an extreme development, due to the traditions of Western civilization. However, the instinct of greed has manifested itself so uniformly under all conditions of social development that it must be considered a relatively permanent condition in human nature which must be taken into account in organizing the relations of men to things. This has been shown to be the case as much under systems of common ownership as under systems of private ownership. The control of this instinct in accordance with social advantage has been again, accordingly, one of the great problems of civilized human societies, and one which we are yet far from successful in solving.

The above statements must be taken by the student only as illustrations of the ways in which the innate propensities

[1] Compare Veblen: "The Instinct of Workmanship," p. 24; McDougall: "Introduction to Social Psychology," Chap. XIV; also Letourneau's valuable study: "The Evolution of Property."

of human nature affect social organization and social institutions. Despite much discussion along these lines, it must be confessed that the problem is, as yet, far from satisfactorily worked out from a scientific standpoint. That *the intelligence and the innate propensities of man work together in all human institutions* is, however, a truth which we may regard as fully established. What remains for social psychology to do is to show just the way in which these work together in general and in particular cases. The student who is familiar with the general facts of human and animal psychology can himself undertake to trace the combined working of these two factors in various social situations. In that way he can provide himself with illustrations which will be perhaps more valuable than any textbook can at present furnish him.

Instincts and Civilization. As we have already said, the way in which the innate propensities of man will express themselves depends upon circumstances in the environment, and so in general upon the social order and the stage of civilization. Human civilization, from the beginning almost, has been a series of devices to control man's animal impulses. The higher civilized social life, especially, is only possible through the control of these impulses by means of many artificially induced habits of thinking and of acting. All the institutions of social control, in other words, such as religion, moral standards, laws and education have been busy, from their very beginning, in devising ways and means of controlling to social advantage the native tendencies of man. This has been necessary because these native tendencies adapt man only to the wild life in the woods. Civilization, in other words, is entirely an acquired character, though this is not saying that it does not utilize, to the fullest degree, man's instincts or native impulses. These instincts, however, have not changed essentially during the last twenty-five thousand years, during which time civilization has grown

up from only the smallest beginning. Slight modifications may have taken place in man's native reactions during this time, though that is not certain. Nor is there much prospect that man will be able to alter, on an extensive scale, the original inherent tendencies of his nature; on the contrary, the practical problem before human society must always remain: How the animal instincts of man's nature may be rationally controlled in accordance with social advantage. And this is one of the main problems on which psychology and sociology seek to throw light.

Until this problem is solved we must expect perhaps to find, every now and then, in our social life, reversions to a more or less instinctive level. These reversions to instinctive activity are apt to occur especially under conditions of excitement, such as occur in crowds, in war and in conflicts of all sorts between individuals or groups. They may also occur, however, owing to the failure of the machinery of social control, that is, owing to the decadence of religion, moral standards, government, law or education. They are favored also by the decadence of the great civilizing ideas and values of the higher human culture. When these restraints drop away, men easily revert to the instinctive level. From one point of view, therefore, many of the inherent propensities of human nature are a constant drag upon civilization, as they have to be under constant supervision and control, if they are not to interfere with its rational development. Actual conflicts in human society, as we have already seen, are particularly to be dreaded because they favor reversion to instinctive levels of behavior. Not only do wars and internal revolutions favor such relapses toward barbarism, but mobs also exhibit the same tendencies. The brutal deeds of mobs, in other words, are to be explained by the fact that under the conditions of excitement in such a crowd even the most civilized men revert to the instinctive level of conduct. All occasions which

produce such emotional excitement as to make difficult rational control of instinctive impulses, are to be deprecated, therefore, in our social life. Conduct of the highest type is only possible when reflection is possible, and when, at the same time, the individual is conscious in the fullest degree of the social value of the standards which civilized society has seen fit to set up.

It follows, from what has been said, that our instincts and emotions are not good guides in civilized social life. These natural reactions need the control not only of highly developed individual intelligence, but of highly developed social standards as well. Those persons who claim that the instincts and emotions should be our supreme guide in social life would hurry human society back again into barbarism. This is not to deny that these native reactions furnish presumptions which need to be analyzed. No native reaction, of course, would exist in a species unless such reaction had had some utility in the past history of the species; but because it was adapted to the past, does not show that it is adapted to the present. Instinctive impulses need, therefore, to be analyzed in the light of the existing situation.

However, it must be acknowledged that the existence of a strong natural propensity furnishes a presumption in its favor, and that in any case the principle of economy would dictate that it should be utilized, if possible, in the social life. This is what all sensible developments in civilization have tried to do. It is indeed the modification of man's original tendencies through the intellect which has built up civilization. The problem of civilization, therefore, is to find, as we have already said, suitable ways of expressing natural propensities in accordance with the demands of an increasingly complex and more delicately organized social life; or, to put the problem positively, to find ways of harnessing animal impulses to work with and for civilizing standards. If any particular native reaction, however, can

find no useful place in our civilization there should be no reason why its expression should not be forbidden altogether, that is, suppressed. There seems to be little ground for the fear, expressed by some social psychologists, that such suppression of a native reaction no longer found useful to society will necessarily result in a "baulked disposition," which will work harm in the social life.[1] Even the most imperious of human instincts, the sex instinct, has been denied expression in many thousands of individuals in every civilization, either as a result of economic or religious conditions, without any serious harm either to the individuals concerned or to their groups. Inasmuch as our instincts were fashioned under very different conditions of life than what exist in present civilization, we can scarcely expect that appropriate stimuli and situations for their expression will always be found. Nevertheless, as we have already acknowledged, the principle of economy alone would seem to indicate that the wiser procedure in our social life is not to suppress natural impulses, or innate dispositions, but to find ways in which they may be expressed in accordance with social advantage. It would be manifestly very foolish, for example, for society not to make use to the fullest degree, in the women of its population, of that natural impulse to care for children which we call the maternal instinct; rather the ideal of society should be to utilize that natural impulse to the fullest extent possible, controlling it, of course, to meet in the most rational way the needs of a social situation. We may conclude, then, that mere repressive measures and policies in human society are not as wise as measures and policies which will utilize to the fullest degree all those springs of human energy which we term the native impulses.

Instinctive Interests and Beliefs. A word should be

[1] For example, Wallas: "The Great Society," pp. 61–65, 173.

said, at this point, regarding the effect of hereditary predispositions upon interests and beliefs. We have seen that modern psychology has demonstrated that the old philosophical theory that our interests and ideas are simply the result of our environment is radically false; as indeed we must say deductively at once from the standpoint of the theory of evolution. One of the characteristics of an instinct is that it "determines its possessor to perceive and to pay attention to objects of a certain class."[1] We attend to many objects, therefore, because of instincts; and these, as the psychologists tell us, are the cases of *involuntary* attention. Beside the acquired interests which the individual takes on from his environment, he has also powerful instinctive interests. Now, these interests affect the development of his ideas, and enlist his adherence to some beliefs rather than to others. What we think, psychology tells us, is largely an outcome of what we do; but what we do is in part a matter of our hereditary reactions; so that what we think is also influenced by these reactions.

It is scarcely probable, for example, that men in general will accept such a doctrine as celibacy, even though it is taught them from the earliest childhood up. The instincts of human nature are manifestly against the acceptance of belief in such a doctrine. Neither will men in general accept the doctrine that confinement or slavery is better than personal liberty; this is, again, an idea which is opposed to the natural propensities of man. Again, an optimistic attitude naturally results from man's hereditary disposition and temperment; it is only reflective thought which brings one to pessimism or meliorism. Illustrations like these might be indefinitely multiplied. The psychologist has found even better examples in some of our simplest concepts. In explaining the origin of ideas and beliefs in human society,

[1] McDougall: *op. cit.*, p. 29.

therefore, the original nature of man must always be taken into account. The opinions and beliefs of men are rooted in their interests; but these latter, on the organic side, go back ultimately to the instinct-emotions. Thus, opinions rest ultimately upon original nature, but upon original nature modified by experience and tradition.[1] The modification, of course, in some cases may go so far that opinions and beliefs may become wholly opposed to original human nature.

Human Instincts and Social Progress. Inasmuch as animal groups show no progress, unless we include under that term the slow modifications produced by their environment, it is highly improbable that the social progress of man has its springs in his instincts or native impulses. These must be regarded as the conditions rather than the causes of man's social and cultural progress. Yet the peculiarities of human instincts are undoubtedly important conditions without which social progress would be impossible. Thus the plasticity and modifiability of man's inherited reactions is manifestly an important condition of social progress. A species like man which undergoes rapid change or progress must have great plasticity of instinct in order to survive. In a certain sense, this plasticity of human instincts makes them adapted to the future, and so makes possible man's adaptation to more complex environments than those under which he developed. Thus it is evident that social progress is conditioned by the nature of the human instincts. In more specific ways, however, specific instincts of man have aided in developing civilizations and in furthering social progress. Such instincts as acquisitiveness, gregariousness and constructiveness have been positive rather than merely negative forces in man's cultural evolution. This statement is especially true of what are sometimes called

[1] An excellent brief discussion of this and other points in this chapter will be found in a pamphlet on "The Principles of Human Behavior" by Prof. R. E. Park of the University of Chicago.

the "social instincts," namely those connected with sympathetic and altruistic impulses. If man had not had a relatively highly developed inherent sociability from the start, he never could have developed any high degree of civilization; for it is these altruistic impulses, as we have already seen, which make possible social coördination, or coadaptations between individuals, of a wider and wider sort. Of course, the altruistic impulses have to be developed through education before they can make possible the social coördinations of civilized human society; but the fact should not be overlooked that they are original, native impulses of man.

Other animals than man have relatively plastic instincts, and some have, perhaps, even stronger native altruistic impulses. Nevertheless, they have not achieved civilization, or exhibited anything which we may call social progress. This is because they have lacked man's more highly developed brain, with its complex thought centers, which is evidently, after all, the true foundation of man's progress. But before we turn to the consideration of the intellect as a factor in human social life, let us note that there is no warrant for the belief that man's progress depends solely upon his intellect. Rather, the facts which we have presented show that the nature of the human instincts has also been an indispensable condition of social progress, and that such progress is the outcome, therefore, of the whole nature of man, working together as an organic unity in relation to its environment, and not of any single factor in human nature.

The Intellect as a Social Factor. As we have already seen, there can be no doubt that the distinctive character of human social life is due mainly to the modifying influence of intellectual elements. While instinct and feeling may be the primitive basis of social life, these elements can go but a little way in explaining the complex life of modern civilized societies. Intellectualistic views of human society have been rendered impossible by the progress of

modern science; but anti-intellectualistic views are equally impossible. We must seek to understand a little more clearly, if possible, therefore, the exact rôle of the intellect as a factor or a force in the social life of man.

Various and conflicting views as to the part played by the intellect in human social life have been developed by social thinkers. For example, in the sociological writings of Ward we find the view that the intellect is not a true force in the social life. Ward rightly holds that the distinctive mark of human society is human achievement, that is, invention in the broadest sense of the term. This would seem to give to the intellect a dominant place in the social life, but while Ward holds that it is a *directive* agent, he says that it is not a true "force." He compares its action to that of the rudder of a ship. Feeling, on the other hand, Ward holds to be "a true cosmic force." The feelings and the desires, according to him, are the "social forces," while intelligence is only a directing agent. It is a factor, Ward says, but not a force.[1] However, we have already seen that there is as little sense in speaking of feeling as a "force" as of intelligence. The intellect (including the physiological processes of the cortex associated with it) is surely entitled as much to be called a "force" as feeling. Both intellectual and feeling processes have been developed to mediate activity and have to do with the complex adaptations involved in human behavior.

On the other hand, Professor Graham Wallas holds, apparently, that the intellect is on the same level as the physiological impulse, as a factor in human behavior. He argues that it is as natural for man to think as to act, and that both instinct and thought are equally natural to man and on the same level. He holds, in other words, that intelligence is one of the original, inherent dispositions of man, which

[1] "Pure Sociology," Chap. XVI, pp. 463f.

works along with his other native tendencies and somehow may be trusted to dominate them in the future, especially if cultivated and organized.[1]

Both of these theories must be characterized as not in accord with the facts discovered by modern psychology. Here again, as so often in social psychology, the exact situation becomes clear only when we examine the facts of individual psychology. As we have already seen, these facts show thought to be neither merely a directive agent of feeling, nor an original inherent disposition of the organism comparable to instinct. They show thought always as a form of the mediation of activity, as "a bridge between activities," so to speak. The intellectual processes, in other words, are "controls" over activity, and come in where there is some conflict or lack of adjustment between instinctive or habitual activities, on the one hand, and the environment on the other. They come in to assist in building up new modes of behavior. They are instruments developed by the organism to control activity with reference to the environment. That is, intellectual processes in the individual are adaptive processes, and so have to do with changes in behavior. The intelligence, to be sure, "irradiates" even the instinctive and habitual actions in the human individual, because these actions in the complex environment of man need constant control and supervision. Its function remains, however, always adaptive.

As soon as we view the human intellect as an instrument of adaptation, the part that it plays in human society becomes plain. Roughly we may say that in the social life instinct has to do with early beginnings, habit with order or organization, and intellect with change. Thus it is absurd to trace social origins in any large degree to intellectual elements, because primitively the environment was

[2] "The Great Society," Chap. III, pp. 36f.

not sufficiently complex to call forth any high development of thought. Primitively action preceded thought in social development; but intellectual processes have later come in to modify and control social action. They have come in, on the whole, in the history of human society to the extent that there was a felt need for them. As the adjustments of the social life have become more complex, there has been greater need of thought to control these processes; for the intellect, we remember, is the final and supreme device produced by organic life for controlling adaptive behavior, and so for modifying the environment. It controls behavior by evaluating activities with reference to the environment; that is, it penetrates to an understanding of the meanings and relations of phenomena by testing first one reaction, then another. Through memory it gradually builds up an environment of its own of ideas and values; that is, the cells of the cortex acquire certain habits of reaction with influence, and even modify profoundly, all the subsequent behavior of the organism. More accurately, perhaps, we should say that on account of his memory, imagination and reasoning, the real environment comes to the human individual loaded with certain values and meanings, and these later very largely determine his reaction to a given stimulus. Thus the intellect modifies instinctive and habitual activities through substituting, in their place, more intelligent reactions, which later become habits, perhaps as strong as any of the original activities, and, as it were, " second nature " to the individual.

Manifestly, what the intellect does for individual behavior, it can do for the collective behavior of a group. As we have already seen, through tradition and its vehicle, language, human groups build up a psychic environment which in time becomes more important for the life of the group than the real environment of objects. This " subjective environment " of ideas, values, and standards in circulation in

the group, the mass of individuals respond to quite as they do to the stimuli in the objective environment. It is quite real to them, in other words, and modifies their activities directly just as sensations and percepts coming from stimuli in the objective environment call forth responses. Put in other language, the "social mind" is quite as real a control over collective behavior as the intellect is over individual action. We all appreciate this, indeed, whenever we become conscious of public opinion, popular sentiment, group standards, the *mores,* or whatever we may call the various aspects of the social mind.

To this extent, the popular view that opinions more or less underlie laws, customs and institutions of all sorts is undoubtedly correct. Laws, customs and institutions, however, are never the outcome of purely rational processes, any more than the opinions, beliefs and actions of men are. Like the actions of individuals, *they are indefinite mixtures of instinct, habit and intelligence.* But while they are never purely rational, there is hope of their progressive rationalization, as all human conduct tends to become more and more mediated by the intelligence. It is for this reason that we must expect rational processes only gradually to free themselves and to function efficiently in controlling the forms of the social life. This is exactly what human history shows. Civilization has been the gradual substitution of a subjective environment for an objective environment, as a basis for controlling activity. At first the ideas, beliefs and standards which dominate social action are but little rationalized; but gradually they are tested and harmonized with the conditions of life.

This testing is not necessarily altogether upon a material plane, though it is always through practical activities. The idea of God, for example, which is finally accepted as true by a group and established in its "mores," is not necessarily such an idea as will secure the greatest material ad-

vantages in food and protection; but rather, the idea which will best unify and harmonize the life of a whole group. Nature worship might, perhaps, best suit the material needs of men; but the idea of the deity as a father has best suited their social needs. It follows that it is not true that social activities can be rationalized only through testing their adaptation or nonadaptation to material needs. Human history shows that social activities along all lines have become gradually rationalized, and that this rationalization has not been simply the result of rationalizing the economic activities of the group. Often religions, for example, have become more rationalized without any change in the technological activities of the group. On the other hand, technological activities concerned with material needs have frequently become more rationalized with the reverse process taking place simultaneously in religion and in art.

Thus the intellect acts upon life as a whole and not through one particular section, or segment, of human behavior; though it must be admitted that where the behavior is closely related to material objects, it is much more easily rationalized.[1] It is certain, for example, that primitive man began the rationalization of his behavior through the manipulation of material objects. But once when the rationalizing tendency has gotten a start, it tends to extend over all phases of human activity. We see this clearly enough in the experience of the individual, and the history of the race furnishes enough illustrations to warrant our extending the generalization to society. The reaction of physical science itself upon the social life of man shows this. Thus astrological notions were once current among the peoples of

[1] This is the position of Keller in "Societal Evolution," Chap. V. But he carries it to an extreme quite unwarranted by either psychology or history when he concludes that "rational selection" among the "mores" is effective only when it concerns those having to do with the basic or material conditions of life.

Western civilization. The progress of the science of astronomy, however, while not directly disproving these ideas, has wiped out very largely such superstitions both among the educated and among the masses. In the same way the influence of science has undermined many other superstitions once prevalent. The whole mass of popular superstition in Western civilization seems indeed about to give way before the progress of science.

Such examples show that the material world is only the starting point for the rationalizing process. So far as the psychologist can see, the rationalizing habit once set up in society, may extend indefinitely until it brings all phases of life under its sway. There is, therefore, good reason to believe that the progressive influence of science will ultimately rationalize all phases of the social life. As the rationalizing tradition becomes established in the social life, art, morality, religion, government, family life and even amusements will become more and more permeated by its influence; for it is characteristic of reason as the highest instrument of adaptation that, while leaving a legitimate place for all things, it demands supremacy, in order that it may secure the harmonious adjustment of all elements by assigning to each its proper place. From the dawn of human history until now, the reason of man has been working for such supremacy, though not without many interruptions. This is what the progress of science means. This is what the progress of education means. This is what Comte's "Law of the Three States" means — the passage of man's intellectual conceptions from a mythological and fictitious to a positive and scientific stage.[1] If progress continues, a completely rationalized state of human society must some time be reached. We are warranted in concluding, therefore, that the largest generalization which we can make about

[1] Compare Comte's statements in "Positive Polity," Vol. iii, Chap. I.

human history is that it is, on the whole, a movement toward the increasing supremacy of the intellect and toward the progressive rationalization of human knowledge and human activities. The intellect, then, especially in the form of reason or science, stands revealed as the ultimate and final factor in social adaptation, the one in which man must put his faith for the future.

Whether we shall speak of ideas as "forces" in human society, depends altogether upon the sense in which we use the word "forces." As instruments of control and adjustment they are certainly profound modifying factors, though they are not the original impelling forces, which we must seek in the instinct-emotions. If we understand this, there is no reason why we should not speak of "idea forces" in social evolution.[1] In any case, there is no justification in social psychology for a non-functional view of the intellect. Essentially the intellect plays the same part in the social life that it does in the individual life. It works along with the other elements in human nature and in the environment, but in the course of human social evolution it becomes more and more dominant over these other elements for the reasons which we have seen.

The Accumulation of Knowledge and Civilization. As we have already seen, civilization has not been built up through the instincts and emotions of man, even though these may be regarded as the original, impelling conditions of his intellectual activity as well as of all his other activity. Civilization, we have said, is decidedly an intellectual achievement. It has been knowledge about the laws of nature, and about the relationships of men to one another which has enabled men to make those complex adjustments which we term civilized social life. The accumulation of knowledge and the progressive rationalization of knowledge has en-

[1] See the works of Fouillée, especially his "L'Evolutionisme des Idées-Forces."

abled man more and more to master nature and to control his own nature. He has mastered nature by making rational adjustments to nature, not passively but actively, by modifying physical objects and the operation of physical forces. By observing and comparing natural objects and processes, moreover, he has come to understand the working of the forces resident in them. These are the processes of invention and discovery by which material civilization has been built up; it is these processes, not the external environmental conditions, which are responsible for the development of human culture. They must be considered the real motive forces in cultural evolution, though the factors in the environment have, of course, been the stimuli. That these processes are the real motive forces in the development of civilization, the student can readily perceive by remembering that the factors in the external environment have never produced cultural evolution in any of the animals below man. The work of the intellectual centers of the brain of man in inventing tools, weapons, labor-saving devices, improvements of communication and transportation, and in discovering the laws of phenomena and the properties of things, has been the real basis upon which the structure of civilization has been reared.

It should also not be overlooked that knowledge of human nature and of the working of human relationships has played a scarcely less important part in human history. Quite as important as the making of tools in the social life, has been the making of new combinations of human activities. New modes of associating and coöperating, or adjusting mutual relationships with individuals, are invented as well as machines. Human nature and human relationships present fields for scientific discovery as well as physical nature. In describing the history of culture, it is easy to dwell upon man's conquest over nature through his technical devices; but it is quite as important to know the suc-

cessive forms of association and standards of social conduct with which he has experimented. Civilization has depended, in other words, not only upon accumulation of knowledge of physical nature, but also upon an accumulation of standards and values, which men have accepted as controls over their conduct. These standards and values, as we have already seen, become indeed the most important part of the social tradition. They are expressions of the social attitudes maintained by individuals of a group toward one another, toward things, and toward other groups. As we have already said, they are in brief the "mores" which give character to the whole group life, and which change only as other standards and values are found to favor better adaptation to the environment or more harmonious adjustment within the group. If we call these social standards and values social ideals, then, in this sense, ideals are the most important thing in the civilization of any human group. Social ideals are judgments as to the value of social activities. While intellectual creations, they are at the same time suffused with feeling, and therefore their social efficacy is increased. They are, therefore, indispensable instruments in bringing about any high type of social adaptation. For this reason, the weight which practical social reformers, moral and religious teachers and educators have attached to social ideals, social standards and social values is justified, even though we now know that many other factors must enter into all efforts at practical social reconstruction. We should never forget that the brain is the chief adaptive organ of man, and that in the human brain the intellectual centers are those chiefly concerned with adaptive behavior; and finally, that ideals and standards of conduct are, so far as we know, the highest product of this delicate, adaptive mechanism.

Only, it is evident that the ideals and standards which men accept must be right if they are going to work well as

guides in their social activities. The efficacy of ideas, ideals and standards has come to be doubted at the present day, often because they have been built up on some other foundation than that of scientific fact. But it is noteworthy that the ideas and standards put forth by the better established sciences have not suffered from this skepticism. It is manifest, then, that ideals and standards regarding our social relations, in order to be accepted and to have the power in our social life which they should exercise, should be built upon the basis of scientific facts, and not upon mere sentiment, esthetic appreciation and moral aspiration, as they have too often been in the past. When our social ideals and standards shall be constructed upon the basis of established knowledge, they will undoubtedly receive general acceptance, first by the intellectual few, and then by the mass; and they will become as powerful in their influence upon the behavior of men as the ideas and standards of physical science now are. Thus the accumulation of knowledge is not only essential to the establishment of right social standards, or "mores," but also to any proper adjustment of the relations of individuals in a high civilization.

The Rôle of Intellectual Leadership. We have already seen that intellectual leadership is necessary for successfully effecting any complex social change. Let us now note the great part which it must play in the development of a progressive civilization. It is only the exceptional individual mind, as we have seen, which is capable of producing ideas that are socially valuable. In part, such an exceptional individual may owe his superiority to biological variations in the direction of a superior brain. Genius undoubtedly has its biological side; but we should not overlook the training which the exceptional individual also usually gets from his early environment. In any case, genius and ability always have their receptive as well as their active sides. Men of ability and of genius take up from their en-

vironment as much as they give back to it. A "great" man is usually a focusing point of many, and sometimes of nearly all, of the tendencies of his age and nation. Indeed, when we look over a list of great men, we usually find that their greatness consists in being able to sum up in their own personality the striking tendencies of their time. The ideas of a genius are, therefore, often as much social products as products of his own individual mental processes.

But these familiar sociological facts, while they make impossible of acceptance anything like the "great man" theory of human history, do not detract at all from the importance of intellectual leadership in civilization. It is the men of intellectual ability who first produce the new ideas, standards or values by which complex social adjustments must be made. These ideas and standards are then copied imitatively by the mass of the group; the process, in other words, by which a new and superior form of association or social order arises is usually, in high civilizations, not much different from the process by which a new and superior type of steam engine, say, comes into general use. The pattern or model must first be furnished by some superior individual who is able to think ahead. Others see the superiority of the new adjustment and copy it. The change has evidently been effected through the mediation of intellectual processes, even though a relatively small amount of intellectual effort may be involved in copying the new ideas and adjustments.

Not all the inventions and discoveries of individuals, however, are taken up and generalized by society. They will only be taken up if there is a felt need for the new adjustment which they bring about in the group. Just how great influence the ideas of an intellectual leader will have, therefore, depends upon the general social situation in the group. This means that if the ideas and ideals of an in-

tellectual leader are to be socially fruitful, such a leader must be in close touch with the life of his group and his ideas must be found adapted to the group life. Hence it happens that the inventions of a particular age, which are assimilated in the social life of that age, will be only the inventions for which that age or stage of social evolution is ready. Here again comes in the principle of social selection. The great man who manages to perform a great work for his time is always one who is socially selected. It is, therefore, social selection, finally, which determines who shall be the accepted intellectual leaders of an age, or who shall be judged as a genius, or great man. In some cases, to be sure, the social selection comes only after the death of the exceptional individual. In such cases, however, there is still social selection, only as it were, of a spiritual rather than a living leader. It need hardly be pointed out that this is the reason why the memory of the lives of men of ability is so highly prized in peoples of high civilization.

But the ideas which are the inventions of exceptional minds, and which are accepted or "selected" by their groups, are of all degrees of social value. Intellectual ability has the power to mislead human groups as well as to lead them aright. Not that the ideas of the intellectual leader are ever literally imposed upon his group; but under circumstances which we have already noted, such as the influence of superstition, ignorance, excitement or lack of social freedom, wrong intellectual leaders may be selected, and wrong ideas or standards accepted. Even highly civilized societies have been known to accept ideas so reversionary as to lead straight back toward barbarism. The social value of the ideas of intellectual leaders can only be finally determined through testing them in actual social life. But undoubtedly very much can be done to secure better intellectual leadership in society, and so better social

ideals and standards, by organizing knowledge and by proper training of intellectual leaders. When all social ideas and ideals are adequately tested by comparison with historical facts and checked up through all other sources of social knowledge, society will be saved much bad leadership, and the harmful influence of many wrong ideas and standards. If intellectual leadership is so important in civilized human society, then, it is highly important that the intellectual life of a group should be organized, and socially guided and controlled. With wise organization and control of this side of its life, as Ward long ago pointed out, society might furnish itself with a never ending supply of socially valuable inventions, both in the ideal and material realms, which would become a basis for continual social progress. The most highly civilized nations are evidently proceeding in this direction, though haltingly; for this is what the fostering of science along all lines and the organization and systematic development of higher education mean.

The Intellect and Social Progress. Our whole argument thus far has been to confirm the time-honored view that the intellect is the active agent of social progress. All the other factors in nature and in human nature assist, but it is chiefly the accumulation and progressive rationalization of knowledge which has enabled man to master nature and to control his own nature. Does this process, however, lead to social betterment, to improved human relationships? When we raise this question, we are at once met by such well-known facts as that intellectual people often show antimoral and so antisocial tendencies. The most intellectual people of antiquity, indeed, the Greeks, had little or no practical social genius, and their social life was characterized from the first by disunity and disharmony, and at length by corruption and degeneracy. Again, the discoveries of science and the inventions of intellectual genius do not always lead to a better social state. There is, therefore, an

apparent antagonism between intellectual and social development. This has been so evident that some social thinkers have advocated the view that the intellect or reason is destructive of social bonds and has to be restrained for the good of the social life by some *suprarational* force or agent.[1] While it may sound absurd, it must be acknowledged, therefore, that it is a fair question whether rationality is consistent with the highest and best development of the social life; whether good will and harmony between the members of a community are fostered by the development of the intellect.

In reply to these questions, several things may be said. In the first place, it must be remarked that the antagonism between social and intellectual development is more apparent than real. Very largely it springs from the fact that the intellect is concerned chiefly with social change, and social changes are usually more or less disturbing, temporarily at least, to settled and harmonious social relations. Again, the existence of unsocialized intellectual development in society may be acknowledged as a fact without accepting the conclusion that the reason in its ultimate development is opposed to the highest interests of the social life. Like any other part of man's nature, the intellect is capable of exceedingly narrow and unwholesome development. All instruments of adaptation, even the highest which nature has produced, fail at times. The existence of unsocialized thinking no more implies an unsocial character of thought processes, than the existence of unsocialized desire. There is no ground upon which the psychologist can approve, then, of the view that the reason is essentially individualistic and egoistic in its activities. On the contrary, the reason is the universal relating activity of mind, and as such, tends to bring men into agreement, unity and harmonious relation-

[1] This is essentially the argument in Kidd: "Social Evolution"; also in Hubbard: "Fate of Empires."

ships. Again, as Comte pointed out, the intellect will become socialized in proportion as it is turned upon the study of human society itself; in proportion as it is used as an instrument of social adaptation, the unsocialized character of the intellect will disappear. The present individualistic development of our intellectual life among certain classes in Western civilization must be regarded, then, as abnormal. Finally, the remedy for the menace of the intellect to the unity and harmony of our social life is not *less* intellectual development, but *more* intellectual development. Rationality is a dissolving force in society only to the extent that it is one-sided, exaggerating certain factors in life at the expense of other factors. The reasoning which takes account merely of a part of life is unquestionably inimical to the best interests of society; but of the reasoning which takes account of all factors, we have no need to have fear. On the contrary, the hope of humanity in the future, as we have already said, must be chiefly and above all an intellectual development which is in accord with social needs.

The democratic ideal of the social life, therefore, which would emancipate intellectually all classes and teach them to "think for themselves," is the ideal approved by social psychology. Not that people will never think wrongly. On the contrary, in an undeveloped intellectual stage, such as we are now living in, many people who are just beginning to learn to use their minds will think most decidedly wrongly. The masses will often follow after intellectual leaders who appeal to their passions, emotions and instincts, rather than to their reason; and the task of guiding men in accordance with reason may at times seem hopeless. But if we insist upon people thinking for themselves, upon more thinking and better thinking, there will come a time when wiser selections of intellectual leaders will be made; when the appeal to reason will be stronger than any appeal to passion or to prejudice. The main thing, as we have al-

ready said, is to establish the rational habit in the social life. The intellectual élite, then, will be able to lead the mass of men to social achievements which are now considered Utopian. This does not mean that the collective behavior of man will ever become an affair of the "pure" reason; the instinct-emotions will still have their place in the social life, not less than all other elements. Indeed, the function of the practical reason is nothing less than to find and to give every element in life its proper place.

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CHAPTER X

IMITATION AND SUGGESTION IN THE SOCIAL LIFE

THERE remain three social mental processes of such great importance in the social life that they demand further and more specific consideration. These are, imitation, suggestion and sympathy. They are closely related processes, and are so intimately bound up with social life that whole social psychologies have been built upon the study of their action, without much regard to other elements in either the individual or the social mind. Following our usual method, we shall take up first the active, or motor, side of these processes, namely, imitation.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF IMITATION. The word "imitation" is often used for three very distinct kinds of psychic processes. First it is used as a name to cover the social method of developing the instincts. In such cases, imitation is a more or less unconscious copying of the instinctive behavior of one animal by another, usually of the same species. The perception of the instinctive activity excites a similar activity in the observing individual from a similar instinctive basis. We say, in such cases, that the instinctive response is excited sympathetically. This social method of developing the instincts is peculiar to the higher animals. In lower animal forms, instinctive reaction can be excited only through the appropriate stimuli in the environment; but in many of the higher animals, including man, the seeing of the activity going on in other individuals, usually of the same species, excites the impulse also. Thus among dogs, if two dogs are fighting, a third dog will usually join in also. The same

tendency undoubtedly exists among human beings. When we see people eating, we experience an impulse to eat also, whether we are hungry or not. Such a method of excitation of instinctive reactions implies, of course, developed intelligence, and that is why we do not find such imitation in the lower orders of animal life. Moreover, even this sort of imitation, if we may call it imitation at all, is found almost exclusively among animals that live in either small or large groups. It implies, therefore, a previous development of group life.

A second sort of imitation is seen in the tendency to conform, or to be like one's fellows. It is the passion to do as others do, and is usually more highly conscious than the type which we have just described, but is still largely without consciousness of the purpose of the imitative act. It also characterizes animals that live in groups and show a relatively high development of intelligence. It is certainly more than a mere neural tendency to do what we see others doing. Rather, it must probably be considered a specific manifestation, or differentiation, of the gregarious impulses. When we strive to conform our ways of action and even of thinking to those of our group, without specific reason for doing so, we are at once gregarious and imitative. The reenforcement of the general neural tendency to imitate by the gregarious impulses would undoubtedly produce such a result. This copying of others for the sake of being at one with one's group is, in human society, then, mainly an instinctive matter, as is shown by the fact that very few people could give intelligent reasons for so doing.[1] It is also manifestly one of the most important features of the social life of mankind. It is, moreover, imitation in its purest form.

Still another sort of imitation is rational imitation, or the

[1] Compare the argument in Trotter: "Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War," pp. 18–32.

copying of the action of another, not merely for the sake of social conformity, nor yet because it satisfies some primitive impulse, but because it is in accord with some rational purpose to do so. Thus, the imitation we see in fashions is largely of the second sort, it expresses a mere instinctive desire to conform; on the other hand, when we adopt some improved tool to accomplish something, the imitation is of this third sort. Such rational imitation doubtless in part grows out of the preceding sorts of imitation, but it is quite different from them on account of its large rational and purposive element. It is no longer pure imitation, but a rational response which is imitative in form, just as the first sort of imitation was an instinctive response, merely imitative in its form. Rational imitation is, however, like the other two preceding sorts, closely connected with the social life of man. It has been a chief factor in his cultural evolution.

Probably we should not apply the term "imitation" at all to psychic or neural processes which do not involve any one of the three above types of response. Some psychologists, however, have spoken of a "biological imitation" which underlies all forms of psychic imitation. By this they mean the type of reaction through which the stimulation which has produced the movement is repeated.[1] This had better be called the habit-forming tendency of neural processes. Imitation must be regarded as essentially a mental and social, rather than a biological, phenomenon, even though there may be interesting analogies to it in the organic world. This is the consensus of most psychologists, at the present time.

The Connections of Imitation with Suggestion and Other Mental Processes. To be rightly understood, imitation must be correlated by the student with other mental

[1] See Baldwin: "Mental Development in the Child and the Race," Chap. IX.

processes. Imitation is but one of the types of interstimulation and response. It is an outcome of instinct and habit and is mediatory of both of those fundamental aspects of the mental and social life. Not only are instinctive reactions in man developed and modified by imitation, but the same statement is of course true of our acquired habits. Without imitation to mediate the expressions of instinct, habit and adaptation in human social groups, anything like harmonious social life would be impossible. For imitation in the broad sense in which we have just used the term, is nothing less than that type of mental interstimulation and response which results in uniformity of activity in the interacting individuals. It is closely connected, therefore, with other processes, which tend toward mental uniformity in a group. It is especially closely related to suggestion, which is a process tending toward *intellectual* uniformity in a group, and to sympathy, which in a broad sense is any process which tends toward *feeling* uniformity in a group. We might define these various terms very simply, indeed, respectively as socially induced activity, cognition and feeling. Imitation, suggestion and sympathy are therefore, all closely related processes. This does not mean that wherever we find one, we must necessarily find the others also; but it does mean that these three processes are continually associated in actual social life, and may perhaps be regarded as the motor, affective and cognitive aspects of one socio-psychic process which for the want of a better name, we may call "mental induction."[1] In discussing these factors in our social life, therefore, we should be careful not only to see that they are related, but to bring them together in our actual descriptions of social activity. This is usually done in the case of imitation and suggestion, imitation being regarded as the active side of the total suggestion-imitation

[1] Compare the statements in Ellwood: "Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects," p. 293.

process; but sympathy is not less the affective side of the same process.

An illustration may perhaps serve to make this point clear. A crowd of men in a panic, for example, shows all three of the processes we are discussing working together as a unit. Some would say that the panic is the result of one individual imitating another; others would say that it was the outcome of sympathy, the emotion of fear being sympathetically shared by all; still others might say that the panic was the result of mass-suggestion. All three answers are manifestly partly right, for in a panic there is always the suggestion of danger, the sympathetic communication of the emotion of fear, and the imitation of the actions of one or more leading individuals by the crowd as a whole. Here, then, we see the three processes working together as three sides of what is practically one process.

Imitation is also always closely connected with certain other mental elements. This is obvious from the fact that individuals are more apt to imitate other individuals of their set, class or nationality than outside of such groups. "The consciousness of kind," of class, of nationality, therefore, usually exercises control over the imitative process. It is very seldom that we find imitation at all of one species by another species. Again, the imitation in human society is very largely that of certain leaders or authorities. It would be difficult to explain this fact of the social inferior so uniformly imitating the social superior, if we did not remember that man is an animal that has an inherent propensity to follow leaders, not merely when there is rational ground for doing so, but even when there is no rational ground. The student can easily multiply illustrations of the control of imitation by other inherent tendencies of human nature, such as the sexual instinct, the parental instinct, acquisitiveness, combativeness and the self-exhibiting impulse. In the adult, the tendency to imitate is, of course, also con-

trolled by numerous acquired habits, some of which have been formed entirely without the aid of imitation. Again, in educated and mature persons, the imitative tendency is guided and held in check by the reason. Thus we see that the whole imitative process in human society is guided and controlled by many other elements, some in human nature, some in the circumstances of environment; and that one could only get a very unilateral view of the social life by viewing it too exclusively from the standpoint of imitation.

The student should at all times be careful to bear in mind that there is no general instinct of imitation; that imitation is a method of expressing many instincts, and especially of expressing gregarious impulses; that it is also a method of expressing habit, and even the very highest forms of rational adaptation. *It is simply a name for one of the types of interaction between individuals, which may be either on an instinctive, habitual or rational plane.*

The Psychology of Suggestion. By suggestion, we mean the process of communicating an idea from one individual to another, which idea is accepted uncritically without rational ground for its acceptance. The state of mind which is necessary in order that a suggestion may work is called suggestibility. It is the tendency to believe without proof and to act without sufficient reason. It is a state in which an idea or image, particularly one that is associated with some original tendency of human nature, becomes more or less isolated in the mind from inhibiting or controlling processes and tends to work itself out automatically. Hypnotism is an extreme example of the working of suggestion and suggestibility. The normal individual in every day social life is, however, more or less suggestible. The critical faculties are rarely fully awake. Indeed, suggestibility is a normal and necessary accompaniment of gregarious, or group, life. The social animal must be ready at all times

to respond to the ideas communicated to him by the fellow members of his group, and he usually does so more or less uncritically. We can scarcely agree with Boris Sidis that man is "social because he is suggestible";[1] but we must admit that no high development of group life is possible without suggestibility. It represents the receptive, plastic side of consciousness with reference to the rest of the group. It is evidently the cognitive side of the same process which manifests itself actively as imitation. The psychology of suggestion is, therefore, essentially the same as that of imitation. Suggestibility manifests itself particularly in connection with all of the great subconscious tendencies of original or acquired human nature. It particularly manifests itself, therefore, in connection with the instinct-emotions and deeply established habits. It is a form of interstimulation between individuals which makes for the intellectual unity of the group. It thus tends toward uniformity in activity, and while, like imitation, it has its pathological manifestations, it must be regarded as a normal and necessary quality of the socialized individual. It is so uniformly present in all forms of imitation as the receptive, or cognitive, side of the process, that usually it will not be necessary for us to discuss it as a separate process.

The Suggestion-Imitation Theory of Society. Since Bagehot published his "Physics and Politics," in 1869, sociologists and social psychologists have put forth suggestion-imitation theories of the social life. Bagehot himself said: "The main force which molds and fashions men in society as we now see it is unconscious imitation. . . . The more acknowledged causes, such as change of climate, alteration of political institutions, progress of science, act principally through this cause."[2] In 1890, Gabriel Tarde, an eminent French sociologist, put forth, in his "Laws of Imitation,"

[1] "The Psychology of Suggestion," p. 310.
[2] "Physics and Politics," p. 97.

the theory that human social life must be interpreted fundamentally in terms of the suggestion-imitation process. Tarde believed that the influence of one mind upon another was entirely through the suggestion-imitation process. Inasmuch as he accepted the psychological view of society, he proclaimed that imitation is "the elementary social phenomenon." "the fundamental social fact."[1] He even went so far as to say that imitation is the criterion of the social, and that "society is imitation."[2] Social unity, according to Tarde, is therefore wholly the result of the suggestion-imitation process. It is not due to organic heredity, but rather to "the effect of that suggestion-imitation process, which, starting from one primitive creature possessed of a single idea or act, passed this copy on to one of its neighbors, then to another, and so on."[3] While Tarde left a place in his social psychology for conflict, or opposition, and invention, yet he found the essential elements of these in the suggestion-imitation process. He believed that the laws of imitation are to sociology "what the laws of habit and heredity are to biology, the laws of gravitation to astronomy, and the laws of vibration to physics."[4]

In 1895, Professor J. M. Baldwin, an eminent American psychologist, put forth independently a similar theory of the social life. Like Tarde, Baldwin found imitation to be fundamental in both the mental and social life, but he guarded himself against Tarde's extreme formulas and maintained only that imitation was the method of social organization and development. The individual develops intellectually and morally by imitating the mental attitudes and the actions of those about him, Baldwin said, while society changes through the imitation of the thought or activity of some

[1] "Social Laws," p. 56.
[2] "Laws of Imitation" (translation by Mrs. Parsons), p. 74.
[3] "Social Laws," pp. 38, 39.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 61.

individual who is accepted as a social leader.[1] In contrast to Tarde, Baldwin found that the content, or the matter, of the social life, in distinction from its method, is thoughts.[2] Thus in Baldwin, the imitation theory is combined with an intellectualistic view of social life. His theory may be briefly summarized as follows: (1) the matter of social organization, or the content of the social life, is thoughts; (2) the method of their organization is imitation; (3) these thoughts originate with the individual; (4) certain of these thoughts are imitated and thus generalized by society.[3]

It is not necessary to criticize in detail this theory of society. As a theory it unduly simplifies the social life by overlooking, or slighting, the working of other factors than imitation and suggestion. There is no evidence to show, important as imitation and suggestion are in the social life, that they are more important than many other factors in the individual and in the environment. Habits are not wholly acquired by imitation, nor is it true that the learning process is fundamentally an imitative process.[4] Recent psychologists have tended to minimize the importance of imitation in the process of learning, or of acquiring new habits. The student also must not forget that psychology shows that the imitative tendency is constantly modified and controlled by a great number of other elements in human nature and in the environment. We cannot interpret society in terms of one of its very general aspects or processes, apart from all the rest of the processes of collective living. If we should do so, we would get a very abstract and one-sided view of the social life, one which is separated in particular from the great forces of organic and social evolution, which have

[1] "Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development," Fourth Edition, Chaps. II, III, XII, XIII.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 504–524.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 465–484.

[4] Compare Thorndike: "Educational Psychology," Vol. ii, "The Psychology of Learning."

made even imitation itself; for man is social, not because he is imitative, but because his whole nature has been evolved under conditions of group life. Hence he is imitative because he is social, rather than social because he is imitative.

The Function of Imitation in Society. Imitation is, then, not the foundation of the social life, but an instrument which the social life has developed to perfect its coördinations. It is, as we have already said, and as Baldwin has insisted, the chief means of propagating the *acquired* uniformities in human society. It is this because it is the type of interaction between individuals which results in uniformity of activity. It is, therefore, the great and indispensable means of bringing about unity in groups when uniform, concerted action above the purely instinctive level is necessary or desirable. Imitation makes for social uniformity, and so makes for social unity, except in those cases where unity rests upon difference rather than upon similarity of activity.[1]

It is manifest that imitation must come in to assist in building up most social habits, or social adaptations. As human culture, and so the distinctive features of human social life, rest upon the accumulation and transmission of acquired habits, the function of imitation in human society becomes very important, indeed. Through it habits useful to the race have been handed down through countless generations. It is a short cut by which the individual profits not only from the acquirements of the past but also from the inventions of the present. A new tool, idea or standard originated by one member of the group has only to be copied by the others in order that the whole group may participate

[1] In connection with the theory of imitation and of social assimilation it would be well to study the immigration problem in the United States. The assimilation of the immigrants to the American type must be manifestly through facilitating the process of imitation. See Chapter VI above and Chapter X of "Sociology and Modern Social Problems."

in the benefits of the new invention. Whenever and wherever a model is furnished, imitation makes easy development in that direction. It thus secures social adjustments with greater quickness and ease, and greater uniformity of thought and action throughout the group, than would otherwise be possible.

But imitation has its limitations as a developer of culture and a promoter of social unity. It becomes less and less an adequate basis for civilized social life as social evolution advances. It is extremely useful in the lower and middle phases of culture, but in the highest civilization, imitation becomes relatively less important, because in the higher phases of the social life unlikeness of activity becomes of greater social importance. Unlikeness of activity favors the division of labor in society, and when not carried too far, favors social interdependence, or solidarity, even more than uniformity of activity. Hence the higher phases of civilization are not so dominated by the imitation process as the middle and lower phases. A people may become civilized, for example, by imitating another civilized people, but in such a case its social life will not show the strength and cohesion that it would show if there were more originality and self-development. Again, a people may progress socially by the imitation of a social élite, but their social life would show more virility, if, even among the masses, individuals would " think for themselves " and show independent judgment. The cultivation of rationality in society means something far more, therefore, than the cultivation of mere rational imitation.

Neither is imitation the basis of the social life. The association of animals shows us clearly enough that something more fundamental than imitation is involved in the origin of associational forms. Coördinated activities, collective life, social relationships exist far below the level of imitation. Imitation, therefore, cannot even be claimed to be the exclu-

sive method of carrying on the social life. It is only one of a number of simple, primary forms of coadaptation between individuals. It is, however, a fundamental type of social interaction to be found nearly universally among all animal groups that have developed to the point in which *acquired* uniformity of activity becomes important. We must admit, therefore, that it is one of the basic things in the development of all the higher types of social life, and especially of human social life. It is thus one of the very greatest instruments in the carrying on of the social life. It is not something which we may possibly outgrow, but rather something which is to be controlled and directed by the higher factors in the social life. For its main foundations, as we have seen, are instinctive rather than rational; and hence in its lowest manifestations it is childlike and even animal-like, rather than human in the fullest degree.

Fashion in the Social Life. The work of imitation in the social life is perhaps best illustrated by fashion, for, as we have already said, fashion is imitation at its purest.[1] Fashion is copying the members of one's group, not for the sake of utility, but for the sake of conformity. Fashion may be accompanied by utility, but its real motive is the advantage of conformity. It is perhaps best seen in clothing, but it affects all the methods, or "styles," of living and thinking. There are fashions, for example, in houses, in furniture, in behavior, in morality, in values and even in ideas. Because all of these things press upon the individual with the weight of mass-suggestion, it is very difficult to avoid conformity to them. And yet they may have very little inherent utility, value or truth in themselves.

It is a mistake to set fashion in opposition to tradition or custom. In small isolated communities the only fashions which obtain are usually the customs of generations. They

[1] See Ross: "Social Psychology," Chap. VI.

are none the less fashions, however, because they are clearly imitations on the basis of social conformity. In larger communities, more or less in contact with the whole civilized world, fashion becomes chiefly an imitation of contemporaries, rather than of the past. In such communities, owing to emancipation from tradition and custom, to the accumulation of an economic surplus, and to competition in social self-exhibition, fashions change often with great rapidity. As soon as a fashion or style has become generalized in the mass of the group, those who maintain their social prestige by "conspicuous consumption" and other means of attracting attention to themselves, feel that they must change their style of dress, of behavior, or even of general living, in order that they may assert their superiority to the mass. Here evidently the instinct of self-assertion comes in to modify the tendency toward social conformity. The élite, to whom the masses have come to look for standards along some given line, change the fashion in order to assert their superiority, or perhaps to gain some economic advantage. The masses of the group, with their habitual tendencies to follow their leaders, imitate the élite. Again the élite change the style, and again modes of living in the group change. Under the conditions of modern civilization, while this results in great variety in the social life, it also results in much economic and vital waste, and not infrequently in social confusion. How to control fashion imitation along all lines by the reason has accordingly become one of the great problems of Western civilization. The mere fact that such a problem exists, however, shows the relative independence and the great power of the imitation process in human society.

It must be admitted that fashion imitation has good as well as bad sides. New ideas of great social value, superior social standards, and even superior modes of general living may be spread to a large extent by fashion imitation; that

is, they may become accepted by the masses because they are imitated as fashions from social superiors, rather than because their utility, or value, is rationally perceived. As a matter of historic fact, superior religions, moral codes, artistic productions and even mechanical inventions, have often been thus diffused, largely through the power of fashion imitation. As a rule, such things have to become "fashions" before they can become embodied as a part of the social tradition. Fashion imitation here shades, of course, imperceptibly into the broader "conventionality imitation," that is, any imitation of contemporaries, of which fashion imitation is manifestly a part, and which we have already discussed as a factor in social change.

The Psychology of the Crowd. Another good illustration of the influence of suggestion-imitation in the social life is in the psychology of crowds, or mobs. In the socio-psychological sense, we have a crowd only when we have some unity in the activity of a large group of individuals gathered together in one place.[1] This unity of activity usually comes through some stimulation, which excites the whole mass of individuals in the group. This stimulation at the same time serves to fix the attention of all the members of the group upon one object, or in a given direction. Under such conditions, a group of human beings usually becomes highly suggestible. The fixation of attention and the excitement which characterize the psychological crowd serve to inhibit the free working of those habits, ideas and standards, which normally guide the individual in ordinary social life. Moreover, the mere presence of a great number of individuals in close proximity increases nervous excitement, emotion, and so suggestibility. A group of individuals in such a condition are very manifestly apt to behave

[1] The best collateral reading on the crowd for the beginner in social psychology, in spite of the voluminous literature on the subject, remains Ross: "Social Psychology," Chaps. III–V.

differently from what they would in ordinary social life. Acquired habits and the control of reflective thought drop away, and individuals are left with only their emotions and instincts to guide them. Moreover, one instinct-emotion excited under such circumstances exerts a strong inhibiting influence upon all of the rest. It is no wonder, therefore, that civilized men act like savages in crowds. The whole crowd becomes, as it were, a mere creature of impulse, liable to follow any extreme suggestion in the line of the emotion which has already been excited. Crowds become thus capable of performing the basest deeds, though at the same time they may often appear to act heroically. Social and moral conduct on a high scale, however, is impossible for the crowd, because its actions are simply the result of a suggestion-imitation process acting upon the level of instinct-emotion. That civilized men are capable of such behavior is again a forceful illustration of the power of suggestion and imitation in human society under certain conditions. It is also a proof that the forms and conditions of association are of themselves powerful influences upon social conduct. No writer has summed up this phase of crowd psychology better than Professor Ross, when he says:

"It is safe to conclude that amorphous, heterogeneous assemblages are morally and intellectually below the average of their members. This manner of coming together spells deterioration. The crowd may generate moral fervor, but it never sheds light. If at times it has furthered progress, it is because the mob, with its immense physical and emotional force, serves as an ice-breaker to open a channel for pent-up humanity, as a battering ram to raze some moldering, bat-infested institution and clear the ground for something better. This better will be the creation of gifted individuals, of deliberative bodies, never of anonymous crowds. It is easier for masses to agree on a Nay than on a Yea. This is why crowds have destroyed despotisms, but

have never built free states; have abolished evils, but have never instituted works of beneficence. Essentially atavistic and sterile, the crowd ranks as the lowest of the forms of human association." [1]

Imitation as a Factor in Social Order. Both conventionality imitation and custom imitation are powerful factors in furthering social order. The imitation of one's contemporaries brings about a great deal of the unity and order which we find in human groups. This is especially true where the social intercourse of the members of the group is close and intimate. Social classes, professions, communities, groups of all sorts, under such circumstances, readily fall into similarities of activity and of habit, which they pick up from one another. This serves greatly to aid in keeping the life of the whole group harmonious at any given time.

But it is chiefly custom imitation which acts as a conservative factor favoring social order in human groups. The social importance of folkways, of custom, of usages and of traditions in preserving social continuity has already been pointed out, and the importance of these factors is, of course, the importance of imitation. The spiritual possessions of the race are thus handed down from one generation to another mainly through the imitative process. Children get the bulk of their habits, ideas and standards from association with their elders, and, as we have seen, especially from their family circles. From a very early age the child absorbs imitatively the examples in the way of behavior and character furnished by his intimate group of associates. Language, moral standards, religion, esthetic tastes and political traditions are thus acquired by the child. In many cases these imitative absorptions from early environment remain the dominant elements in the mental and moral

[1] Ross: "Foundations of Sociology," p. 126.

character of the individual throughout life. Thus are to be explained, without any doubt, in the main the peculiar local traits which we find in nearly all human groups. National peculiarities, for example, are very largely acquired by the participation of each individual in the customs and traditions of his country. The whole content of cultural development, indeed, because it is made up of acquired habits is passed along from generation to generation very largely by imitative methods. Even in the industrial and technological realm, where utility is supposed to reign supreme, custom, usage and tradition are found not less than in the other phases of social life, only more under the control of other factors.

Social order and organization, therefore, are very largely conserved through imitative processes. Nearly all of the forms of the social life are handed down from one generation to another through imitation. Only the simpler forms may be supposed to spring directly from human needs, or from mere habituation to physical environment. In all other cases, practically, imitation acts as a mediating process by which social and cultural forms are preserved. The harmony and order of human social groups are, therefore, very largely a product of conventionality and custom imitation.

Imitation as a Factor in Social Progress. Conventionality imitation is one of the main methods, as we have already seen, by which changes are brought about in human societies.[1] This imitation may be of two sorts, either of its own leaders by a group, or of one group by another group. This latter sort of imitation, the imitation which results from the contact of groups, especially of dissimilar cultures, has been one of the most powerful influences in human history. Civilization has been spread very largely through the imitation of one group by another. No civiliza-

[1] As collateral reading on conventionality imitation, read Ross: "Social Psychology," Chaps. VIII–XI.

tion, so far as we know, has been developed by a people without borrowings from other people. In the history of existing modern nations these borrowings have been so extensive that no nation can be said to have developed its own civilization. Even Western civilization, so-called, has borrowed extensively from the civilizations of the Orient; and we now know that every existing culture in the world has borrowed to a greater or less degree from every other culture.

As Tarde and Ward have shown, the mutual imitation resulting from the contact of dissimilar cultures is favorable to social progress. Such contact and mutual imitation favor the development of social plasticity in customs and institutions, and of rational social selection. Under such circumstances, many new social adaptations are made, and if the general intellectual and moral conditions of the group are favorable, these adaptations are usually of a higher type; that is, progressive. The mutual borrowings of the various peoples of the earth have, therefore, been exceedingly influential not only in bringing about many social changes, but also in furthering social progress.

The "imitation sociologists" have rightly emphasized the important part which the imitation of new inventions by the mass of individuals plays in social change and social progress. There can scarcely be any doubt that this is the method by which the most striking advances have been made in civilized human societies. The imitation of gifted leaders has been a factor of supreme importance, as we have already seen, in the social uplift of all civilized communities. The rise and spread of Christianity affords an excellent illustration of the part which the imitation of ideas and standards of conduct has played in human progress. There can be no doubt that Christianity, as a set of moral and social ideals, spread over Western Europe almost wholly through the force of imitation. Such ideals, however, failed

to spread in Africa and in Asia to any extent, possibly because imitation was limited by certain racial traits, but more probably because it was limited by certain cultural conditions. The acceptance of Christianity by Western civilization, however, has been effective for social progress, not in proportion as its ideas and standards have been blindly imitated, but in proportion as there has been intelligent assimilation and understanding of the ideas and ideals of Christianity, and intelligent adaptation of them to the social life. Imitation evidently must coöperate with the other factors in adaptation if it is to work successfully in the direction of true progress. In practically all progressive social movements imitation is present, but it usually works, if it results in better social adaptation, in combination with critical intelligence. In other words, it is not pure imitation, but *rational* imitation which is effective for social progress.

The study of social origins illustrates, in a very striking and conclusive way, both the importance and the limitations of imitation as a factor in social evolution. There is no reason to believe from the evidence of cultural anthropology that all human civilization has been diffused from a single center,[1] or that civilization in general has been the mere copying of some primitive models, furnished by the distant past, as certain theorists of the present have claimed. Early civilizations started not simply in one primitive center, but apparently in many centers. Thus we have no reason to suppose that the bow and arrow was invented as a weapon but once, and then spread to all of the rest of the world by imitation from a single center. On the contrary, such a weapon as the bow and arrow seems to have been invented several times independently by different peoples. Again, if

[1] This is the theory of the German ethnographer, Graebner, and is also apparently indorsed by Professor Elliott Smith in his work, "The Migrations of Early Culture." Anthropological opinion in general, however, is as stated above.

we take the cultures of the numerous primitive peoples existing in the two Americas before the discovery by Europeans, we find apparently not one center of culture but several independent centers very remotely, if at all, connected.

This is shown not only by the divergence among these cultures, but also by their similarities; for these similarities can usually be more rationally explained as adaptations to a similar environment than by the supposition of borrowing. The similarities of the cultures of the peoples inhabiting the arid plateaus of North and South America, for example, are to be explained not as due to borrowing, of which there is no evidence, but as adaptations to similar physical environment. Again, many of the common traits of the various Amerindian groups were simply due to the lack of animals suitable for domestication on the American continent. Finally, positive similarities in the social organization, religion and technologies of the various Amerindian groups are to be explained quite as much through the general traits of human nature and the general level of their cultural evolution as through imitation of one group by another group.

"Ethnographic parallels" illustrate this point still more clearly.[1] Peoples widely distant in space, of different culture and of different race, are often found to have developed closely similar customs and institutions. In some of these cases, evidence of cultural contact and of borrowing, or imitation, have been established; but in many other cases there is no such evidence. Thus, there is no evidence to show that the wide-spread custom of deforming the skull has spread from some single center. The more reasonable supposition is that with similar instincts, intellectual capacities and desires, human nature has worked out similar ideas and practices, especially in approximately the same stages of cultural evolution.

[1] See the work of Andree: "Ethnographische Parallele und Vergleiche."

Neither borrowing nor originality, imitation nor invention, must be overstressed, accordingly, in interpreting social evolution. Both have played a part in social development, and it is a psychological mistake to derive one from the other; for originality and invention are rooted ultimately in organic variation. It is equally a mistake to regard imitation as a quite subordinate factor in social development, which may be safely ignored; for while heredity, environment, acquired habit and rationality continually condition the working of imitation in human society, yet within the limits imposed by these it is a relatively independent factor. Imitation is only a method, an instrument, for bringing about social adaptation, as we have said; but because it is in humanity one of the most important methods of social adaptation, human history and the social life about us cannot be understood apart from it.

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CHAPTER XI

SYMPATHY AND CONSCIOUSNESS OF KIND IN THE SOCIAL LIFE

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SYMPATHY. In a previous chapter, we have already noted the close connection of sympathy in the broadest sense of that term with the suggestion-imitation process. As in the case of imitation, there are at least three main types of sympathy in human society, and their confusion one with another has made the rôle of this feeling element in the social life one of vagueness and uncertainty. Let us note carefully the three distinct kinds of psychic processes denoted by this word "sympathy."

(1) First, sympathy is used in a broad sense by social and psychological writers to denote what we have called induced feeling, but what is often called "contagion of feeling." This sort of sympathy is best termed "organic sympathy." It is seen in nearly all of the higher gregarious animals. It is also to be clearly observed in children and in large masses of human beings, such as crowds, in emotional circumstances. Children and adults are both apt to reflect the same mood of feeling which they find in their associates. When one gets angry, another gets angry too; when one shows fear, others show fear also. This is evidently a suggestion-imitation process, but at the same time it is a case of the contagion of feeling, or organic sympathy. In all of the sympathetic excitations of native reactions in animals and in human beings, we have reason to believe that similar feelings always exist. Sympathy in this sense is, as we have already said, the feeling side of induced activity, or imitation. Such organic sympathy is,

however, very important in the social life. McDougall calls it "the cement that binds animal societies together."[1] It is, in any case, important as a reënforcement of those uniform activities which make the unity of a social group possible. Like imitation, it is one of the simplest types of mental interaction between the individuals of a group and one of the simplest expressions of social adaptation. Such organic sympathy may also be regarded as the feeling side of like-mindedness, and as Professor Giddings has pointed out, it is dependent not only upon organic resemblance, but also upon the perception of resemblance. Let us note, however, that sympathy, even in this broadest sense, is not so much the basis of the social life as again a psychic instrument which functions to maintain and develop the life of the group. Like imitation it implies a previous development of the group life.

(2) Another very common meaning given to the word sympathy among sociological writers is that of altruistic feeling, or feeling *for* others. Sympathy in this sense is not so much "feeling as others feel" as it is a name for all of the altruistic emotions accompanying the expression of instincts connected with the family life and with group life generally. These are more properly spoken of as the sympathetic or altruistic emotions, but in popular language and often among sociological writers, such altruistic emotions are lumped together and called collectively "sympathy." There is some psychological justification for this, and psychologists have used the word at times in practically the same sense when they speak of sympathy as though it were a single emotion. Strictly sympathy in this sense is a name for a class of emotions and not for a single one; but this class of emotions is so important in man's social life, that some single name is useful to designate it.

[1] "Introduction to Social Psychology," p. 93.

Sympathy in this sense is closely associated with the instincts connected with the family life and with the gregarious impulses. McDougall, who calls this type of sympathy "active sympathy," argues that it is based upon the gregarious instinct and is almost always accompanied by gregarious impulses.[1] It is certainly nonreflective in character and closely associated with all the habits and instincts connected with group life. Indeed, sympathy in this sense may be said to be the feeling which accompanies harmonious association, and reënforces man's natural tendencies toward association and coöperation. It is preëminently "the social emotion" in the sense that it is the name for those emotional reactions which accompany coöperation and harmonious association. As we have already seen, it is proportional to the success and harmony of the coadaptation of the activities of individuals.

We would emphasize that sympathy, in this sense of sympathetic or altruistic emotion, is unreflective in character. It seems to be a differentiation of organic sympathy more closely associated with certain instincts, especially gregarious impulses. It is important as a basis for all the higher forms of natural affection between individuals, such as friendship and family affection. It is also important as the basis upon which are built up the altruistic sentiments. Finally, this instinctive sympathy is important as the basis of rational sympathy.

(3) The third type of sympathy, then, is reflective or rational sympathy. It is simply the second type of sympathetic emotion developed, guided, and controlled by reflective thinking. Rational sympathy is, of course, the most valuable form of sympathy in all the higher phases of social development, because it is controlled by the reason. It has been one of the chief active agencies in building up the

[1] "Introduction to Social Psychology," pp. 168–172.

higher forms of social and altruistic sentiment which have characterized the most advanced civilizations. It is, however, a great mistake to consider reflective sympathy to be the type of all sympathy in the social life. This is the mistake of Ward, for example, who says: "That sympathy is a rational faculty admits of no doubt," and argues that all sympathy comes from reflection, that is, from the exercise of the imagination and the reason.[1] The correct statement, however, would be that sympathy is primarily organic and instinctive, and that only in its later and higher developments does it become reflective sympathy. The imagination and the reason acting in connection with the sympathetic emotions may greatly modify their direction, but it does not change their essential character. This is an important point for the student to remember in the discussion of the nature and function of sympathetic emotion in the social life.

The Relations of Sympathy and Altruism. Altruism may be roughly defined as behavior favorable to others. In a broader sense, we may use the term to cover all of the impulses and feelings of the individual, whether native or acquired, which are favorable to others, and especially to the welfare of large groups. Some recent psychologists, among them McDougall, have argued that sympathy is not the root of altruism and is not in any sense altruistic. This is quite true of sympathy in the first sense in which we have defined the term. It is also true that sympathy in the second sense (the sympathetic emotions which accompany altruistic impulses) is, of course, not the root of such impulses. For feeling, as we have already emphasized, is never the basis of activity, but rather an accompaniment of activity. Therefore, the roots of altruism must, of course, be sought in the life process as a whole rather than in any particular

[1] "Pure Sociology," p. 423.

form of feeling or emotion. However, feeling as an evaluation of activity does, as we have already seen, modify activity either in the way of reënforcing it or inhibiting it; and this is as true of sympathetic emotion as of any other form of feeling. Therefore, sympathy in the sense of the emotions accompanying altruistic impulses does play an important part in the development of altruism. It accompanies altruistic activity and reinforces it. While not the original spring of altruism, it is so important that we may safely say that the development of altruism in human society is impossible without sympathy. It is, of course, especially reflective or rational sympathy which we must rely upon to aid in the development of those higher forms of altruistic activity which civilization finds it necessary to encourage.

Practically it is correct, then, to regard sympathy as the feeling side of altruism, and altruism as the active expression of sympathy in the second sense in which we have used the term. At least we can expect no high degree of altruism to develop in human social life without the cultivation of this sort of sympathy, this feeling *for* others. Humanitarian sentiments, as we have just said, are built up very largely through the activity of reflective sympathy; and without humanitarian sentiments becoming a part of the tradition of the social life, we can expect no high development of humanitarian activities. The growth of philanthropic activities in human society must be regarded, therefore, as a development very largely due to the increase of sympathy, especially of reflective sympathy.

If sympathy of the second and third sorts is thus closely associated with altruistic impulses and actions, we have no right to regard such sympathy as mainly egoistic. The organic basis for such sympathetic emotion is the altruistic impulse implanted by natural selection. When the emotion

becomes reflective, the egoistic element in it may often appear to be very large; but we must not forget that the original basis was an instinctive impulse favorable to others, and that the individual would be incapable of such sympathetic emotions if it were not for the original altruism inherent in his nature. Moreover, the real direction and trend of reflective sympathy in human society is found through experience to be in an altruistic rather than in an egoistic direction. For reflective as well as instinctive sympathy functions for the advantage of the group as a whole rather than of the individual.

Our conclusion must be, accordingly, that sympathetic emotion is psychologically a very important element in the social life in the way of reënforcing altruism, or action favorable to others. It is hardly possible indeed that good will can exist among all the members of a group without sympathy and understanding, as we have already pointed out, among the members of such a group. Even sympathy in its lowest sense of common feeling produces solidarity of feeling in the group as a whole; and the more developed forms of sympathy, through the principle of suggestion-imitation, breed reciprocal good will. If it is desirable to develop a good will as broad as humanity, it is evidently necessary that human societies should cultivate the more intelligent forms of sympathy.

The Connections of Sympathy with the Consciousness of Kind. We have called attention to the close connection of organic sympathy with imitation and suggestion, and we have just discussed the relations of the various sorts of sympathy to altruistic behavior. There remains one other psychic process whose close connection with the various types of sympathy it is important that the student of social life should bear in mind; and that is what Professor Giddings has termed "the consciousness of kind." He has pointed out that what we call sympathy is really a

phase of "consciousness of kind."[1] In his later works he uses this term as a collective name for all of the sympathetic or sociable states of mind, including "organic sympathy, the perception of resemblance, conscious or reflective sympathy, affection, and the desire for recognition." We shall use it, however, in a more restricted sense, meaning by it simply the consciousness of similarity or resemblance. What, then, is the relation of this intellectual process to sympathy in its various forms?

We have already pointed out that organic sympathy is the feeling side of organic and mental similarity and is stimulated by the perception of resemblance. But the second and third types of sympathy are also dependent upon the consciousness of physical, mental and moral resemblances. Even in low types of life gregarious tendencies seem to be mediated by this form of consciousness. In a school of fish of a given species, for example, which stay together, there is probably some consciousness of mutual resemblance. In most forms of animal life, indeed, some recognition of kind, or of species, seems to mediate sex attraction and parental care, though some experiments have shown that in the lower forms such consciousness is very vague and indefinite. Now, it is these activities connected with the reproductive process and with living together in groups which are accompanied, as we have seen, by sympathetic forms of emotion. If the consciousness of kind mediates these activities, it also mediates the accompanying sympathetic emotions.

It is easier to see this when we turn to human beings. In virtue of the fact that we can only think of others more or less in terms of ourselves, we find it impossible to understand or to sympathize rationally with any one whom we do not think of as in some degree like ourselves. For this

[1] "Historical and Descriptive Sociology," pp. 278–288, 298.

reason Professor Giddings lays it down as a law that sympathy is proportionate to resemblance, or rather to the consciousness of resemblance, actual or potential. While this is probably an overstatement of the matter, there can be no doubt that the consciousness of resemblance, or of kind, is closely connected with sympathy in all of its forms. Such consciousness in man acts as a stimulus to altruistic impulses and thus excites, at the same time, sympathetic emotions. It is, indeed, usually the intellectual counterpart of sympathy, and may be considered the intellectual side of the same process. Thus we see again the close connection of all mental processes which function in the social life, showing quite conclusively that they were evolved as an organic whole to meet the needs of group life.

A practical conclusion follows here which may be worth pointing out. Sympathy, as we have already seen, is a very important matter in harmonious association and group solidarity. We have also seen that it is roughly proportionate to the harmony of the coördination between individuals. It may expand, therefore, through the wider successful coordination of practical activities, by whatever means brought about; but on account of its close connection with the consciousness of kind it may also expand through the developing of wider perceptions of resemblance. Thus the expansion of both the consciousness of kind and of sympathy may outrun the actual wider coördination of practical activities. They are both instruments to promote group solidarity, and in anticipation of wider adjustments, like all of the instruments of living, they may be made ready in advance to control practical activities.

The Sympathy Theory of Society. Older than the imitation theory of society is the sympathy theory. It was first explicitly formulated in 1759 by Adam Smith in his "Theory of Moral Sentiments." Smith defined sympathy as "fellow-feeling," and held that all of the moral senti-

ments were built up on it as a basis.[1] Social and political organization, accordingly, in so far as they were moral, also rested upon sympathy.

On account of the obvious importance of sympathetic feeling and altruistic behavior among animals that live in groups Darwin, also, pointed to sympathy as the chief factor which might explain the moral life of mankind and the moral aspects of social organization.[2] Developing these ideas of Darwin, Sutherland in his "Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct" set forth the thesis that "the sympathetic type is the one which is more and more distinctly emergent as we ascend in the animal scale";[3] and he finds that so far as human society is concerned "the law of sympathy has been the law of progress."[4] He also agrees with Smith in saying that "sympathy in general is the ultimate basis of all moral feeling."[5]

Ward also, in his sociology, finds a large place for sympathy. It will be remembered that he makes the feelings the primary forces in human mental and social life. He finds sympathy, consequently, as that phase of feeling which is favorable to others, to be the basis for all the higher developments in the social life. It is sympathy, he says, which makes possible altruism and all humanitarian advances in human society. The sympathetic feelings are, then, according to Ward, the essentially progressive forces in human society.[6]

Broader and more carefully worked out are the theories of Professor Giddings. In his "Principles of Sociology," published in 1896, he set forth an hypothesis which must be regarded, in the main, as a sympathy theory of the social

[1] "Theory of Moral Sentiments," Part I, Section I.
[2] "Descent of Man," Chap. IV.
[3] Vol. i, p. 291.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 10.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 156.
[6] "Pure Sociology," pp. 422–426; 450–454.

life. He found the basis for the social life in what he called "consciousness of kind," which he recognized as a mental state which included the element of sympathy but also included elements of perception. His thesis was that social organization, social solidarity, coöperation, and all advances in social adaptation rest upon the consciousness of kind as their chief subjective basis. In his later works sympathy and the consciousness of kind are subordinated to the more fundamental conception of similarity or resemblance, both physical and mental, as the basis of the social life; but the consciousness of kind, beginning with organic sympathy, and ending with the higher types of sympathy, affection and the perception of likeness, he still finds to be the chief subjective element in the social life.[1]

There can be no doubt that all the mental states which Professor Giddings groups together under the term, the "consciousness of kind," are very important for the social life, and that their importance has not yet been adequately recognized by psychological and sociological writers in general.[2] However, all of these sympathetic or sociable states of mind concern only one side of the social life. A system of sociology built upon the exploitation of these is bound to be more or less one-sided. Sympathy and the consciousness of kind must be regarded as one factor or set of factors in our social life, and no statement of their working can be an adequate statement of the whole; for the social life of man does not rest fundamentally upon these psychic factors. Rather again, they are organs or instruments of

[1] "Historical and Descriptive Sociology," Part II, especially pp. 275–355.

[2] Abundant concrete material for illustrating the workings and the importance of these elements in the social life will be found again in the immigration problem and the negro problem in the United States. See "Sociology and Modern Social Problems," Chaps. X, XI.

adaptation which have been developed to meet the needs of group life.

The Social Function of Sympathy. We have already pointed out that the feeling attitudes of individuals toward one another are very important in initiating and maintaining types of adaptation between those individuals. Common feelings serve to reënforce and to fix common activities. Sympathy in the sense of common feeling, therefore, conduces to the solidarity of the group; for the solidarity of feeling reënforces the solidarity of action. We see, then, sympathy of this sort is one of the simplest types of mental interaction between individuals and one of the most important in the social life. It is a practically universal accompaniment of all uniformity of social action.

In the sense of altruistic feeling or emotion, sympathy is a mental and social attitude favorable to the development of the higher and more harmonious types of social adaptation and coöperation. It is thus the form of feeling which is especially favorable to the group as a whole. Sympathy, then, makes easy the development of complex adaptations which require some sacrifice on the part of the individual. Without those tendencies to feel with and for others, which we gather together under the name of sympathy, the high types of relationship between individuals which civilization demands could scarcely be initiated or persist. To be sure, much complex coöperation in modern society exists which is apparently simply the result of the division of labor and not accompanied by sympathy between the individual cooperators. But such coöperation presupposes a certain amount of common feeling among the individuals concerned and a generally high level of development of altruistic tendencies. We do not mean to imply that coöperation is inconsistent with self-interest, but rather simply to point out that the higher and more complex types of coöperation in human society cannot be developed upon self-interest

alone. Professor Giddings has clearly shown that the conscious forms of coöperation depend in some degree upon the consciousness of kind, which is another way of showing that they depend upon sympathy.[1] Those who advocate the doctrine that the forms of coöperation demanded in civilized society may rest upon self-interest alone as a sufficient basis, without any sympathetic or altruistic feeling being enlisted, are making a serious mistake in social psychology. Coöperation of stable and complex sorts has never existed, and can never exist, in human society without common feeling and some degree of altruism. This point we shall take up again.

Charity, in the sense of help of the socially weak and unadjusted, illustrates, as a concrete expression of sympathy in human society, the social function of this feeling element. When guided by intelligence, charity has always strengthened social groups by helping those out of adjustment with society to get adjusted, by helping the weak, in other words, to become strong and relatively efficient members of their group. It has functioned, therefore, to increase both the solidarity and the efficiency of social groups. Rescuing those overtaken by calamity, caring for the sick and the injured, and helping the weak in general, has immensely increased the sense of social solidarity. Hence all human groups, from savage to civilized, have had some sort of system to care for their weaker members.

But charity also illustrates the limitations of sympathy as an instrument for bringing about the highest type of social adjustments. Unwise charity may lead to grave evils in society. It may perpetuate the degraded and the unfit and encourage the wicked and the worthless. Sympathy, in other words, unless guided and controlled by the reason, may produce more misery in society than it can relieve.

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 352–355.

There is much evidence to show that maudlin sympathy is demoralizing both to individuals and to classes. Very manifestly, the type of sympathy needed in the complex social life of the present is rational sympathy, moreover a *rational* sympathy which rises to the level of being guided by scientific knowledge. The form of charity needed in modern social life is, of course, the form which will seek to remove the sources of human misery by searching out and removing its causes.

Nevertheless, we shall not get rid of the need of sympathy in human society by getting rid of the causes of misery. For after all, the great work of sympathy in human groups is to mediate the formation of good will among their members. It is only through altruistic feeling and the reciprocal conferring of benefits that human societies can develop the good will among all their members which is essential for their peace and highest prosperity. As long as, and to the extent that, good will remains important in human social life, so long and to that extent will sympathy remain important. It is a practically universal instrument for developing both social order and social progress in human groups. Let us see briefly in what way sympathy functions in both of these aspects of the social life.

Sympathy as a Factor in Maintaining Social Order. While the actual achievement of social organization is not the work of sympathy, yet after any human group has become organized, the rôle of sympathy as a social bond between the members of a group becomes of primary importance to its stability and order. Almost any human group will illustrate this. The family group is especially knit together by bonds of sympathetic feeling; but so also are the community and all other genetic groups. In primitive societies, as is well known, the sentiment of kinship, which must be regarded as built up on the basis of instinctive and rational sympathy, was the most conspicuous

social bond, and down to very recent times played a very important part in maintaining the unity and continuity of all tribal and national groups. The "blood bond" between the members of uncivilized, and even of civilized, groups has often been the most powerful expression of their solidarity; and unquestionably this bond was built up on the consciousness of kind, or kinship, and the natural or instinctive sympathy between all the members of the group. The sympathy between the members of such groups and those sentiments built upon sympathy came in time to function not only to maintain social solidarity, but also all habits and customs which had become associated with the activities of the group as a unit. This spreading of sympathetic feeling to everything connected with the solidarity of the group made it a powerful conservative social force, helping to maintain institutions and customs from generation to generation. Indeed, as long as the sentiment of kinship dominated the social life, progress was next to impossible, except as circumstances in the environment compelled rational readjustments in the group life.

Even in the most advanced society, in which the sentiment of kinship no longer plays a conspicuous part, sympathy is a cohesive force which cannot be dispensed with. All social groups and classes seek to cultivate sympathy among their members, for the cohesive power of the group might be lost if sympathy did not support it. Individuals, also, conscious that their successful social adjustment depends upon winning the sympathetic feeling of their associates, seek sympathy from one another. All of this, of course, helps to maintain a settled and harmonious order among individuals. The whole moral life of human groups is, indeed, we must admit, closely associated with sympathy in all of its forms. It must be acknowledged that Adam Smith was right to this extent, that morality, as we understand it, could not exist in human society without sympa-

thy. It is especially in the form of altruistic feeling, however, that sympathy reënforces the sense of moral obligations. Pure self-interest may perhaps prompt the meeting of moral obligations to some extent; but in the long run, such obligations are discharged only in proportion as the disinterested tendencies of human nature, of which sympathy is among the more conspicuous, are cultivated and developed. We need sympathy in a high degree, therefore, in human society, if we are to have anything like a settled moral order. Good will is the prerequisite for such an order in any human group; and sympathy, we repeat, is the form of feeling which mediates the development of reciprocal good will among the members of a group.

Sympathy as a Factor in Social Progress. The student will remember that we have insisted that feeling processes mark the beginning as well as the establishment of activities. They have to do with the selection of the impulses which are allowed to develop, as well as with the guiding and sustaining of developed activity. Hence conscious changes for the better in human society can be satisfactorily brought about only by the enlistment of the feelings upon the side of the change; for it is feeling which sanctions the new adjustment upon its individual or organic side. Now, the sympathetic feelings are obviously those which can be most easily enlisted on the side of changes advantageous to the group. Ward was right, therefore, in pointing out that it was the successful enlistment of the sympathies in behalf of reformative changes which accomplished much of the great social and political reform of the past two centuries. In any reform movement in human society, indeed, there must be a constant appeal to the sympathetic emotions, if the movement is to be successful; but of course, it is the higher or intellectual forms of sympathy which must be relied upon as truly progressive forces in the social life. The appeal to mere emotion may result in sym-

pathy working the harm which we have already pointed out. It is the sentiments developed upon the basis of rational sympathy, such as ethical love and the love of humanity, upon which society has rightly placed a premium. It is the growth of these sentiments in particular which has played a conspicuous part in alleviating misery and opening the doors of opportunity to all classes in civilized society. The great increase of sympathy and altruism in these higher forms in modern society is probably the surest guarantee of continued progress and the ultimate social adjustment of all classes, nations and races in the modern world. It becomes an important practical question, therefore, how these higher forms of sympathy and altruism can best be cultivated in modern society.

How, as a matter of fact, does sympathy increase? We have seen that it may increase simply as activities become more widely extended and interdependent, simply as a result of higher social organization. To a certain extent the growth of sympathy may be, like the growth of all feeling, merely a result of the growth of activities realized. If we want people to have similar feelings, for example, we have usually only to get them to act alike. Again, if we want to get one individual to entertain an altruistic feeling for another, it is notorious that one of the best ways to accomplish this result is to get that individual to do something for the other. In human history, altruistic feeling has often lagged behind and been an accompaniment or resultant of altruistic activity, rather than otherwise.

We have pointed out, however, that sympathetic feeling may have, and usually does have, a very real part in the initiation of altruistic activities in human society. For in man, activities of many sorts are gone through imaginatively before being realized in actual practice. Thus feeling may select in advance the impulse which at some future time may be developed. Sympathy in human society, in

other words, develops largely through the imagination and the understanding. Hence the expansion of our consciousness of mental and moral similarities and identities between ourselves and our fellow human beings has much to do with the expansion of our sympathies. While not inevitable, sympathy is apt to arise spontaneously between those who perceive their mental and moral resemblances, or who understand their similarities in nature and in destiny. The growth of intelligence through the accumulation of knowledge and the expansion of the consciousness of kind through such knowledge have been very largely responsible for the expansion of sympathy and altruism in the modern world. Put in concrete terms, our sympathies have expanded, not simply with the expansion and growing interdependence of our economic life, but also with growing knowledge of our fellow human beings, and especially of their likenesses in nature and in destiny to ourselves.

Another element must not be overlooked, however, in the expansion of sympathy and altruism in human society, and that is the influence of ethical religion. All the ethical religions have insisted upon the essential kinship of all mankind, and at the same time upon the essential oneness of men in moral condition before the deity. Christianity especially has made the sympathies and sentiments natural to the family group the standard for moral and social practice. It has made the bonds of sympathy, love and altruism, which are naturally characteristic of the family, the ideal bonds which should unite all humanity. In scientific fairness, therefore, we must say that the religious sanction given to such standards by ethical religions has been one very powerful factor in the development of modern humanitarianism, or in other words, in the growth of that fund of altruism with which our civilization has become equipped and which, as we have already said, is the chief basis for the largest hopes which one may reasonably en-

tertain for the humanity of the future. If sympathy and altruism are important in human society, it is evident that they are not beyond control, but that they may easily be cultivated.

We would emphasize, in conclusion, that from the standpoint of social psychology the most important element in human progress, after the development of reason, is the development of a humanity-wide sympathy and good will. Indeed, these two are, from one point of view, of equal importance in the social progress of the future. Rationality and good will must go together in any well balanced progress that is to remain stable. Why, then, it may be asked, with such a development of both altruism and rational knowledge as apparently exists in the modern world have these not worked out better results than those we see? The reply is that they have not been brought together and made to work together. It is only when rationality is placed in the service of good will and when good will is rational that we may expect the best social results to follow.

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CHAPTER XII

SOCIAL ORDER

THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL ORDER. By social order we usually mean something not strictly synonymous with social organization, or even social solidarity. Rather we refer, when we use this term, to the ideal aspect of social organization or social unity. By social order, we mean a settled and harmonious relation between individuals or the parts of a society. The problem of social order has therefore, largely, a practical and ethical outlook. It is not a problem in pure science, but rather an application of the theoretical principles which we have been considering. The problem is: How can relationships between individuals, classes, and even nations and races become settled and harmonious? To answer such a question we shall need knowledge of the principles of social psychology; yet it is evident, also, that we shall be dealing more or less with questions in social ethics.

It is evident in the first place, that all of the factors which shape social organization or affect social solidarity must enter more or less into this problem of the determination of the conditions which make for settled and harmonious relationships among individuals. Hence, in a certain sense, we have already discussed in the preceding pages the problem of social order. In many cases, indeed, we have already pointed out the bearing of certain factors, such as instinct, habit, tradition, imitation and sympathy, upon social order. The student should, therefore, review all that has been said concerning the working of these different factors in association, in order to see clearly how each of

them affects the problem of social order, or harmonious social relationships. Harmonious coördinations between individuals, we have already seen, are brought about by favorable conditions in the physical environment, by similarity of biologic constitution, by similar instincts, habits, feelings and ideas in individuals. Such social order as exists in the lower types of social life, below the human level, for example, is almost entirely an outcome of the effect of geographical conditions, biologic constitution, and similar instincts and habits in the individuals of the group. These same agencies have of course been powerful influences to bring about harmonious coördinations in human groups. The settled and harmonious relationships in savage groups are very largely the result of what we call custom, tradition, folkways — all of which, of course, are forms of acquired habit. But in all human groups we also find at work to maintain social order something we do not find at work in any animal group, namely, conscious means of social control, especially as elaborated into regulative institutions. In all human groups, in other words, there is more or less conscious and deliberate means used to coerce and control the individual. These means become organized into activity complexes which have been reflected upon and more or less consciously sanctioned by the group as a whole. The social order of human groups is, therefore, in a sense artificial. It is not simply the natural, or spontaneous order springing from instinct, habit, sympathy and imitation; but rather, there is added to these natural factors a great deal of conscious reflection and purpose on the part of the group. This is shown by the fact that the "mores" of even the most primitive human groups are held by them to be necessary for social welfare. In the complex social life of man it is evident, then, that something more than the spontaneous order arising unconsciously from the working of similar instincts, habits and feelings

has been necessary to secure settled and harmonious relationships among individuals. That something more is the "institutions of social control"; and while we have already considered these in their bearing upon social unity, we shall need to reconsider them briefly in order to see their significance for social order.

Social Order and Social Control. The growing complexity of social life, as social evolution advances, calls for ever increasing means of control over individual character and conduct, if conflict between individuals and classes is to be avoided and settled and harmonious relations among all the activities of the group achieved. To secure a high degree of social order in civilized human groups is, therefore, very largely the problem of increasing the efficiency of their regulative institutions. But just at this point a difficulty emerges. For it is evident, as we have already pointed out, that the control of individual character and conduct may be such as to prevent normal social changes and so block social progress. Order may be gained from such control, but it is at the expense of normal social development, and the price is too costly; for, as we have already pointed out, such a procedure is bound to result in social disaster. Moreover, another difficulty is to get the individual to conform his habits to the requirements of the social life without stirring up his instinctive antagonism and opposition to restraints upon his behavior. Just how the compulsion shall be applied to the individual to get him to conform his habits of thinking, feeling and acting to those of his group, is the practical problem of social control which has confronted all human societies. The answer given historically has varied all the way from the most brutal means of despotic governments to the most subtle control through suggestion and education.

When the social psychologist considers the need of social control, and at the same time the original nature of

the individual, he is not surprised to find either the many failures made by human institutions in their efforts to solve this problem in the past, or the many individuals in the complex social life of the present who have come to take a purely negative attitude toward some, if not toward all, of the institutions of social control. This completely negative attitude, taken by some individuals toward some regulative institutions, is no doubt in the main due, as we have already pointed out, to the natural revolt which springs up in individuals against abuses which have been connected one way or another with such institutions. Nevertheless, as we have seen, all social organization is necessarily more or less compulsory in character. Human society, from the start, has involved more or less conscious attempts to discipline individuals and to standardize conduct; and as the social life increases in complexity, society's means of discipline and control over individuals must increase, instead of decrease, if social order is to be maintained. For it is evident that in a very complex social life, the adjustments which the individual is required to make, in order to coordinate his life harmoniously with that of his group, are so difficult that they require an increasing degree of collective supervision and control.

Now the chief regulative institutions which have been employed to bring about harmonious social adjustments in the past are, as we have seen, government, law, religion, morality and education. Are all of these institutions needed at the present time in order to secure the high degree of social order which civilization requires? Or may some of them be dispensed with? Further, how may they be so organized and made to work as not to become impediments to social progress? Let us again take up briefly the function of each of these great regulative institutions in securing and maintaining social order; and let us see, in a very general way, how ideally they should be organized, in ac-

cordance with the principles of social psychology and sociology.

Government and Law as Means of Social Control. From one point of view government may be regarded as the chief regulative institution of human society, in that as an agency to enforce law it must be the last resort in controlling conduct in any group. While beginning probably as a means of control in time of war, government has tended to absorb, to some degree at least, all the other regulative institutions of society. Some social thinkers of the present would apparently have it absorb and direct all social activities. Such an extension of the functions of government would be impracticable, and would probably be dangerous, even if practicable, because it would overcentralize the system of social control. Nevertheless, as the chief regulative institution of human society, the functions of government, as Mill said, are "co-extensive with human interests."

Negatively, the functions of government and law are those of social restraint, to enforce certain social inhibitions and to inflict penalties for their violation. But it is a great mistake to think of government mainly in terms of its "police powers." Positively, government and law exist to harmoniously coördinate and integrate activities of the members of a group, first, with reference to securing internal order, and then with reference to social welfare generally. They are organs of adjustment, standing above the individuals, classes and minor institutions of the group, functioning to adjust the relations of all of these, so as to secure justice to all and to promote the welfare of the whole group. It is evident that as soon as we emphasize these positive functions of government and law, we can no longer think of these institutions as merely static. They exist to secure social order, but they need not interfere with social progress, especially not in their democratic forms. It is evi-

dent, too, that one of the great practical problems of the social life is how to increase the efficiency of government and law as regulative agencies, and that this problem is far from solved in modern civilization. The best of modern governments can scarcely be said to be adapted to the work of securing a high degree of social order and justice among the conflicting elements of our complex industrial civilization. The New World especially has lost, in part, its tradition of the place and importance of government and law in the social life. The nations of Europe, on the other hand, may seem in some cases to have overexaggerated their place and importance; but even their governments are far from efficient as organs of social justice.

On account of the tendency of all social groups to be egoistic and to regard themselves as ends in themselves, human history shows that government may easily be so developed as to be inimical to the establishment of a truly harmonious order between the classes within the nation, or of a harmonious world order among the nations. For it may champion the selfish interests of one class at the expense of all others, or of one nation at the expense of humanity. This is the chief source of the abuses of government. But, as we have tried to show, it need not necessarily be so. Government need not be the triumph of the selfishness of one class over the selfishness of another. For in its essence, as an organ of social adjustment, it stands above the contentions of individuals and classes. Nor need the government of any particular national group be opposed to the establishment of a harmonious world order. For the socio-psychological principle that loyalty to one group need not weaken, but may rather strengthen, loyalty to a greater group, of which the smaller group is a part, makes it possible that government within a nation may be easily made to serve the life of humanity. However, in democratic nations, it must be admitted, a government above

mere class or national egoism is practicable only on the condition that the individual voters are dominated by ideals of patriotism and of the service of mankind rather than by mere selfish, class or national interests. It is apparent, then, that ideal government itself must be built up through other means of social control.

Will government be less and less needed as social evolution advances? Is it "a necessary evil"? Is the anarchist ideal of no government the one to which our knowledge of social evolution points as the social goal? Such questions, answered often affirmatively in the nineteenth century, betray an utter misunderstanding of the nature of human social life. Government and law instead of being less needed in the future, will become more needed, even though social progress continues and the development of individual character keeps pace. For the more complex adjustments required in the social life as social evolution advances need increasingly efficient means of control over individual and group behavior. The whole view of the social life which modern psychology has developed leads to this conclusion. That government is not best, therefore, which governs least, but rather that which governs most; provided it does so in socially wise ways, so as neither to destroy individual initiative nor to block normal social change.

But government and law by themselves are inadequate means of social control in all human societies. The control which they can effectively exert must be largely over external acts. They cannot control the attitudes, motives and intentions of individuals, and all attempts of governments in the past to control these directly have ended, as we have seen, in social disaster. Government and law do not go deep enough to secure the highest type of social order, or in fact any type which is adequate for the social life of the present. Their control is too crude and external, too late

in beginning with the individual, and too intermittent in their pressure upon him. We may safely conclude, therefore, that government and law are effective as means of social control in proportion as they support, and are supported by religion, morality and education.

Religion as a Means of Social Control. Among all peoples and in all ages, religion has been a powerful means of social control, because it adds a supernatural sanction to conduct. The individual needs to have the values and standards of his group impressed upon him in the intensest way if they are to control his behavior effectually. This religion can do, because it gives a universal meaning and sanction to those values and standards. It is, as many able writers on religious psychology have shown, essentially a projection of social values into the universe. Thus it gives to these values a character of universal and absolute validity which makes them more effectual in controlling social behavior.

Negatively religion presents itself as a form of social constraint. It especially associates itself with all the "taboos" or prohibitions of the social group, or of its dominant class. It invokes the fear of supernatural agencies who will punish the violators of these prohibitions. It is a method of reënforcing habits of action which have been found to be safe by the group, or which are believed to conduce to group welfare. It lends itself easily, therefore, to maintaining a given social order, and it is easily exploited by a dominant class in their own interests. This conservative aspect of religion has been perceived and emphasized by so many writers that some have tended to ignore its other social aspects. It is this which has often made religion an impediment to progress and an instrument of class oppression. On the other hand, it is this aspect of religion which has led even writers of strong anti-religious bias to find in it, though uncritically, the analogue of instinct in the

animal world or of gravitation in the physical world.[1] In any case, religion everywhere and especially in its lower phases, manifests itself as a harmonizing and order-preserving element in human groups.

But it is a mistake again to think of religion mainly in terms of its static or conservative aspects. Progressive religions are, to be sure, exceedingly rare in human history, taking it as a whole. But there is no necessity of this in the higher stages of cultural evolution. Religion, as a valuing attitude toward the universe, can as easily attach its sanction to behavior and to ideals which are progressive as to those which are static. The higher forms of religion, the idealistic religions, become, therefore, instruments of social order in a higher sense than merely sanctioning an existing order. They attach their sanctions to moral and social ideals beyond the existing order of things. The intimate connection between the higher religions and social idealism is shown psychologically in many ways. For example, these religions have, for the most part, gotten their ideals from the family life; and as we have seen, social and moral ideals in general come from the intimate personal forms of association, such as the family. In general, religion is, as we have said, a projection of the ideal values of the social life. If these values are conservative, then, of course, religion becomes conservative, even to the extent of becoming a stumbling block to progress. On the other hand, if the ideal values of a community are progressive, then religion, too, will become an instrument of progressive social order. It is not that religion creates progress, but it may sanction it. However, we should remember that those religions which stimulate the altruistic impulses and feelings of the individual do lay a foundation for social progress. They make possible higher types of social order in which the

[1] Compare Ward: "Pure Sociology," p. 133.

relations between individuals will become more harmonious because more sympathetic. It is evident that in proportion as religion sanctions altruistic conduct on the part of the individual, in that degree it helps to harmonize the relations among individuals and to secure the establishment of a just social order. It is evident, also, that if we wish an harmonious order among all individuals, classes, nations and races, we must have a religion which will sanction preëminently those values which attach themselves to the life of humanity as a whole; that is, we must have a humanitarian religion. As we have already pointed out, such religion is a powerful aid in promoting good will among men, and so in the establishment of an ideal social order.

Incidentally, also, the higher religions are favorable in other respects to social order. They give a fuller meaning to life, encourage hope, and so strengthen endurance in suffering, preventing social pessimism and degeneracy. Above all, sane religion strengthens loyalty to high social ideals, and so increases stability of character in the normal individual, which in turn makes for harmonious as well as stable relationships among individuals.

It is no part of the business of social psychology to pass upon the truth or falsity of any religious belief; but as a science it cannot ignore the social effects of religion. Are these socially favorable effects which we have just pointed out only incidental, and can they be just as well secured by some other means of social control? So far as social psychology can discover, there is no substitute for religion as an instrument of social control. Man must have confidence in his world, he must have faith in the system of things, if he is to work harmoniously with that system. He must believe in the possibilities and the value of life, if his energies are to be fully released. He can not believe that the universe is a "fool's house" which will make his highest endeavors but foolishness in the end, without coming to

despair of social idealism. He is under psychological necessity, in other words, of projecting his values into the universe, and this as we have said, is essentially the religious attitude of mind. But the values projected are social values, and when thus universalized by religious feeling they come into consciousness again with reënforced validity and intensity. They thus become as standards more effective for the control of social action. It is no accident, therefore, that religion has been so intimately connected with social order throughout human history, to the extent that the decay of religions has usually been associated with the decay of particular types of social order.

The belief that society in the future will be able to do without religion rests, then, upon about as unsatisfactory a psychological and sociological basis as the belief that society will be able to do without government. Religion will become more necessary as social life becomes more complex, for the reason that there will be more necessity for social control; that is, greater need of reënforcing social values in just the way which religion does. One of the gravest and most disturbing signs in the social life of the present, therefore, has been the decay of effective religious belief. Hence too, one of the greatest practical needs of present social life from the standpoint of social order is a religion adapted to the requirements of modern life. Much has still to be done, evidently, to secure such a religion; for narrow ecclesiastical forms and religious beliefs which are predominantly theological rather than ethical in their content, are still the rule in the modern world. What is needed is a socialized religion, a "religion of humanity," which will make the service of man the highest expression of religion. It is only just to add that the higher forms of Christianity have been developing rapidly in this direction.

The Church, as the concrete institutional expression of the religious life, so far from being an outworn institution

in society, evidently has before it a field of social usefulness such as never existed in any past stage of social development. As the organized embodiment of the religious life of the people, it ought to be the public conservator and propagator of ideal social values. This means that it must become largely an educational institution, "an ethical culture society" in the best sense, a society where the highest ethical culture is given to all who come within its influence. Until we get in every community a church which is thus effective socially, we cannot expect to maintain a high type of social order.

Morality as a Means of Social Control. As we have just implied, religion secures its social effects chiefly by giving sanction to the ethical standards of the group. What we have said regarding the social value of religion has been indirectly, therefore, an argument for the need of ethical standards or ideals as a means of social control in human society. No social order, so far as we know, has ever long existed in any human group without being based upon some accepted moral standard or code of the group. "Mores," or socially sanctioned forms of conduct, are coextensive with human society. The moral, indeed, is nothing but the social raised to an ideal plane. Proper moral ideals and proper moral practices, or virtues, of themselves would guarantee, in the long run, the harmonization of relationships between individuals. But the moral ideals are often one thing, and the social or moral practices another, and one of the constant problems before human society is how to get these two things to coincide. It would be a step toward this end if we could secure the general recognition of the fact that virtue does bind men together in harmonious relationships; that without loyalty, honesty, veracity and justice, for example, between men, there can be never anything more than a shabby semblance of social order.

Moral codes and standards, therefore, while they may

seem to be largely negative and in the nature of social inhibitions, are nevertheless the positive basis upon which social order rests. Even the very fact that these codes and standards change from age to age proves to the social psychologist their intimate connection with social order; for it is clearly evident that they are instrumental to maintaining social order under given conditions. Higher types of morality are needed, therefore, as the social life becomes more complex. The virtues that suffice for a population living under relatively simple conditions of life are found to be no longer adequate under more complex conditions. Moral standards have to be continually raised to secure the higher types of social order needed as civilization advances. The problem is again how to secure a corresponding rise in the level of moral practice in the group. Increasing population, with increasingly complex relations of life, will probably try our civilization far more than the pressure of population against natural resources, unless the higher moral practices required by more complex social conditions can be secured.

A step in securing them would be the universal recognition of the social importance of morality, that it is synonymous with ideal social order. As long as the Nietzschean doctrine that morality, especially altruistic morality, is an impediment to progress is countenanced, we must expect grave social disorders to result. The amoralistic tendencies of the present age are perhaps the gravest sign of all of social decadence. Morality instead of being less needed as humanity advances, like all other forms of social control, is more needed. Only it must be a morality which is not merely static and conservative, but which keeps pace with the changed conditions of social life. The problem of the present is how to expand our narrow class, national, and racial morality into a morality which is truly humanitarian, which will put the claims of humanity above those of any

minor group. To secure the recognition of a completely universal morality, the principles of which shall be regarded as binding in all human relationships, is a first step toward ending the social disorders of the present.

To find a system of ethics adequate to support our complex civilization and to secure the general acceptance of such a moral code, is certainly one of the greatest scientific and practical issues before present society. What system will accord best with the results of social psychology and sociology? The hedonistic system of morals, or the ethics of pleasure, is very obviously antisocial and anarchistic in its effect upon society. It works toward individual gratification rather than toward social conservation. It is essentially destructive, therefore, of social order. This has usually been seen by the more careful social thinkers. On the other hand, "self-culture" ethics has often been commended as in accord with the demands of social progress. But self-development, or self-culture, may easily become regardless of the welfare of others, and when it does so, it becomes as essentially antisocial as hedonistic ethics. Self-development, as a moral ideal, has too frequently worked in modern civilization toward social exploitation for the benefit of special classes and privileged individuals. An individualistic ideal of self-development must also be, then, condemned from the standpoint of social order. Both the hedonistic and self-culture ethics of the nineteenth century accordingly must be considered as inadequate to meet the needs of our complex civilization.

It is evident that only a system of ethics which will state the moral ideal in social terms will be adequate to secure the highest type of social order. In other words, *the moral ideal must be pictured, not as a perfect individual, but as a perfect society consisting of all humanity.*[1] This means

[1] Compare Adler's article, *International Journal of Ethics,* Vol. xx, p. 394.

that we must have a socialized or humanitarian ethics which will teach the individual to find his self-development and his happiness in the service of others and which will forbid any individual, class, nation, or even race from regarding itself as an end in itself, apart from the rest of humanity.[1] It is only such an ethics which will prove adequate to put an end to the series of endless conflicts between classes, nations and races which the modern world is witnessing. Such a system of ethics would be both constructive and synthetic from the social point of view. It would be constructive, because it would tend to preserve and develop all the values connected with world-wide social order and progress. It would be synthetic, because it includes all elements of permanent value in human social life. It includes, for example, the ideal of self-development, because the development of the individual in accordance with the requirements of a progressive social life is the first condition for the realization of such a moral social ideal. It also includes the happiness of the individual as a necessary element in the moral ideal, for the most harmonious social life can be secured only when reënforced by agreeable feeling. Thus the ethics of service, or humanitarian ethics, is synthetic of all that is worth while in the hedonistic and the self-culture ideals; but it avoids the social dangers inherent in those ideals because it emphasizes, not self, but humanity. From the standpoint of the psychology of social order, only such a system of ethics may be commended. It alone can secure that high development of sympathy, understanding and altruistic activity which is needed in highly complex types of social life if harmonious relations among individuals, classes, nations and races are to be preserved.

But systems of moral codes and moral standards are

[1] For brief reading on socialized ethics, read Chapter V in the author's "The Social Problem."

important in society only in so far as they affect individual moral character and conduct. It is stable individual moral character of a high type upon which ideal social order must rest. The problem, therefore, remains of how this high type of individual character can be produced.

Education as a Means of Social Control. Human character, in so far as it is not a matter of heredity, is formed mainly in the plastic periods of childhood and adolescence. Personal education, therefore, furnishes the ultimate and most subtle form of social control because it controls the formation of habit, and so of character, in the developing individual. It must be the main reliance of civilized human society in securing high types of social order. If properly carried out, personal education should furnish to the developing individual at the plastic period of life a controlled artificial environment, especially a subjective environment of the proper ideas, ideals, standards and values. It can, accordingly, mold individual character in almost any direction which heredity makes possible. It can undoubtedly secure more difficult forms of social adjustment than can government, law, religious or moral sanctions, acting upon the adult individual. It can, moreover, more easily function to secure a *progressive* social order than any of the other great means of social control; for government, law, religion and even moral codes tend to become static. So, too, under certain conditions, do educational institutions; but in theory, at least, education can as easily adapt itself to a higher social order which should be, as to any social order which exists.

Of course, the education which can achieve all this will be something far different from the individualistic education of the nineteenth century, or the commercialized education of the present. It must be a thoroughly socialized system of education, which will coöperate with, and have the coöperation of, all the other regulative institutions of

civilized society. Government and law, religion and morality, must work through education to have their full social effect in sustaining social order. On the other hand, education must work to conserve these great instruments of social order. A socialized education, indeed, is not to be thought of as separate from these other means of social control so much as simply a method by which the other means may be more successfully realized.

A high degree of social order in the great civilized communities of the present evidently demands that all of these five means of social control be brought to their maximum state of efficiency. They are far from reaching such a state as yet in any civilized nation. This is in part owing to social indifference and ignorance; but it is also in part due to the growth in modern civilization of negative doctrines regarding these regulative institutions. These have become widespread in Western nations and are a real impediment to securing and maintaining a high type of social order. While such doctrines doubtless arose in the main from the abuses of government, law, religion, morality and education, yet it is time that scientific students of our social life should maintain in no uncertain terms that *the only question before our civilization is the types of government, of law, of religion, of morality and of education which will be best suited to our social needs. To any one who understands the real nature of our social life, the question cannot be, therefore, as to which of these means of social control we can best dispense with.* As long as purely negative doctrines regarding any or all of these institutions prevail in Western civilization, we cannot expect that they can be brought to a high state of social efficiency, or a high state of social order achieved; for the constructive efforts of those who see their value in the social life will be blocked by the destructive efforts of those who refuse to acknowledge that they are necessary means of social control. It

is, of course, too much to expect that such social regulative institutions will ever become universally popular with all individuals; for they trench too much upon the natural egoism of the individual; they are felt by him too much as instruments of restraint rather than of development. Hence a further problem for the social psychologist is, as we have already indicated, how the positive and constructive sides of these regulative institutions may be made evident to the individual. To some extent this is undoubtedly being done, but the problem would seem to be in the main still one to be solved. It is only education, among these means of social control, which has become thoroughly popular among the masses in some modern nations; and it has become popular, it must be confessed, oftentimes through giving up its character as a means of control and appealing to the individual only as a means of selfish success in life. However, the popularity of education is at least an indication that it is not impossible to popularize also the serious business of government and law, religion and morality. What is evidently needed is that these institutions should be more understood from the point of view of their social meaning and purpose. A socialized education must evidently attempt to give a social view of these institutions.

Mental Homogeneity and Social Order. Among the social thinkers of the present, Professor Giddings has especially emphasized that a stable social order must rest upon like-mindedness. That he is essentially right in this view has been clearly implied in our discussions in previous chapters. If social order of any sort, indeed, is to be achieved there must be fundamental likeness among individuals in those primal elements of human nature, the instincts and the impulses. There must also be fundamental likeness and agreement in acquired habits. There must also be sympathy and mutual understanding between all the members of the group. A natural, spontaneous social or-

der, as we have already said, rests upon fundamental similarity in these psychical processes in individuals. But in the more complex human groups there must also be similarity and agreement with regard to the more fundamental standards and ideals of life. The higher types of social adjustment between individuals, as we have seen, rest upon and are mediated by coördinating ideas and feelings. A stable social order of high type, therefore, depends upon agreement, similarity, in the ideas, ideals and standards of the individuals who participate in the social life. This has, indeed, been quite fully implied in all that we have said regarding the necessity of mutual understanding, mutual trust and confidence among individuals in high types of social life.

However, differences as well as similarities among individuals are necessary and advantageous in complex society; and this Professor Giddings fully recognizes. Differences of a certain sort, as well as similarities, conduce to harmony of relationships between individuals. If there were no differences in the ideas and behavior of individuals, we should have no variation in the social life and hence no progress. No one, therefore, can question the value of differences in ideas, ideals, standards and conduct in the progressive societies of the modern world. Perhaps, in certain ways, we need to appreciate more the value of these differences and to be more tolerant of them. They have value not only for social progress, but for social order. In all human groups, from the family to great civilizations, differences are valuable as well as likenesses; only these differences must be of such a sort that they will fit together in an organic whole. They must, as we have already said, be in the nature of complementary differences.

But all of this does not detract from the importance of mental homogeneity, or essential mental and moral re-

semblance in the make-up of individuals, for social order. It is undesirable from the standpoint of social order that individuals should be mere copies of each other in their mental and moral make-up, if such a thing were possible. But on the other hand, there is an extreme social disadvantage in too great differences between individuals in their mental and moral make-up. There must be essential resemblance if there is to be any harmonious coördination of their activities. When ideas and standards of life are too far removed from each other, they involve conflict in the resulting habits which they represent. When, moreover, these ideas and standards relate to fundamental conditions, there can be no doubt that their disharmony is radically opposed to the development as well as to the maintenance of any high type of social order. Auguste Comte was perhaps the first sociological writer to emphasize this fact. He pointed out that the instability in institutions and social disorder of his time were largely to be attributed to the disagreements which existed in social life concerning fundamental things. Hence he declared that "stability in fundamental maxims is the first condition of genuine social order."

The present age has still to learn the full importance of this social truth. With Comte, we must say that no stability in our institutions can be assured as long as the present strife between ideas, ideals and standards of life continues. People are now, not infrequently, utterly divided regarding the most fundamental values of our social life. But in the main, there would seem to be only one reliable method of bringing them into lasting agreement regarding these things; and that is, through the development of the sciences which deal with our social life. It is the task of social science to settle upon the basis of fact and rationality these disagreements in opinions and ideas among individuals. If there is no hope through science of bring-

ing men to more unanimity and more genuine unity in their opinions regarding the values and ideals of life, then there is also no hope of any high, harmonious type of social order emerging from the strife of the present. Of course, science alone in practice cannot bring about this desirable unity with regard to the ideals and standards of our social life. The truths of science must be applied by government, law, religion, morality and education in the actual work of life. Nevertheless, the work of science in establishing standards which must be accepted by all rational minds, because they rest upon established facts, is in a sense fundamental; and among the sciences dealing with the social life, the work of sociology is particularly important, because it deals with the most general and fundamental relations of individuals. When science fully recognizes that its social task is this work of correcting erroneous opinions and standards on the one side, and of synthetizing ideas and values so that the true view of human life shall clearly emerge, we shall not lack sufficient like-mindedness in society, nor ultimately a high and stable social order.

Conflict and Social Order. The place of conflict in the social life in relation to order may need a further word of discussion. A certain school of sociological writers, in recent years, have tended to make conflict a normal if not an ideal element in all social life. There is no objection to this view, if nothing more is meant by conflict than the normal competition between individuals, interests and ideals in the social life. Such conflict is not inconsistent with social order of the highest type. It is a struggle indeed, as a rule, for higher and more advantageous adjustments, and usually results in good both to the group and to the individual. There is an element of necessary conflict in all social change and adaptation, as we have seen. It is upon this basis of conflict or competition between individuals,

habits, ideas and standards that selection is made. A progressive competition between interests, ideals and institutions in society must be considered, therefore, a necessary method of progress in no sense opposed to social order.

But those who glorify conflict in the social life do not usually mean this normal competition of life. They mean by it rather the primitive, unregulated struggle between individuals and groups, or what we might call, "absolute hostility" between individuals and groups. Now conflict in this sense is not only opposed to social order, but is indeed the antithesis of social order, because there can be no settled, harmonious relations between individuals when conflict of this kind exists. As we have already pointed out, conflict of this sort is an abnormal element in the social life, marking the breakdown of a normal social adaptation and reversion to a primitive brute-like level. Such conflict, to be sure, may issue in social order, and even in social order of a higher type, through the elimination of lower types of individuals or groups. But this is a primitive method of securing order which it would seem that modern civilized societies might advantageously dispense with. It is a brutal and unnecessary method, because the socializing and civilizing agencies of the present are sufficient to secure rational social adjustment without resort to such means. Brutal and unregulated forms of conflict should not be tolerated, therefore, within the pale of civilization. They often defeat, as we have seen, the very ends for which they are employed. Instead of resulting in a higher and better social order, they are apt to prove so destructive of the higher social values that they result in more or less reversion toward the social forms of barbarism. There is, therefore, little hope of a higher type of social order issuing from a brutal struggle of classes. The same thing must be said regarding any form of unregulated struggle

or conflict in society between either individuals or groups. As long as war between nations lasts, and as long as settled antagonism and hatred between classes and races exist, there can be little rational ground for hoping for the permanency of any high and stable social order. Such social conflict is a negative and destructive element in the social life, and its predominance would be simply the sign of social dissolution. Perhaps the greatest task before the civilized societies of the present is, accordingly, to put an end to the lower and more brutal forms of conflict and competition between individuals, classes, nations and races, and to firmly establish among them social peace and harmony.

But how can this be done? Our argument, in substance, has been that it can only be done through the development of rationality and good will throughout human society. But if such a development were itself wholly individual there would be no guarantee of its persistence. To become effective for social order, good will must be organized. All human communities have found this to be the case in establishing any sort of social order. We may reasonably conclude that the same will hold true in any attempt to establish a world-wide social order. The good will that exists among civilized nations must be organized if world-wide peace is to become even half way assured. So also within the nation and even within every community there is need of more organization of good will, if social peace is to be assured among classes. While this organization may be achieved perhaps in part through voluntary agencies, it would seem most economic and efficient to use the agencies of social control already in existence to organize this good will. We come, therefore, again to the conclusion that in the higher civilization social order is quite entirely dependent upon the efficiency and organization of the means of social control.

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CHAPTER XIII

SOCIAL PROGRESS

THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL PROGRESS. Social progress is not strictly synonymous, as we have seen, with social evolution or change. Progress implies an amelioration of the conditions of human life. A theory of social progress is, therefore, outside of the limits of strictly pure science, since such a theory looks to the practical. The theory of progress is as much ethical as sociological, and perhaps the sociologist and social psychologist must leave to ethics the final determination of what social progress is. But the former sciences have certainly much to do before ethics can construct the final norms for determining progress. The differences between progressive and retrogressive social changes, the factors at work in each and the possibilities of their control, will have to be determined largely by sociology before ethics will be ready to set up its standards for social progress. Moreover, as we have repeatedly said, there is no rational ground for any absolute separation of the work of the various social sciences when it comes to these points where their work naturally and logically overlaps. The ultimate motive for the development of all the social sciences, and indeed of all science, is practical. Sociology and social psychology would be far from "socialized" if they did not have a forward and practical look. What light can they shed upon the social changes of the future, upon the direction of those changes and upon means of controlling them? In particular, what is the relative importance of the human and of the nonhuman

factors in the social changes which we judge progressive? Can the human dominate the nonhuman so that man's social destiny may be said to be, to some extent at least, in his own hands? That is, can social progress be rationally planned and controlled? If sociology cannot give some sort of scientific insight into these questions it is certainly, as Ward long ago insisted, one of the most useless of all sciences;[1] for why should we study social evolution unless it be for the sake of controlling social evolution? And why should we seek to control it unless we can get some relatively definite scientific criterion as to the direction which it should take?

It is hardly necessary to tell the student that this whole book has been an endeavor to furnish a scientific basis for answering these questions. We have tried to show that sociology is vitally related to human life and destiny, and that this is particularly true of its psychological phases. Practically all that has been said, therefore, has a bearing upon the theory of social progress. We have tried to show how the foundations for man's social progress were laid in his organic nature, especially in his superior intellectual capacity. We have seen, also, that the native impulses and feelings of the individual, especially the so-called altruistic impulses and feelings, have been indispensable conditions of social progress. We have seen how the slow accumulation of tradition in the shape of knowledge, standards and values, has been the basis for each successive advance that humanity has made; how imitation has served to diffuse and generalize inventions and progressive adaptations throughout mankind; how the expansion of the consciousness of kind, sympathy and altruism have made possible wider and more harmonious coördinations among individuals and groups. Our *whole* theory of social progress

[1] "Dynamic Sociology."

must, therefore, be sought by the student in all the preceding chapters. Nevertheless, there remain certain conceptions to clear up, and certain positions to summarize.

The Conception of Social Progress. We shall attempt no formal definition of social progress. It is not anything which can be defined once for all in a few set phrases. Social progress depends upon change, but manifestly not all changes in society are progressive. What changes do we call progressive? Professor Hobhouse has said that social progress means "the growth of social life in respect of those qualties to which human beings attach or can rationally attach value." [1] But what are the social changes to which we do or should attach value?

For one thing, we generally call those changes progressive which, on the whole, aid humanity in mastering physical nature. Mechanical inventions, economic prosperity and the like, are considered marks of progress because they are usually judged to be the means of man's mastering physical nature, and therefore serve better to adjust him to his environment. Discoveries within the realm of physical science are likewise regarded as indications of progress, for the same reason. But we also call changes in political conditions and in moral standards which make for more harmonious relationships between individuals and groups progressive. They aid in man's mastery over himself and his social environment. New means of coöperation, new social relationships which harmonize better the interests of individuals and reduce conflict among them, new knowledge of human nature or of ways of living together, are rightly regarded as progressive because they mean increasing mastery by man, not over physical nature, but over himself and his social relationships. Social progress implies for

[1] "Social Evolution and Political Theory," p. 8. Chapters I and II of this book are recommended to the student for collateral reading on the theory of progress.

one thing, therefore, this double mastery of man over physical nature and over himself. It means a better adaptation of social groups to the requirements of their existence, and adjustment to a wider, more universal environment. It means greater capacity, therefore, of society, of civilization, to survive. It means greater efficiency in carrying on the common life — greater capacity for, and greater development of, coöperation. Finally, it means greater harmony in the relationships of individuals and of groups. Social progress, in the long run, therefore, includes all movements which make for the social survival, the social efficiency and the social harmony of mankind.

Some sociological writers have made the chief criterion of social progress increased complexity of social organization. But it is doubtful if increased complexity of social structure has any close connection with progressive social change. It is entirely conceivable that there might be increasing complexity of social structure, with decreased capacity for social survival, social efficiency or social harmony. Such a purely objective conception of social progress is not adequate for scientific purposes, even though we acknowledge that increasing complexity of social organization has, in general, marked the changes which we call progressive. Other sociological writers have claimed that social progress consists in the increase of the division of labor and of interdependence in the social life; but the criticism which we have just made of the conception of progress, as increased complexity of social structure, applies also to this conception. More sociological writers have, however, given an entirely subjective definition of social progress. They have claimed that it may be adequately defined in terms of the increase of human happiness; that it consists essentially in passage from a state of general hardship, fear and discomfort, to a condition of general comfort and happiness; in passage from a "pain

economy" to a "pleasure economy."[1] We would not deny that true social progress must ultimately work for the greatly increased happiness of mankind. But such a subjective criterion of progress cannot be accepted, as increased happiness is at most only one element in the conception of progress. Popularly, of course, such a hedonistic criterion of social progress would be readily enough accepted; but from the general theory of feeling which we have presented, it is evident that, scientifically, an increase of happiness in social life can be regarded only as an incidental outcome of progress, an accompaniment of the processes which make for progress, but not a certain criterion of progress.

Our conception of social progress must evidently take humanity rather than smaller social groups as its subject, because if the relations between all human groups are not harmonized, if humanity as a whole does not show greater efficiency in mastering itself and its environment, and so greater capacity for survival, progress will defeat itself. There may be, of course, relative social progress within smaller social groups; but unless the results of this progress are gradually diffused throughout humanity, they cannot be permanent. Progress requires better adaptation to a *universal* environment, and this means that humanity must be its subject. The conception of social progress which we finally come to, then, is that of: *increasing adaptation to the requirements of social existence which shall harmonize all factors, whether internal or external, present or remote, in the life of humanity, securing the greatest capacity for social survival, the greatest efficiency in mutual co-operation and the greatest possible harmony among all its varied elements.*

Accepting provisionally this conception of progress, the

[1] Ward: "Dynamic Sociology," Vol. ii, p. 161; Patten: "Theory of Social Forces," Chaps. IV, V.

question then arises: what factors determine that changes shall be progressive rather than retrogressive in their nature, and how may these factors be controlled? This question has been discussed to some extent by pretty nearly every social thinker from the time of Plato down to the present. Pretty nearly every theory of progress has been set forth, but most of these theories have been what we may call unilateral, that is, they have been based upon the perception of some single factor at work in progressive social changes. We cannot review all of these theories, but it is necessary before attempting to set forth a sociological theory of progress to pass some of them briefly in review.

The Anthropo-Geographical Theory of Progress. Certain social thinkers have found the active causes of human progress in certain favorable conditions and crises in the natural physical environment, such as in the conditions of climate, soil, food, topography and the general aspects of nature. Perhaps no one has ever believed that these geographical conditions are adequate alone to explain human progress; but certain thinkers would make these conditions the preponderant or determining ones. Buckle, in his "History of Civilization in England," gave a classical expression to this view. He endeavored to show that indirectly physical conditions operating upon economic conditions would determine social progress. The geographical conditions in Europe, favorable for man's mastery of nature, he argued, have been the prime factors in the development of European civilization, and for that reason, no high development of civilization which would be permanent could be expected outside of Europe. Other writers of this same general school have held that climatic conditions which stimulate the energies of men are the prime causes of progress; or that the conditions of food supply in relation to men's needs especially determine progress.

Food supply, they say, is the immediate stimulus which gives rise, through efforts to control it, to invention and discovery and all control over nature. Food supply, moreover, determines the size of the social group, and this reacts upon its culture. The equation of food and population offers, therefore, when its full reactions upon the social life have been examined, the explanation of the really significant movements in human history.[1]

That favorable conditions, and also crises, in man's natural physical environment do play a part in his social development, there can be no doubt, and we have tried to point out briefly, but carefully, just what their part is in the social life process.[2] But the anthropo-geographical theory of progress is too simple to show all of the active factors at work in social progress. If it were an adequate explanation, it is not unfair to say that the geographical conditions should make progressive societies out of hordes of apes, or even herds of lower animals. Progressive social evolution does not always take place when physical conditions are favorable, nor have the most favorable physical conditions, in the past, prevented social retrogression. The civilization of Greece and Rome went down, but their geographic conditions did not appreciably alter. The geographical determinists in general have failed to show any definite and certain connection between changes in climatic and geographical conditions and well known historical progressive and retrogressive social changes. In the early history of human society, however, the dependence of progressive change upon geographic conditions is more marked,

[1] Recent discussions of the bearing of geographic conditions and food supply upon the social life will be found in Semple: "Influences of Geographic Environment"; Huntington: "Civilization and Climate"; Woodruff: "Expansion of Races"; Buckle's famous Chapter II remains, however, the best collateral reading to begin with.

[2] See Chapter II above.

and, as we have already pointed out, both favorable conditions and crises in the physical environment have certainly played a large part as stimuli in developing human civilization. The natural physical environment is, of course, the framework within which man's social evolution has taken place, and there can be no doubt that through selection, habituation and stimulation, it has been a very large factor in social evolution; but in itself, it is quite inadequate to explain social progress.

The Biological or Ethnological Theory of Progress. Many social thinkers have held that the determining factor in progress is that of race or biological constitution.[1] Quite evidently the anthropo-geographical theory neglects this internal factor of blood or biological make-up. From the standpoint of biology this theory evidently has a great advantage. For modern biology would explain the difference in the life of various species of animals mainly through their biological constitution. Why should not this theory, then, explain quite adequately the difference in the life of various human groups?

There can scarcely be any question, considering all that we know of biology, that racial heredity counts in social evolution; that even the biological make-up of individuals enters very largely into social reactions. This we have already pointed out, and we may acknowledge, with the eugenists, that without sound physical heredity there would be but little hope of continuing human progress. We cannot admit, however, from our scientific evidence that the more extreme advocates of the biological theory of the social life are right, when they claim that the quality of civilization is entirely determined by the matter of breed or race.

[1] An early work along this line is De Gobineau: "Inequality of Human Races," the essential ideas of which have been used in many recent works, such as Chamberlain: "Foundations of the Nineteenth Century" and Grant: "The Passing of the Great Race."

Admitting to the full the importance of individual and racial heredity, this theory is inadequate to explain social progress, because human groups have so much in their collective life, as we have already pointed out, which does not come to them in a biological way. We have seen that so much is acquired by each individual in his lifetime, and that tradition plays such a large part in handing down the achievements and possessions of the past, that the biological constitution of the individual does nothing more than furnish the potentialities of progress. The child is born a savage, or rather a mere animal. All that he does in the way of strictly human social development is a matter of individual acquirement. His biological constitution, therefore, can furnish only the basis upon which his social progress takes place. Doubtless this foundation must be sound if a sound superstructure is to be reared; but racial progress and social progress are two very different things. This we can see plainly enough when we compare the conditions of European society to-day to the conditions four thousand years ago. The biological conditions of the European peoples four thousand years ago were, so far as we know, not different from what they are today, except that probably the heredity of the various stocks was somewhat sounder. During the four thousand years, social progress in Europe has been enormous. But we have no right to speak of any corresponding biological development. The physical constitution of our early European ancestors evidently furnished the potentiality of progress; but as it has not changed within that period, it cannot be regarded as the active factor in the many progressive and retrogressive social changes that have taken place.

If neither race nor geographic environment are sufficient to explain social progress when taken alone, why are they not adequate when taken together? One answer is that race and geographical environment are among the most sta-

ble, unchanging factors in the social life. For thousands of years they have not appreciably changed in Europe, and yet social progress has been enormous. It will not do, therefore, to say that the races of men are like trees, each bringing forth the fruit of civilization in due season in accordance with its nature and environment. Such a statement implies psychologically and sociologically a misunderstanding of the whole nature of social progress. It implies a simple, organic conception of the social life, rather than a cultural and psychological conception. Psychologically and sociologically there is no evidence to sustain the belief that civilization and progress are the result of the coworking of merely two factors, race and geographic environment. Rather both of these, even when taken together, merely furnish the potentialities for social progress.

The Economic Theory of Progress. The most popular theory of social progress in history and in the social sciences at the present time is the theory that progress depends upon economic conditions; that is, upon the conditions of the production and distribution of material goods. This theory may be considered to be the dominant theory not only of social progress but of social evolution in the social thought of the present time. Its popularity is undoubtedly mainly due to its advocacy by the Marxian socialists under the name of "the materialistic conception of history"; but its spread and acceptance have been aided not a little by the work of certain economists who have advocated the same theory under the name of the "economic interpretation of history."

The original statement of the theory, in the words of Marx, was that "the method of production of the material life determines the social, political and spiritual life process in general."[1] With Marx, the theory was essentially one

[1] Marx: "Critique of Political Economy," Author's Preface (translation by Stone), p. 11.

of the determination of consciousness by the material conditions of the social life.[1] The methods by which the means of subsistence were produced and distributed in society, he argued, would determine the ideas and standards of the social life in the long run. Hence all other social processes are intermediated and controlled by the economic process. Government and law, religion and morality, for example, are only superstructures reared upon the basis of economic conditions, and in the long run will change with these economic conditions. Social progress is, accordingly, mainly a matter of the method of getting a living, of the method of gaining the material means of subsistence, as Marx said. In the hands of Marx and his followers this doctrine was converted into a revolutionary instrument; for the practical inference which they drew from the doctrine was, of course, that if economic conditions are made right, other social conditions will spontaneously right themselves. This is the form in which this theory is popularly held largely, at the present time, as a theory of social progress.[2] The masses have come to believe that a just economic order

[1] It is perhaps unnecessary to point out that, from a psychological point of view, "economic determinism," in order to qualify as an adequate scientific theory of social evolution, must prove itself to be an adequate theory of the determination of consciousness (and its associated neural processes) by the material conditions of the social life. This it has not yet done, and it must be doubted if it can do so for many reasons; among others: (1) because of the active nature of consciousness with its centrally initiated processes (see Chapter III); (2) because of biological variations springing from the forces resident within the organism; (3) because of the part played by native impulses in determining interests and so ideas (see Chapter IX). For further criticism read the writer's article on "Marx's Economic Determinism in the Light of Modern Psychology," in *American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. xvii, pp. 35–46.

[2] Even Ward practically indorses the theory in this form when he says that the spiritual part of civilization "does not need to be specially fostered" ("Pure Sociology," p. 18). His theories in general, however, contradict this view.

which will assure an economic surplus to every one will prove to be the key to human progress which has so long been sought in vain; and a large number of scientific social thinkers, who should be more critical, apparently agree.

In recent years, the economic determinism of Marx has been combined with the Darwinian theory. It is said that all man's progress comes in the form of adjustment to his environment, and that, as a matter of fact, the environment to which he adjusts himself at the present time, so far as it is not merely geographic, is economic. Our system of industry and its technology, in other words, furnishes the environment to which adjustment must be made by individuals and groups of individuals. Selection, whether natural or rational, must work upon the basis of this environment. There may be variation, but in the long run the social life must conform to the material basis of its existence. Thus economic determinism issues with a new dress, clothed, so to speak, in the robes of the Darwinian theory; and proclaiming that the norm to which social adjustment must be made is that of the economic system in effect in social life at any particular time. Our only hope of social progress lies, therefore, in changing the economic system which is the norm of adjustment in social life at any given time.

That there is much psychological and sociological truth in this theory, our discussions in the preceding chapters have sufficiently indicated. There can be no doubt that much of the stimulus for social change comes from crises and maladjustments in what we might call the system of social "maintenance," in other words, our economic system. There can also be no doubt that that system does furnish at any particular moment an environment which demands and even necessitates more or less conformity on the part of individuals and groups living within the system. Thus our economic or industrial order does furnish the

great framework, the main outlines, of our civilization. For understanding the main distinctive features of our civilization, or of any civilization, we must turn, in a great degree, to its technology and industrial organization. Admitting all this, the question still remains, is this an adequate theory of social progress? Can we accept any such purely objective explanation as scientifically adequate? In other words: *are the psychological factors mere reflexes, in the long run determined by objective economic conditions?*

One reason why this theory has not been subjected to adequate criticism on the part of psychologists and sociologists probably is the vagueness of the word "economic." Practically everything in life has its "economic" aspects. Not only do objective "goods," technologies, and conditions of living fall under the caption of "economic," but also interests, desires and ideas. Thus the theory may become a confused jumble of objective and subjective factors. However, the more scientific advocates of the theory state it mainly in objective, environmental terms; that is, that the system of industry and technology at any given time is the basis upon which all else in the social life builds itself up as a superstructure, and which in the long run determines the whole social life. This corresponds also with the popular statement of the theory which we have noted above; namely, that if objective economic conditions were made right, other things in the social life would spontaneously right themselves. The "other things" in the social life, in other words, are considered more or less of a reflex of objective economic conditions. It is this theory which we shall undertake to criticize as a theory of social progress.

It is evident from our statement that this theory of progress includes important factors overlooked by the two preceding theories; but it is also evident that it is not in accord with some of the fundamental principles of social

psychology. It regards the organism as passive rather than as self-active. The mind is regarded as a more or less passive reflex of the environment, instead of an active instrument of adaptation. Ideas are determined by the environment, according to this theory, and not, as we have seen, by both original human nature and the environment. The organizing and creative, or constructive, tendency of the higher phases of the mind, such as reasoning and imagination, is quite left out of account. Moreover, the most important source of the ideals and standards of the group are the interrelations of the members of the group, and these are primarily personal and social rather than economic. As Cooley says, the source of the primary ideals is the life of the primary groups, such as the family and the neighborhood.[1] These groups are found everywhere, in all stages of industrial development; and hence along with original human nature they dominate the more intimate standards and ideals of the social life far more than the industrial system.

In other words, the primary adjustment which the individual has to make in human society is not an adjustment to things, but to other individuals; and the norm of adjustment is not to the economic system, but to the social environment as a whole. If this were not so, we should expect to find material civilization developing in advance of language, religion and moral systems; but as a matter of fact we find these latter significant things in society developing, not infrequently, in advance of the system of physical maintenance. Thus anthropology clearly shows, for example, that language got its development much in advance of systems of technology. The Bushmen of South Africa, for instance, have a very elaborate language with a rich vocabulary; but their system of technology and of

[1] See "Social Organization," Chap. IV.

industry remains but little in advance of that of primitive man. Again, human history shows that very often in the history of the world, people's moral, religious, artistic and scientific ideas change in advance of their systems of industry. Thus the Jews apparently reached the stage of henotheism, if not of monotheism, while they were yet in the pastoral stage of industry. On the other hand the reverse proposition is also true, that peoples not infrequently in history have changed their methods of getting a living without changing their fundamental moral and religious ideas. Thus the Chinese have remained ancestor worshipers down to the present, even though they have left the pastoral stage of industry behind for two millenniums or more. There is thus no such exact correlation between the different phases of the social life as economic determinism presupposes. *Socially accepted ideas and standards are not necessarily reflexes of economic conditions.*

It is, however, true that the social life must remain a more or less harmonious unity. While different elements of some sorts will fit together, others will not. Hence a change in the method of getting a living frequently does necessitate extensive readjustments in the whole of the social life. Perhaps the same cannot be said for changes in scientific knowledge or in moral, religious or artistic standards. Nevertheless changes in these things are apt also to bring about changes in the whole social life. Our habits of response to certain classes of stimuli affect, in other words, to a certain extent our habits of response to all other classes. This is because of the unity of individual personality and of the interdependence of all phases of the social life. But while it follows that the economic phases of the social life must affect to a very great degree all other phases, it does not follow that they determine them in any certain way, or to any such extent as the economic determinists have thought. Social psychology leaves the doc-

trine of economic determinism, in the sense that economic factors absolutely or preponderatingly determine the whole of the social life, without adequate scientific foundation.

But, it may be asked, is not the economic factor in the social situation the one that changes, and, consequently, the one to which we must look for the explanation of progress? The reply is, that it is not the only factor which changes, and that changes in other factors are often antecedent to changes in technology and industry. As we have seen in Chapter IX, the processes of invention and discovery are those by which the material aspects of human culture have been built up; and these processes, while dependent upon general social conditions, are nevertheless essentially psychic and personal in their nature. The factors in the objective economic situation act as stimuli, but as we have seen, psychology does not find external stimuli in the environment to be the full explanation of any response. To quote again what we said in Chapter IX, "The work of the intellectual centers of the brain of man in inventing tools, weapons, labor-saving devices, improvements of communication and transportation, and in discovering the laws of phenomena and the properties of things, has been the real basis upon which the structure of civilization has been reared." And of course we must remember what we have repeatedly said, that these intellectual centers are not concerned alone with things and with men's relations to things, but with the relationships of men to each other, with standards, ideals and values of every sort. The real motive force for social progress, then, lies within the individual and within the social mind of the group, and not in the objective conditions of the physical environment.

But this conclusion does not exclude the view that there is a certain justification for the predominatingly economic character of the social consciousness of our time. For we must admit the entire dependence of all higher forms of

civilization upon economic conditions. In a sense, the dependence of man upon economic conditions increases as civilization advances; for with the growth of technological and industrial systems, the economic environment comes to have a good deal of the same relation to civilized man that the geographic environment had to primitive man. In other words, the type of civilization becomes absolutely dependent upon economic conditions. Like the physical environment, the economic system presents the platform upon which social progress must continue. But, also like the physical environment, the economic system is not so much a rigidly determining element as the basis upon which we act. It furnishes certain conditions and certain stimuli to development in certain directions without which a right development of the whole social life would be impossible. It is unfortunate, perhaps, that the emphasis upon the importance of economic conditions in our social life should just now be obscuring the importance of many other factors; but there can be no question, from the standpoint of social psychology, but that before many of the higher mental and moral adjustments can be successfully made in our social life, economic conditions will have to be made favorable to these adjustments. This may be only a preliminary step perhaps in true social progress, but *it is a step which must be taken before we can have a humanity adjusted to the requirements of its social existence.*[1]

Hence the sociologist and social psychologist must be heartily in favor of all those social reforms which aim at securing economic justice in our present society. He must be in favor of removing those social and economic inequalities which hamper the normal physical, intellectual and moral development of the individual. He must favor, in other

[1] For additional reading as to the importance of the economic element in social progress, read Chapter IV of "The Social Problem."

words, the securing to each individual of the economic minimum which is necessary for right living and social efficiency. He may heartily unite with social workers in approving such movements as that for compulsory insurance against the contingencies of life, such as sickness, accident, unemployment, old age and invalidity; the movement for a minimum wage sufficiently high to make possible a human standard of living; the movement for labor legislation which will protect the worker against accident, disease and too long hours of labor; the movement for reforms in our present system of taxation, such as will furnish adequate revenue for social needs and at the same time serve to distribute wealth and to remove social inequalities. All these and many other economic reforms are necessary preliminaries for the highest degree of social progress. The industrial poverty which characterizes our civilization ought to be abolished, and there is no reason why it cannot be without social revolution. Full recognition of the importance of psychological factors in our social life does not lead, then, to unduly minimizing the real importance of objective economic conditions. It leads us rather to see that material progress is only one step, though a necessary one, in general social progress. When the material conditions of life have been properly cared for, there still remain mental and moral adjustments to be made, without which even material progress will not be secure; and which, indeed, must be made to keep step with material progress if civilization is to realize any harmonious development. It is the overlooking of this fact which makes the economic theory of progress psychologically, to some extent, a danger in present society.

Psychological Theories of Progress. The geographical and the biological theories of progress emphasize what we may call the nonhuman factors; for they are largely beyond human control. To a certain extent, this is true also of the economic theory of progress, especially when stated

in its most rigid form. For the succession of methods of getting a living and of technologies is also little amenable to human control.[1] The psychological theories of progress, on the other hand, because they emphasize the instruments of social adaptation which lie within human control, bring out clearly the human factors in social progress.[2]

We have already seen that man's higher intellectual capacities have been the distinctive factor which has made human civilization possible; and that the development of man's intellectual life, through the accumulation and progressive rationalization of knowledge, has been the chief factor which has enabled him to master physical nature and to control his own nature. In other words, the changes in man's ideas, standards and values have been the chief factors in his social progress. But it may be asked, what has determined these changes in ideas, standards and values? And why are such changes frequently unfavorable rather than favorable to real social progress? The answer to these questions has largely been given already in the preceding pages. But we may briefly recapitulate by reminding the reader that, so far as science knows, the intellect is the supreme instrument of adaptation in the social life; that like all instruments of adaptation, however, it may at times function inadequately; that we may expect it to function more adequately just in proportion as it perfects itself through the accumulation of knowledge and its rationalization. Functional psychology shows us, then, the element of truth in the so-called ideological theory of progress. It shows us that human history is not primarily a movement of ideas,

[1] In Marx and his followers, indeed, they are not infrequently represented as succeeding each other with inevitable, and almost mechanical, necessity.

[2] The adjective "psychological" is, perhaps, not well-chosen to designate such theories. We mean theories which make progress determined by some one or more psychic factors; whether ideational, affective or volitional.

but of activities wherein ideas function, both perfectly and imperfectly, to secure adjustment. The intellect does not work, then, in a mechanical way, nor is the movement of ideas a purely logical one, as some social thinkers have tried to make out. Rather the intellect and its ideas are human instruments of adjustment, but as instruments *they are the means by which social progress can be rationally planned and humanly controlled.* Hence the scientific program of accumulating and rationalizing knowledge and of socially organizing and directing intellectual activities as a basis for furthering progress is not a chimerical one, but rests upon a solid foundation in psychology and sociology. Hence, also, the importance of recognizing the intellect as the active factor in social adaptation and progress.

The success of movements against alcoholism in modern society will serve to illustrate our point. Without any change in geographic environment or biological conditions and without any radical change in the economic system, but simply through the accumulation and diffusion of knowledge regarding the physiological and social effects of alcohol and the inculcation in the young of standards and habits corresponding to such knowledge, the most progressive societies of the present seem about to sweep away the use, if not of all, at least of the stronger alcoholic beverages. If by the accumulation and diffusion of knowledge and the inculcation of corresponding standards such a revolution can be brought about in the long-standing mores of civilized nations regarding alcohol — mores defended by privilege and by vested interests — then there is every reason to believe that rational changes and adaptations in every phase of the social life can be effected by the same means.

Moreover, the recognition of the intellect as the active factor in social adaptation, and one which is susceptible of more or less social control and organization, need not lead to leaving out of account other factors, both psychic and non-

psychic. The increase of sympathy and good will, we have seen, for example, is as necessary for better social adjustments, as the accumulation and rationalization of knowledge. A purely intellectualistic theory of social progress is, perhaps, as dangerous and one-sided as any of the theories which we have discussed. Knowledge must be transformed into standards, ideas into ideals and values, right emotional attitudes must be developed, before stable social progress can be effected. But the means of manipulating these, psychology shows us, is again through the intellect or through such changes in the objective environment as rational judgment directs. We may cordially admit, therefore, that progress depends upon the accumulation of a fund of altruism, or of altruistic sentiments, as well as upon the accumulation of scientific knowledge; but the latter factor will aid the development of the former. There is, as we have seen, no necessary antagonism between rationality and altruism in society. The one can and should be made to aid the other.

From the psychological standpoint, the means of social manipulation and control of the psychic factors in our social life becomes the question of supreme importance for social progress. This means lies undoubtedly in the educational process. Probably the greatest service which Professor Lester F. Ward rendered to the social sciences was to demonstrate, once for all, that education was the initial means of progress in human society. Ward showed that it was through education that we must hope to control opinions, beliefs, ideas, standards, and so, actions in the social life. He regarded education, however, as meaning simply the diffusion of information. While his thesis might be doubted if one accepted the narrow meaning which he gave to education, we cannot doubt it if we accept the larger conception of education which has been worked out by educational science; namely, as the whole process of controlling the

formation of habits and character in the individual. The key to progress certainly lies in the psychic adjustment of individuals to the social life, in the "social attitudes" developed in the individual; and such adjustment is a matter of education in the broad sense. It is, of course, more than the education of the intellect, or than any education which the school has thus far offered. It is the education of the whole man, fitting him for participation in the social life in the way most advantageous to the future of humanity. Such an education can be provided only through the coördination of all of the educational agencies of society. But the school may justly be regarded as the chief and the center of these agencies for controlling the formation of habits and character, the ways of thinking and of acting, of individuals. Society must find means of coördinating with the school such other educational agencies as the home and the church, the library and the public press. Education must become the organization of all the means of the psychic adjustment of the individual to the social life. Such education would truly become the initial means of controlling social organization and even physical development. It would be a consciously directed and controlled social evolution. We know that the civilization of the past has been handed down from generation to generation always essentially by educational means. While it may be passed along to the new generation in a static way, and so become a bar to progress; yet, as we have already said, education may become as easily the instrument of progress. For it is exactly at the point of the transmission of the acquirements of the past from one generation to another that there is greatest opportunity for improvement. Methods and processes of education have largely determined the social progress of the past; they can even more largely determine the social progress of the future.[1]

[1] For brief reading on the bearing of education on social progress, see

But the educational theory of progress is, we observe, essentially a theory of the method rather than of the causes of social progress. Education is a method through which the various factors in progress, especially the psychic factors, may work. When we attribute great importance to education in social progress, we do so because human experience has shown it to be an effective means of the social manipulation and control of ideas, standards, values, of habits of thinking and acting, and indirectly even of industrial processes and biological conditions. It is through education that progressive ideas in government and law, religion and morality may be focused upon the young, and so determine their development. It can furnish, as we have seen, a sort of artificial environment for the development of the individual, to prepare him for a higher order of life. But, if we do not accept Ward's conclusion that the mere diffusion of correct information, or of scientific knowledge, alone will accomplish this, the question still remains: What will give a socially progressive direction to education and to all of the ideas, standards and values which it brings to bear upon the developing individual?

The Sociological Theory of Progress. It is evident that to get an adequate theory of social progress, we must transcend the strictly psychological viewpoint. For our theory of social progress must include all elements and factors in progress. It must be not unilateral, but synthetic. *The sociological theory of progress,* in other words, *must find a place for favorable physical and geographical conditions, the biological factors of heredity and selection, the economic factors of the production and distribution of wealth, and the psychic factors of knowledge, standards and emotional attitudes.* For we need in human society, not only better bodily health and better economic conditions, but better thinking, better mutual feeling and better mutual will for

Chapter XVI of Ellwood: "Sociology and Modern Social Problems."

social progress. A sociological theory must show how all of these work together to produce progress. But more than this, it must show how, so far as they are susceptible of social manipulation and control, they may be given artificially a socially progressive direction.

So far as the psychic factors are concerned, it is clear that they must be given the direction of enlarged and increasingly efficient and harmonious social organization if they are to work consistently toward social progress. In other words, it is the *socialization* of the intellectual elements of knowledge, beliefs and standards, and of emotional attitudes and values, mainly through socialized education, which will make them work progressively. This means, in effect, that they should be directed toward the harmonious adjustment of the total life of humanity. *It is only ideas, standards and values which are capable of serving as instruments of the increasing social coördination and coadaptation of the largest possible human group — humanity as a whole — which are capable of working consistently in the direction of social progress.* Through the socialization of these psychic elements, moreover, there is every reason to believe that industrial and even biological processes also may be socialized; that is, they will be so directed as to realize the largest human good for all.

In practice, the sociological theory of progress means that we must get rid of narrow one-sided movements and developments in our social life. Our civilization is obstructed and menaced by one-sided development, one-sided efforts at reform, narrow group movements, aiming only at the good of particular classes or groups. All of these one-sided movements are of course based upon one-sided theories of social progress, such as those which we have just discussed. They rest upon the perception of the importance of some single element or aspect. But no true progressive policy which will be lasting in our civilization can be secured by

such one-sided movements. Indeed, as we have already said, they present a grave danger, because they give rise to ill-balanced views of the social life and to exaggerated and inharmonious developments. We shall not be able to secure any social progress which is worth while, until social policy is broadened so as to give duly proportionate attention to all factors in the social life. *This means that our social movements must be synthetized if any sort of satisfactory social adjustment is to be reached, and that they must all be given a humanitarian direction rather than a direction favorable simply to one class or group.*[1]

Practically, also, the sociological theory of progress points to the enlargement of our social consciousness as the proximate means of progressive social development. The hope of human society, in other words, lies in the development of its own social self-knowledge; that is, in the development of scientific knowledge concerning every phase of the social life and concerning the social life as a whole. It is through such scientific study and investigation of the social life that the value of each of its phases as a factor in progress must become apparent. And it is through the bringing together and the synthesis of all this knowledge in the science of sociology that the social life as a whole will become intelligible, and so subject to rational control. The perfecting of the instruments of social progress depends, therefore, largely upon the development of the social sciences. Such development is clearly necessary, not only to aid social progress, but even to avoid social catastrophes. Humanity will be able to secure rational control over its own destiny only with the fuller knowledge of human nature and human society which the development of the social sciences can give to us.

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[1] For the development of further details in the sociological theory of progress, read Chapter VI of Ellwood: "The Social Problem."

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CHAPTER XIV

THE NATURE OF SOCIETY

The knowledge which social psychology and sociology furnish us of the social life should lead up to a general theory of the nature of society. All that we have said has, indeed, had such a theory in view. What, then, shall we conclude to be the nature of society from the discussions of the preceding pages? Three great historical theories of the nature of society have been held by the social thinkers of the past, and all of them are to some extent still held by thinkers of the present. These theories are the contract, the organic and the psychological theories of society. Other theories of the social life than these three are of course possible; but as a matter of fact, these other theories have gravitated in the direction of one or the other of the three great leading historical theories which we have named. Thus mechanistic theories of society have usually tended in practice to become either contract theories or organic theories. A criticism of these three leading theories should accordingly help us to get a general scientific view of the nature of society. Let us, then, consider these theories in the order of their historical development.

The Contract Theory of Society. Probably most persons who have thought about the social life at all have begun their thinking with what we may call a crude contract theory of society; that is, they have thought of the unity and forms of the social life as a matter of agreement or understanding between individuals. This theory is very old. It is indeed the first form which rationalistic thought,

as a rule, has taken regarding the social life. While it goes back in its beginning to early Greek philosophy, it became fully developed only in the hands of the legal and political thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The sociological thought of those centuries is very largely in terms of the contract theory. Such thinkers as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau each gave the theory a peculiar expression. The theory has not lacked defenders among modern sociologists. De Greef, the Belgian sociologist, finds the essence of society to consist in the phenomena of contract. All sociological thinkers who find that the social life rests fundamentally upon mutual understanding and mutual agreement should be ranked with the contract theorists.[1]

The essence of the contract theory is, then, that human society is primarily a rational and artificial construction, depending upon an expressed or implied agreement, explicit or implicit "contract," between individuals. It is the theory that human institutions are essentially arbitrary inventions, and that they can be made over by mutual agreement to suit the convenience of the parties in the "contract." All social organization is, according to this theory, an outcome of self-conscious relations between individuals, and these relations subsist only by virtue of the mutual consent of the parties thereto. For example, according to this theory, the form of government, or the form of the family, is dependent simply upon the mutual agreement and mutual convenience of the individuals involved, and these forms may be made over to suit the pleasure of the individuals concerned.

A modification of this theory is to be found among those numerous writers of the day who hold that while the origin of society and institutions was not in contract or mutual agreement, society and institutions should proceed to organize

[1] Fite: "Individualism" (Lecture IV) contains the most modern presentation of the contract theory. De Greef's views will be found in his "Introduction à la Sociologie," Vol. i, pp. 131–147.

at once upon the basis of contract. Mutual agreement as to the forms of the social life, if it has not been the basis of social order in the past, can and should speedily become so. Marriage and the family for example may not have been originally a contract, but marriage and family relations in the future should be simply of the nature of a contract.

Society is passing, these theorists tell us, from a condition of "status" to a condition of "contract." These theorists, of course, receive considerable support for their contention through the undoubted fact, which we have already noted, that the self-conscious and intellectual elements in the social life become more conspicuous and more influential seemingly as we advance in social evolution. This theory, then, presents "contract" not as the origin of society, but as its goal. The student should note, however, that even with this modification, the contract theory assumes that the social life may become, even if it is not yet such already, quite entirely an intellectual and artificial construction to suit the pleasure of individuals. The physical, biological and deeper psychological factors which make human institutions something more than mere arbitrary inventions are usually quite ignored by the contract theorists.

It is a frequent mistake to confuse the contract theory of society in some of its forms with a psychological view of the social life. The contract theory is, however, not a psychological theory of society in the proper sense of that phrase, but rather an intellectualistic theory; its basis is an individualistic theory of our mental and social life. It is to be sharply distinguished, therefore, even in its modified form from the psychological theory of society which we have attempted to set forth in this book. It generally neglects or discards as of no importance the biological, instinctive and habitual element in the social life, to say nothing of the great factor of coercive social control. It is, accordingly, a theory which is exceedingly favorable to

the making of arbitrary changes in social institutions, because it neglects the deeper, more fundamental factors in the social life. It was formulated very largely indeed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as an instrument of social revolution, and its prevalence today is largely symptomatic of the fact that ours is still a revolutionary age.

The whole view of the social life which modern psychology presents is opposed to the belief that human institutions are essentially rational and artificial constructions, or mere arbitrary inventions. We have tried to show that they are rather in the nature of adaptations to the requirements of a collective human life, which is growing ever more complex and ever expanding its dominion over physical nature. We are very far from denying elements of truth in the contract theory, however, especially as stated in its modified form. It is true, as we have seen, that the intellect of man plays an increasingly commanding part in all social adjustments, and that even the convenience of man can be better served as the laws of nature and of human living together are better understood. However, the contract theory fails to take into account in any adequate manner the factors in human living together which are beyond rational control, or not subject to man's mere convenience. These are, in a large sense, the biological factors, the factors which have made organic and social evolution. That is the reason why one must say that there can be no assurance of sanity in sociology and in social psychology without the biological viewpoint.

The contract theory of society, then, affords no explanation of human social life as we find it. As has often been pointed out, it presupposes that human society is made up entirely of normal adult individuals, each of high intelligence, capable of understanding and acquiescing in all of the regulations and organization which exist in a well-

ordered social life. That such a condition of affairs existed primitively is, of course, a ludicrous idea. Many people who see this do not see, however, that the contract theory affords no adequate ideal for human social life. They fail to see that the social life in its essence is not, and never can be, a matter of mere contract or convenience between individuals; that human living together must always, if it is to have any measure of success, be in accord with the more fundamental forces which shape life as a whole. These conditions and laws of living together are not man-made, they are not arbitrary constructions of the intellect. They must be understood and accepted. There is much more than mere contract, therefore, in the forms of our social life. A condition of "status" must always remain a part of the social life. Fundamental biological conditions and habit alone are sufficient to determine that, even if no external social constraint or coercive control existed. But these latter, as we have seen, are also necessary for organized social life. For example, marriage and the family life can never become merely a form of contract or of mutual agreement. The necessities of the birth and the rearing of children and the whole welfare of humanity at large prevent such a possibility; or rather if such a possibility could be realized, it would defeat all of the higher aims of civilization.

The Organic Theory of Society. A reaction from the contract theory of society is to be found in the organic conception of society. This conception grew up largely under the influence of the development of biological science in the nineteenth century. While its beginnings go back again to Greek philosophy, it came to its fullest and most consistent expression in writers, such as Spencer, who were dominated by the theory of organic evolution.[1]

The essential idea of this theory is the opposite of that

[1] For brief reading on the organic theory, see Spencer: "The Principles of Sociology," Vol. i, Part II, Chaps. I, II.

of the contract theory, namely, that society, instead of being a rational and artificial construction, is a product of organic evolution and so is essentially an organism. If it is not exactly a biological organism it is, in any case, essentially like a biological organism in its nature and construction. It is a growth which has come about through the operation of natural law. Like an organism it is subject to the same general laws of organic growth and decay. Its unity is in no wise different from the unity which we find in the biological organism; it is essentially a physiological dependence, such as we find between the parts of a biological organism. While there are differences between the social organism and the biological organism, according to the organic theorists, the points of resemblance are much more important than the points of difference.

Some of the organic theorists, such as Lilienfeld, held that these resemblances between biological and social organisms were more than mere analogies, but accurate scientific descriptions of the social reality.[1] In general, however, the organic theorists claimed that human societies presented only analogies to biological organisms; that they were not biological organisms in the strict sense, but were "super-organisms." Most of these theorists, however, regarded the social organism as a growth brought about by the operation of the blind forces of organic nature, but little subject to rational, human control. Such was particularly the view of Spencer, in whose writings it is not unfair to state that society appears as a sort of super-human structure which science might presume to describe but hardly to control. While Spencer did not draw the conclusion of a rigid predeterminism of the social life by nonhuman factors, he nevertheless came to take a *laissez faire* attitude toward the social life, as a natural or organic construction

[1] See his "Gedanken über die Socialwissenschaft der Zukunft," Vol. i.

which man could hardly hope to control successfully by interfering with its natural processes.

When the implications of a biological determinism or fatalism began to be perceived in the organic conception of society, reaction from it was inevitable. Many modifications of the organic theory arose. Philosophical writers undertook to interpret the view that society was an organism in a philosophical or psychological way.[1] Other writers like De Greef and Fouillée aimed to reconcile the contract theory of society with the organic theory by finding society to be essentially a "contractual organism."[2] These attempts at synthesis, however, were based not upon generalization from facts, but upon logical processes of reconciliation of antithetical theories, and hence they fell short of making a true synthesis.

As a reaction from the contract theory, the organic theory of society served a very useful purpose in the history of social thought. It emphasized the real connections between organic and social evolution even though it exaggerated them. It also emphasized the compelling nature of the unity of social life and the fact that social institutions are by no means arbitrary inventions. It set forth certain truths which the social sciences can never afford to neglect; namely, that human social life is a phase of all organic life; that in the social process biological processes and forces are fundamental; and that the unity and solidarity of society is an expression of the original and continuing unity of the life process.

There can be, of course, little objection to the use of the term "organism" in the broad philosophical sense to describe human social groups, if by it is meant nothing

[1] See especially Mackenzie: "Introduction to Social Philosophy," Chap. III.

[2] See Fouillée: "La science sociale contemporaine," Book II, Chap. III.

more than to emphasize the unity and interdependence of the social life. The word "organism" is in many ways the most apt philosophical term which we have to describe the unity of the social life. On the other hand, its use often suggests misleading analogies, and leads to wrong conclusions. In the hands of certain sociological writers it has become an instrument of social conservatism and even of the defense of absolutism in government. Moreover, the actual social life which we find in human groups is far from corresponding to the ordinary organic conception. Human social groups are made up of relatively independent, self-determining, self-conscious individuals, quite unlike in their nature, relations and behavior to the cells of a plant or animal organism. There are many conditions in social life which find no parallel in the strictly organic world. For example, individuals are often members now of one group, now of another, and even of many groups at the same time. As long as the national group was the chief object of attention in the social sciences, as it was in the "nationalistic" stage of sociology, it was easy to insist upon the many resemblances between a social group and a biological organism. But as soon as *any* social group is made a unit of investigation in sociology, it is quite impossible to keep to the biological analogy. Where the social organism, then, begins or ends, as Professor Ross has well said, becomes a puzzle. And the social sciences are, moreover, beginning to see that even the national group itself, except in our special period of history, has no such definiteness of form and structure and distinctiveness from other groups as the organic analogy presupposes.

We must, then, drop the organic analogy in the social sciences, at least in the form in which it came to us from the nineteenth century. The truth which it emphasized, however, that social groups are living, functioning unities whose basis is fundamentally biological, because they are a

part of the world of life in general, is a truth which objective social science will undoubtedly never discard.

The Psychological Theory of Society. It is the contention of this book that the psychological view of the social life offers a scientific basis for the synthesis of the elements of truth in both of these contending theories. It makes possible a true synthesis of the elements of truth in both of them, because it is a wider generalization which includes the facts in the social life which both have emphasized. The psychological theory of society is often misrepresented to be the imitation-suggestion theory, the sympathy theory, or even, as we have seen, the contract theory. Modern psychology, however, takes fully into account not only the strictly psychic elements in human behavior, but also biological conditions and forces. It takes account also not only of the organism, but of its environment. It would be absurd, therefore, to describe as a psychological theory of society a theory which was dominantly in terms of some one psychic element, such as imitation or sympathy, or even in terms of a whole class of psychic elements such as the intellectual. The psychological theory of society furnishes a basis for the synthesis of other theories because it is so broad. It would even quite misrepresent modern psychology to speak of a theory of the social life wholly in subjective or psychic terms as "psychological."

Nevertheless, the psychological conception of society is a distinct conception not to be confused with either the contract or organic conception. Like the organic conception it gives a fundamental place to the forces of organic nature, but, unlike it, it gives a large and increasingly important place to psychic factors as we ascend in the scale of social evolution. It makes a place thus for understanding in the social life such factors as imitation, sympathy, the intellectual elements and conscious social control. It has also a place for the influence of environmental factors, because

it sees the whole social life in terms of habit and adaptation. The psychological conception of society is thus not merely synthetic of certain biological and intellectual elements, but of all factors. It is, in fact, inclusive of all the factors which go in any way to make the social life of man.

Wherein, then, is the psychological conception of society distinctive, and what is its peculiar value? The reply is, that the psychological conception presents the social life as an adaptive process in which the psychic processes within the individual function as the active elements. It is the theory that the social life is a process, but a process made up essentially of psychic elements; that is, of forms of interstimulation and response between individuals, such as communication, suggestion, imitation, sympathy, conflict, and of psychic processes within individuals, such as instinct, habit, feeling and intelligence. It is the theory that the explanation of human social life, as we have said, is to be sought in the underlying traits and dispositions of men, in the influences of the environment which act upon their plastic natures, and in the resultant aims and standards which they develop. The social process, according to this theory, is not purely subjective, but is psychic only in the sense that its significant elements are psychic. More strictly, as we said in an earlier chapter, the social process may be described as a psycho-physical process of coadaptive adjustments among individuals; but as it is a process carried on by means of mental interaction between individuals, its significant elements are psychic.

The unity and the regularity which the social life develops is, accordingly, a unity and regularity which is upon the psychic plane. The coördinations or coadaptations between individuals, as we have seen, while they are coördinations of activities, yet they are intermediated by the feelings, ideas and standards of individuals. The continuity of the social life, too, is a continuity which is upon the psychic and not

upon a merely physical plane. It is a continuity mainly of acquired habit, even though it has an hereditary basis. It is a continuity maintained in human social life by passing on from generation to generation knowledge, ideas, standards and values. These ideas, standards and values have gradually accumulated and developed in human history from primitive man to the present. They are a set of inner mental habits acquired in ever increasing complexity by each succeeding generation. Human history thus presents itself as a growing tradition, and human society as a "social mind," which cannot be understood apart from its content, that is the particular ideas, standards and values which make it up. Thus the further we get away from the animal plane the less does a purely organic or biological way of looking at the social life suffice. Human culture is essentially a psychic matter, and the human societies that we know are creations of cultural evolution.

The cultural theory of the social life and the psychological are thus identical, except that the psychological is broader in its foundations, and makes a place for the conception of social evolution as something broader than cultural evolution. When we look at human society from the standpoint of its cultural elements, however, its folkways, its mores, its conventions, its public opinion, and its social mind, we are looking at it from an essentially psychological standpoint, if we recognize that these things are rooted in the psychic life and evolution of its individual members; and this we must do unless we are to separate our whole view of human society from the rest of established scientific knowledge. The cultural view of the social life thus blends with the psychological view as soon as we give it an adequate scientific foundation.

The social life is a process. It is a process of living together. But it is a process which we may well describe as psychical, because in carrying it on the psychical elements

of impulse, habit, feeling and ideation, and their expressions in communication, imitation, suggestion, sympathy and other types of mental interaction are the vital, constituent elements. It is a process, however, which is directed to the carrying on of common, though differentiated and integrated, activities. It therefore becomes unified on its psychic not less than on its physical side. Because the whole social life is intermediated by these psychic elements, it must be interpreted, if interpreted scientifically, in terms of interstimulation and response. This means, of course, that it must be interpreted in psychological terms. It is for this reason that we may justly claim that the psychological conception of society is in the last analysis identical with the sociological.

The psychological conception of society, moreover, has more than merely theoretical value. It answers the questions which men have asked as to how far human society can be modified and in what ways it can be most advantageously modified. It shows that the key to the understanding of social modifications is the nature of the individual. It is the social attitudes which the individual develops which make the social life. These attitudes, while rooted in the organic nature of the individual, are mainly a matter of habit. The problem of modifying the social life thus becomes essentially the problem of modifying habits in vast masses of individuals. Human society is modifiable, social psychology shows us, in the same sense and in the same degree which human nature is modifiable. It is not a "contract" which was made, or can be made over, to suit the pleasure of the parties thereto; neither is it a "machine of the gods" which men cannot modify by taking thought. Its organization and institutions, resting as they do upon habit, may be easily modified, within the limits permitted by physical nature and human nature, by changes in the environment both physical and psychic. It is the

psychic environment, however, or the "social mind," which counts chiefly in human society. The easiest approach to the modification of human society, therefore, is through the manipulation of the intellectual elements, ideas, standards and values, especially in the young. Their rational direction and control in the way of social advantage can certainly be counted upon to change the whole mass of habits, social attitudes, customs and institutions of society. The limits of the possibilities of such change, moreover, cannot be set. Civilization is just beginning, and when the civilizing process is rationally directed with an understanding of the principles of human psychology and sociology, social progress will be beyond anything which the world now dreams to be practicable.

The Individual, the Group, Society. To what practical conclusion do we come as to the relation of the individual to society, and of minor groups to the larger social life? We have seen that the individual and society are correlatives, and that there is no necessary antagonism in their development. The human life, which we know, is a social life, and the individual, whom we know, has gotten his development in and through the larger life process of which he is a part. Nevertheless, antagonism between the individual and society may and does develop, and a constant question in social ethics is how the interests of the individual and society may be reconciled. To emancipate the individual entirely from social control and constraint would be to make of him a mere animal, a sheer savage. The idea of developing the individual apart from the social life, and independent of it, finds no support in either psychology or sociology. A very large trend of nineteenth century thought, however, was in the direction of the development of what we may call a "superindividual." This idea was that a superior individual might be produced who would be beyond any need of social control. Thus could be estab-

lished a sort of anarchistic society, on a purely individualistic basis, made up of superior individuals, each a law unto himself in most, if not in all, the relations of life. Such a society, however, is an impossibility from the standpoint of social psychology. The whole movement to emancipate the individual from the burdens, obligations and restraints which society imposes upon him, must be regarded, therefore, as a mistake, provided of course that the obligations and restraints are for the total social welfare. The individual, however, has a right to demand that the obligations and restraints to which he must submit himself shall not be arbitrary, but shall be for the good of social life as a whole. This means, in effect, that the standards which society sets up and enforces through its customs and institutions should be, not arbitrarily, but scientifically determined, for the welfare of the social whole.

This leads us to the further perception, however, that human progress lies not in the direction of producing a superindividual or "superman," but in the direction of producing a superior society. The social values, in other words, are not carried by the individual alone, or wrapped up in the concept of personality; but they are also carried by institutional forms and inhere in the larger social life of which the individual is only a part. To pay attention merely to the development of the individual and his personality means often to overlook the value of institutional forms and of the larger life of humanity. It is for this reason that individualism, the movement which is concerned simply with producing the superior individual and which makes the individual alone the source and the seat of all social values, is a one-sided movement dangerous to society at large. It is a movement which must be transcended, therefore, if a true and stable social progress is to be realized.

However, while our civilization has been trying to tran-

scend individualism, a new and more insidious danger has developed, which we may call "groupism," the tendency to make some class or minor group the unit of development. Probably Western civilization will find more difficulty in transcending such "groupism" than in leaving behind individualism. That this tendency may produce even greater social disturbances than individualism, the world of the present bears witness. That groupism of any sort, however, whether it be of a class or of a nation, rests upon the same fundamental fallacies as individualism, must be evident. No class or group can be the bearer of all the social values, or even of a majority of them.

The unit of our sociological and ethical thinking, accordingly, must be neither the individual nor any minor group, but the largest human group possible, humanity. We started our discussion of social psychology, however, by defining society as any social group. But we now see that this conception can only be a tentative one for the sake of scientific analysis. Practically and ethically we are forced to regard society as *humanity viewed from the standpoint of its reciprocal relations.* The end of social development lies, then, not in the individual or in any minor group, but in the total life of humanity. Not the development of self, or the dominance of a class or group, but the development of humanity is the real end to which social science points as the only workable ethical and social ideal. But this ideal is synthetic of the two ideals just mentioned, so far as they can be justified, because it includes the development of the individual in accordance with the requirements of a progressive social life, and the development of all classes, nations and races who go to make up the whole of humanity. For the individual, the ideal of life becomes, according to this view, a life of service in which he shares in and strives to realize a higher life for all humanity. He is moral and social, in the fullest sense of those words,

in proportion as he merges his ends and activities in the total life of humanity. For the group, whether it be class, or nation, or race, the same ideal holds. Purely group morality must be transcended, and the conscious ideal of the group should be to serve the life of all humanity. Class or group consciousness must be replaced by a truly social consciousness, for groups exist not as ends in themselves, apart from the rest of humanity, but as parts of humanity. Like the individual, however, each group is the bearer of certain values, and should be given its due place in the total life of humanity. Thus, the humanitarian ideal, the ideal of a humanity all of whose parts are harmoniously adapted and coördinated so as to secure the highest degree of social harmony and efficiency and the greatest capacity for social survival, is synthetic of all subordinate ideals, giving to all of them their due place and value, but taking from them the danger necessarily inherent in them when given the first place in the social life.

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